as mars la tour

Battle of Mars-la-Tour

Discover this historical event.

Battlefield Anomalies

The battles of mars–la–tour and gravelotte/st privat..

“ C’est le general soldat qui a gagné la bataille de Solferino.”

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Introduction

Since I have already dealt with the political build up to the war between France and Prussia/Germany in 1870 in my article, ‘The Battle of Spicheren’, to be found on this site, I will not bore the reader by regurgitating the same information herewith. It is however necessary to spend some time examining the way in which both sides entered the conflict and what steps were (or were not) taken militarily by both belligerents prior to the conflict and during the first crucial encounters that set the tone for the entire campaign.

The French Army.

The Prussian victory over Austria at the battle of Königgrätz (3 rd July 1866) had come as a complete shock to Emperor Napoleon III and the French nation as a whole. Now there was no longer any manoeuvring room for Napoleon’s pipe dreams of armed mediation on the Rhine. Indeed, after resting on the laurels of the Crimea War (1853-56) and the Italian War (1859), it was found that, with the exception of the natural fighting spirit that resided in the French soldier, all else was sadly lacking. As Lieutenant – Colonel Baron Stoffel, French Military Attaché in Berlin, had been reporting back with astute accuracy:

August 1868. “ During divine service it is upon the King and the army the minister calls down, before all others, the blessing of the Most High. The great bodies of the State are only named afterwards….What a contrast with the position filled by the army in France, where it is but a mass of men, the outcasts of fortune, who lose every day more and more discipline and military spirit.”

August 1869. “The principal points that I seek to make are clear:

“(1) War is inevitable, and at the mercy of an accident.

“(2) Prussia has no intention of attacking France; she does not seek war, and will do all she can to avoid it.

“ (3) But Prussia is far –sighted enough to see that the war she does not wish will assuredly break out, and she is, therefore, doing all she can to avoid being surprised when the fatal accident occurs.

“(4) France, by her carelessness and levity, and above all by her ignorance of state affairs, has not the same foresight as Prussia.

Because of rapid mobilization and exceptional staff work, coupled with her adoption of a breech loading rifle, Prussia was able, with some element of luck, to defeat Austria within seven weeks in 1866. France, now realising that she was no longer in a position to demand anything in regard to compensation from her now powerful neighbour across the Rhine, began to take steps to increase the strength of her small professional army. This task fell to Marshal Adolphe Neil who became Minister of War in 1867. Niel’s proposed plan was to raise the numbers of the French army from its present 288,000 to one million. Over the next year and a half various proposals were put forward until a final working plan was accepted by the Corps Législaift which, despite grumblings about expense, gave 800,000 men in the front –line and a trained National Guard of 400,000 in reserve when mobilisation was complete. As McElwee states:

With apathy among the people towards the Empire setting in it was felt that it would be unwise to change the old method of mobilisation. Regiments were generally posted to garrisons far from their recruiting zones for fear of any political problems occurring in the vicinity of their depot area, thus a double journey had to be made on mobilisation from their garrison back to their depots to take in any reserves and draw war material, and then from the depots to the Concentration Area, all of which caused severe problems on the already overstretched French railway network.

That the French army Intendance lacked organisation, and was at best a hastily improvised affair, is made glaringly obvious by a telegram sent by General Michel, who was the commander of a cavalry brigade (later of the division) attached to First Corps, Army of Alsace (later Army of Châlons) stating, ‘ Have arrived at Belfort. Can’t find my brigade. Can’t find the General of Division. What shall I do? Don’t know where my regiments are.’ And again, on the 27 th July, Leboeuf, now Chief – of –Staff to Napoleon, sent a message to General Félix Douay, commander of the 7 th Corps inquiring, ‘How far have you progressed with your formations?’ ‘Where are your divisions?’ No one had informed Leboeuf that Douay was still in Paris performing his duties as an Imperial aide–de–camp. When that general arrived at Belfort the next day he replied to Leboeuf in a slightly irritated tone:

Although a work of fiction, The Debacle, by Emil Zola, gives the reader a wonderful impression of the chaos that rained within the French army during the war of 1870. Zola interviewed many veterans of the campaign as well undertaking meticulous research, and since the book was published in 1892, the events he describes had to be carefully explained as there were still politicians and soldiers alive who could question his accuracy.

Despite the chaotic state of mobilisation there were one or two bright glimmers in an otherwise dark and foreboding sky.

Although the shock of Austria’s defeat had rocked Napoleon and his military advisers back on their heels they nevertheless saw clearly that there were lessons to be learnt. The most obvious one was to arm their soldiers with a weapon superior to the Prussian Needle Gun.

The second innovation to the France’s military arsenal was never used effectively during the war, and thus possibly the most important military technological advancement of its time was never exploited to its full potential.

The French high command, although their courage under fire can never be questioned, had not had any real experience dealing with the problems involved in a major European conflict. True, generals such as Canrobert, MacMahon, Bourbaki, Bazaine, Leboeuf and Ladmirault had all seen a great deal of action, but much of this was in “small wars” in North Africa, and even the Empires excursion into the Crimea and Italy (and the debacle in Mexico) really bore no comparison with what would be entailed in coming up against a first rate military power such as Prussia had now become. The Emperor himself was in no fit state to lead an army, a fact he would soon realize. His lethargy and illness cast a sad shadow over the army and the French nation as a whole.

The Prussian Army.

While the French had no peacetime organisations for their army in regard to brigades, divisions and corps, these being only formed upon mobilisation, the Prussians had a system of territorial decentralisation that allowed for their respective Corps Staffs to deal with mobilisation while their General Staff worked on the concentration and the Aufmarsch .

Another factor that gave the Prussian army a distinct edge over its opponent was their Great General Staff. When he took over as Chief – of – Staff in 1857, Moltke found a ready – made body of dedicated professionals within Clausewitz’s Kriegsakademie who were constantly working on the problems involved in the event of war. What Moltke did was to groom and personally train a selected dozen of these professional soldiers each year in staff rides and Kriegspiel . These officers would then be allocated to the staffs of higher formations where they would disseminate Moltke’s ideas so that a common doctrine was obtained throughout the army. It did not always run smoothly, but it was far superior to the bungled efforts of the French high command.

The one great mistake Moltke made in 1870 was in clinging to the Dreyse needle gun as the main armament of his infantry. He knew full well in November 1867, only fifteen months after the battle of Königgrätz, the potential of France’s new weapon when French General de Failly, who had just won a victory over Garibaldinian irregulars at Mentana in Italy, sent a rather tactless telegram which contained the statement: ‘ Les fusils Chassepot ont fait mervelle.’

French War Plans.

On June 30 th 1870, In a statement that would come back to haunt him for many years to come, the French liberal Prime Minister, Emile Ollivier, made the sweeping statement that, ‘…the peace of Europe seems better assured than at any previous period.’ On 19 th July 1870 France declared war.

Because of the size of her army in comparison to Prussia/Germany, the French had decided, after scrapping other half thought out plans, that in order to give them a fighting chance, a quick offensive across the Rhine would cause the Prussian concentration to stall. In order to get this spoiling attack moving quickly French regiments would move directly to their appointed war stations with their reserve back – up units reporting to the depots and from their being sent to the front in 100 men units. These calculations were supposed to work so that by the fourteenth day of mobilisation the whole French army would be at full strength. The speculative offensive would take place on the ninth day of mobilisation with 150,000 men at Metz and another 100,000 at Strasbourg uniting and moving rapidly across the Rhine; while a further 50,000 troops were forming at Châlons. Thus, it was thought, this would force the South German Confederation to declare neutrality and Austria to join France, combining to march on Berlin. On the 28 th July the Emperor took over supreme command with not a single French army corps in readiness to take the field; the stage was set for disaster.

Prussian Plans.

I Army, General von Steinmetz, VII and VIII Corps; one cavalry division; 60,000 men, to assemble on the River Moselle at Wittlich.
II Army, Prince Frederick Charles, III, VI and X Corps, the Prussian Guard and two cavalry divisions; 131,000 men, to assemble at Neunkirchen and Homburg.
III Army , Crown Prince of Prussia Frederick William, V, XI Corps and Bavarian I and II Corps, together with a division each from Baden and Württemberg; 130,000 men, assembled around Karlsruhe in the Palatinate.
IX Corps, consisting of the 18 th Prussian Division and the Hesse Division was united with the XII Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men, assembled around Mayence, to reinforce the II Army when required.

Opening Moves.

As Moltke states in his Correspondence 1870 – 71 :

After viewing the engagement at Wissembourg and its consequences from the heights of the Col de Pigeonnier, Marshal MacMahon realised that with the rout of Douay’s division his own position could be compromised, however,

Fröschwiller – Wörth.

On 6th August the battle of Fröschwiller – Wörth was fought when the commander of the advanced units of the German V Corps, considering that the activity along the high ground occupied by the French was a sign of their pulling out and retiring, decided to push on and test the enemy position, bringing on an engagement that neither Moltke nor the Crown Prince had anticipated or desired. Wading across the Sauer, the bridges in their area having been destroyed by the French, the skirmish line of the Prussian 20 th Brigade (V Corps) were greeted by heavy chassepot and mitrarilleuse fire forcing them to retire back over the stream to the protection of their artillery line, by which time the sound of gunfire had caused the Bavarian II Corps commander, General Hartmann, to march to the sound of the guns. Without much tactical finesse Hartmann ordered a rash and uncoordinated attack on the strong French left wing which was driven back without much trouble by General Auguste Durcrot’s well entrenched infantry holding the tree covered slopes to the south, and thereafter the fighting died down on this flank.

The battle developed all along the line and became one in which the superiority of the French rifle was pitted against the accuracy and range of the German artillery, and although MacMahon’s units continued to hold on grimly, the mounting pressure on Lartigue’s position began to cause him alarm:

Although proving the point that as a missile weapon cavalry were now as obsolete on the modern battlefield as elephants became to ancient armies, Bonnemain’s sacrifice did allow time for MacMahone to disengage the rest of his forces and begin a retreat. By 5:00 p.m. on his right wing the divisions of Pellé and Dumesnil, which had been cut off from the rest of the army when the Prussians drove a wedge into the French position, escaped south towards Haguenau. The left wing and central formations fell back towards Niederbronn and Reichshoffen were their retreat was covered by the 5 th Corps. The French casualties had been significant with almost 6,000 officers and men killed or wounded and a further 9,200 taken prisoner, including 28 guns.

The Prussians made no attempt to carry out a pursuit, their cavalry being too far in the rear, and in any case the losses incurred were such that the Crown Prince considered his army to be in no fit condition to seek another engagement having sustained a total of 10,600 officers and men killed and wounded.

The fateful day of 6 th August 1870 was a dark one in the annals of French military history, for while MacMahone was being pounded at Froeschwiller, the Prussian I Army under Steinmetz was engaged in a battle that, because of his reckless and insubordinate attitude, he should not have won and the French, if they had not squandered every opportunity that presented itself for victory, should not have lost.

Even with the best of planning warfare always throws up imponderable problems, especially at human level. Moltke’s concept concerning the dissemination of his ideas and orders for a common doctrine to be maintained throughout the army, but still allowing for the individuality of separate commanders, fell far short of what he intended as had been shown at Froeschwiller, and was to be tested again in more serious fashion.

General Charles von Steinmetz, commander of the Prussian I Army, would prove to be one of the most cantankerous and disobedient subordinate that Moltke had to cope with until his removal, albeit after he had squandered the lives of thousands of soldiers, in 1871. Born in1796 Steinmetz had seen action during the Napoleonic Wars and gradually rose through the ranks becoming a Major – General in 1854. He served with distinction during the Danish War of 1864 and commanded a corps during the Austro – Prussian War of 1866 where he was given the sobriquet “The Lion of Nachod” for his part in that battle. He made few friends owing not only to his poverty stricken background, but also due to his rather arrogant attitude and Spartan lifestyle. His willingness to sacrifice the lives of his soldiers to achieve his objectives coupled with gross insubordination could quite easily have ruined Moltke’s careful planning on more than one occasion.

During the early hours of 6 th August Moltke was informed by Steinmetz that he was going over to the offensive, proposing to strike at St Avold and Saarbrücken. With his usual arrogance he failed to inform Frederick Charles of his intensions which, in turn, threw the whole of Moltke’s carefully worked out tables of march into confusion with two German armies advancing on the same objective.

When the French corps of General Frossard had taken possession of Saarbrücken during the heady advance of 2 nd August the position he had taken up in the hills overlooking the town and parade – ground had been, what Frossard himself later wrote, ‘ ma position était aventurée.’ Now he gave this ( what would prove to have been ideal) ground up and retired his II Corps one mile south – west to the heights near Spicheren, a ‘position magnifiques’ that he had personally, being trained as an engineer, reconnoitred before the war. That Frossard was not supported in his stand at Spicheren by the other elements of the Army of Metz, who were positioned in haphazard formations, more prepared for retreat than aggression, was another example of the complete ineptitude that plagued the French high command.

In true gung – oh style, more fitted to a twenty year old than to a septuagenarian, Steinmetz pressed on with his own attack plans, veering across the march route of Prince Friedrich Charles’s II Army and causing consternation in that armies forward units. When the VII Corps of Steinmetz’s I Army came within sight of the French position at Spicheren the commander of its 14th Division, yet another “I do it my way” field officer, General von Kameke, asked for permission to attack. His superior, General Zastrow, readily stated that Kameke could do as he saw fit thus, in so doing, displaying a total lack of any understanding of Moltke’s intentions and bringing on an engagement that should, with a more aggressive attitude on the part of the French, have thrown the whole of Moltke’s carefully planned arrangements dangerously out of gear.

Frossard was not alone in failing to exploit the haphazardous decisions and pig headed attitude of Steinmetz and his subordinates. In rear of Fossards corps, at no more than eighteen kilometres distance stood over 40,000 troops, these forces could, if they had been brought together with Frossard’s formations, not only have given Steinmetz a severe hammering, but would also have knocked most of the stuffing out of Moltke’s original well conceived plans. But as Howard say’s:

‘…As to intentions of enemy main body, as yet only conjecture.

It would appear that even Moltke seems to have expected the usual French Furia Francese ?

German losses amounted close to 5,000 killed and wounded; French casualties were lower at around 2,000, but a further 2,000 unwounded prisoners also fell into German hands. As the hungry and tired French troops trudged away from the battlefield a sense of despondency set in, with no shortage of derision being bought down on the heads of their leaders whose irresolution and ineptitude was considered as being the reason for their defeat.

The Fortress of Metz.

Over at German headquarters Moltke had his own problems to deal with. Steinmetz’s overzealousness and downright disobedience had caused total confusion among the units of the left wing of his I Army and the right wing of the II Army, a confusion that was not helped when, after issuing fresh instructions to First Army to clear the way for the Second Army to move south – west on the Saar from Neunkirchen and Zweibrücken, Steinmetz once more chose to ignore his new instructions. These new orders were, after securing the railway communications at Forbach, to advance on the road from Saarlouis to Metz as per his original instructions, keeping in close touch with the left wing of the French army. As David Ascoli puts it:

By 13 th August almost 180,000 troops were gathered on the right bank of the Moselle close to the fortress of Metz. The food and fodder situation had improved greatly and ammunition was adequate, however the problem of distributing these items to formations that were constantly being reshuffled as plans changed remained a constant concern. These reworking of plans and the general uncertainty in regard to strategy were caused, in the first instance, by Napoleon remaining in command, this causing further problems when the military advisers surrounding him tendered advice in military terms that came into conflict with the political (dynastic) considerations bombarding the Emperor from Paris. In no fit state to balance one factor against the other Napoleon now chose to compromise. He would remain at Metz but hand over command of the Army of the Rhine to one of his senior officers; however this in turn was not without its own problems.

Marshal Franҫois Achille Bazaine had risen to his position from the ranks and was regarded as one of France’s finest officers. He had served with distinction in the Crimea and Italy, and even the disastrous Mexican affair did not affect his standing as a first rate leader of men. The problem was that Bazaine had never held such a high post as the one now thrust upon him – Commander – in – Chief, and although he would prove to be totally inadequate for the job one must also not forget that the blame for all the woes of France considered due to his mishandling of events should also be shared by those who put him in command in the first place.

The Advance of the German Armies.

When Moltke received the news that the French had fallen back under the guns of Metz, on the 12 th August, he immediately took steps to take the offensive which would now entail an advance on a wide front incorporating all three of his armies. The plan was to spread out his forces covering some eighty kilometres and taking in all crossings points on the Moselle River within their scope. On the right wing Steinmetz, still in sulking mode but now under strict control would moved I Army on the axis Sarrlouis – Metz, his forward units on either side of Boulay. In the centre Prince Frederick Charles II Army advanced toward the Moselle River crossings above Metz, while on the left Crown Prince Frederick William’s III Army, now out of contact with MacMahon, was probing forward towards Lunéville and Nancy. It is worth quoting Ascoli here in regard to some criticism levelled at Moltke concerning his apparent dilatory arrangements of the advance:

The Battle of Colombey – Nouilly.

Bazaine was, for the last time in his career, actually engaged on the battlefield, taking over command of Decaen’s division when that general was killed, and on these occasions he was in his element. He was slightly wounded in the shoulder by a shell fragment but still continued to give encouragement to his soldiers by his undoubted bravery and cool bearing under fire, but that was where his military talents ended. As far as any counter – attack was concerned Bazaine had no intention of committing any such rash undertaking, especially when recalling the Emperor’s emphasis on rapid retirement, thus another chance to do great damage to the enemy was lost.

The battle itself was indecisive but had delayed and disrupted the French retreat. French casualties numbered 3915 to the German 4620, proving that if nothing else, the battle of Colombey – Nouilly was no petty rearguard action. It was also to show how, even with victory within his grasp, Bazaine seemed to still consider that Napoleon was making the military decisions as commander of the army. When he visited the Emperor at Longeville to report on the day’s events the monarch had retied to bed and Bazaine gives the following account of their brief conversation:

15 th August.

Bazaine’s orders for the continuation of the retreat to Verdun were not issued until 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 15 th August, at the same hour that German cavalry patrols were already wheeling around the Verdun road and were to show not only the Marshals tardy attitude in regard to making a swift and well conducted retirement but they also highlighted his inability to cope with the tasks involved in being army commander. The orders were:

Left flank, 2 nd and 6 th Corps to take the Verdun road to Mars – la – Tour and Rezonville.
Right Flank, 4 th and 3 rd Corps to march on Doncourt and Verneville.
Imperial Guard, in the rear of the above formations at Gravelotte.
One cavalry division to cover each flank of the retirement.
Laveaucoupet’s division (2 nd Corps), to remain as garrison in Metz.

As David Ascoli states regarding Frederick Charles’s reaction to these instructions:

‘It was a tidy order, very precise and very Prussian. It presupposed every kind of presupposition. It assumed several false assumptions. And it came very close to bringing about a disaster.’

Michael Howard states:

As events turned out Frederick Charles’s unauthorised alteration to Moltke’s orders could have resulted in the whole Prussian/German war machine being either drastically knocked out of gear or even totally ruined. Even a prince of the royal blood should be expected to carry out the orders of his military superior.

The Battle of Vionville – Mars – la – Tour.

Early on the morning of the 16 th August Napoleon bade farewell to Bazaine and set off on the road to Verdun, from where he would take the train to Chalons. At this time the French army was stationed as follows: around Rezonville 2 nd and 6 th Corps were encamped. The Imperial Guard was stationed to the rear of Gravelotte. One cavalry division was covering Vionville and two more observing the roads towards the north and west. The 4 th Corps under Ladmirault was still struggling to get out of Metz. At around 9:00 a.m. German artillery began dropping shells into the French horse lines and camp of General Forton’s cavalry division around Vionville, announcing the arrival of the advance guard of General von Alvensleben’s III Corps of Ferderick Charles’s II Army. Forton’s troopers quickly responded, driving the advance guard back on Alvensleben’s main body, which was now beginning to concentrate on the high ground south of Rezonville.

Snaking their way up onto the plateau through the Gorze ravine Alvensleben’s troops were now confronted, not by a rearguard as expected, but by the whole of Frossard’s 2 nd Corps spread out from Vionville across the fields to Rezonville and on as far as the Juree stream. In rear of these formations and plainly visible was the swath of white tents of the French 6 th Corps to the north of Rezonville, with the compact masses of the Imperial Guard standing around Gravelotte, a sight to weaken the resolve of many a general. Not so von Alvensleben; seemingly unperturbed he at once ordered General Stülpnagel’s 5 th Brandenburger Infantry Division to attack.

Meanwhile Alvensleben’s 6th infantry Division had been advancing towards Mars – la – Tour, which was already occupied by von Rheinbaben’s cavalry division, from there it had turned east towards Vionville, diving out the a regiment of French light infantry who were holding the village. Pushing on to Flavigny it was then halted and its artillery added to the German gun line which, by the evening would contain over 200 guns massed in an arc from Mars –la – Tour to the Bois de St- Arnould.

Even with the Krupp cannon dominating the battlefield, by 11:30 a.m.,von Alvenslaben’s situation began to look precarious to say the least. His one immediate support was General Voigts – Rhetz’s X Corps, marching to the sound of battle and approaching the field but still several hours distant. Now, despite the enemy artillery still causing consternation among his troops, should have been the time for a strong and forceful French army commander to have issued orders that would have given him a victory. Sadly Bazaine was not that man. Michael Howard sums up the dilemma and character of this brave but strange man:

It was now passed mid – day and although being informed by Voigts – Rhetz’s chief of staff, Colonel Caprivi, that X Corps was on the way, von Alvensleben, his infantry reserve now all committed saw that, although the French had been temporarily held, it was only a matter of time before they put in an annihilating attack against his weak left flank. To shore up his line and slow down the enemy Alvensleben, like Frossard, now turned to the cavalry. “Von Bredow’s Death Ride” was one of the last great cavalry charges in history and the cost was commensurate, but like the old adage that if you buy enough tickets in a lottery you are bound to win something, it did work, at least in causing consternation in the French ranks.

Born in 1787 Bredow was seventy three years of age when he climbed onto the saddle of his charger to lead his brigade into battle and into history. His command consisted of three squadrons of the 7 th Cuirassier Regiment and three squadrons of the 16 th Uhlan (Lancer) Regiment, a total of 804 officers and men. Upon receiving the order to charge von Bredow did not demure but, like a well trained cavalry general should do, did take his time in preparing for the attack. He rode out to study the ground and thereafter detached a squadron of cuirassiers and a squadron of Uhlans from each regiment to cover his left flank towards the Tronville wood. After briefing his regimental commanders at 2:00 p.m. and then pronouncing “ Koste es, was wolle” ( It will cost what it will), he ordered the advance.

Bredow’s charge had three profound effects, one in regard to the battle itself, the second upon Bazaine, and the third in regard to the role of the mounted arm in future wars. The first effect was that it caused confusion in the French 6 th Corps gun line from which it never recovered; the second effect, from a psychological point of view, was that it added even more weight to Bazaine’s already over – defensively orientated mindset that he was about to be overwhelmed and cut off from his womb at Metz. The third, and most profound effect, was the wholly artificial assumption the success of the charge gave to the proponents of shock tactics – that cavalry could still be used in the old style, and successfully, on battlefields now clearly dominated by rapid artillery and rifle fire; this unwarranted notion would set the trend for mounted units until well after the outbreak of the First World War.*

Voights – Rhetz himself had been on the field for some hours before his corps began to arrive and, seeing the urgency of the situation, he had sent orders for it to march to the sound of the guns with instructions of where and how to proceed. The first to arrive was the 20 th Division under General Kraatz – Koschlau, these formations being instructed to bolster the thinning ranks of their comrades in the III Corps still hanging on to a small corner of the Tronville copse; the other division, the 19 th , under General von Schwarzkoppen, moving up from St Hilaire, was ordered to fall on Ladmirault’s right flank. Without an advance – guard, Schwarzkoppen’s troops, moving in close company columns came in against the very centre of Ladmirault’s new formed line. Soon the Chassepot once again began to prove its worth, mowing down 2,000 of the 4,600 men in Wendell’s leading German brigade. Seeing a wavering in the enemy ranks, Grenier, showing a spark of the offensive, ordered a counter attack which drove the now depleted enemy back in disorder. Again victory beckoned, and once again the French failed to exploit the opportunity, caution overruling aggressive action.

With the French showing a distinct lack of élan , Voigts – Rhetz choose the opportunity to use the cavalry for another time gaining charge. The mounted missiles thrown at the enemy this time were three squadrons of the 1 st Guard Dragoon Regiment and two squadrons of the 4 th Cuirassier Regiment. Interestingly, the 1 st Guard Dragoon Regiment had yet another member of the Blumenthal family within its ranks, one Lieutenant Werner, who was a personal friend of Rittmeister Prince Friedrich von Hohenzollen – Siegmaringen, the brother of King Carol of Roumania, another officer in the regiment. Here I let Henry von Blumenthal take up the action:

August 17 th .

During the night of August 16 th – 17 th the French forces were distributed as follows: three divisions of the 4 th Corps (Ladmirault) around Doncourt; two divisions of 2 nd Corps (Frossard) and the 1 st Division (Tixier) of 6 th Corps (Canrobert) between St Marcel, Villers aux Bois, and the Roman Road, the remaining eight divisions and one half division as follows – two from 3 rd Corps (Leboeuf) and the remaining two of 6 th Corps, plus two and one half division of 2 nd Corps and the two divisions Imperial Guard, between Rezonville, Gravellote, the northern edge of the Bois des Ognons and the high ground south of Rezonville.

When he finally managed to force his way back through the crowds of walking wounded, panic stricken teamsters and civilians now bolting back towards Metz, Bazaine received news that added still more weight to his growing defensive attitude, he was informed by General Soleille, the commander of the army’s artillery, that the expenditure of ammunition had been so great during the battle that it was necessary to restock from the reserves in Metz. This, together with the condition of the troops who had been engaged in the struggle and were now in a state of some confusion, convinced the Marshal that retreat seemed the better part of valour. Yet, at 4:00 p.m. on the 16 th , he still had the whole of the uncommitted Imperial Guard, plus units from other formations who had seen hardly any fighting, at his disposal. This mass of decision was close to 40,000 strong and should have given France a great victory, but retreat was the only option ever considered.

Moltke knew that the French were now somewhere further east but was totally ignorant of their exact location. Reports sent in by cavalry patrols were confusing and contradictory, making it difficult to judge whether the French had decided to continue the retreat by the two remaining roads to Verdun through Briey and Étain, or if they intended to concentrate in front of Metz. As he wrote:

18 th August. Gravelotte – St.Privat.

The scene was set for a major military disaster, which, however, was allowed to pass not only because of Bazaine’s incompetence, but also due to the prevailing attitude for the defensive that now seemed to have taken hold of the French high command in general. When, at 9:00 a.m., Leboeuf informed Bazaine that large clouds of dust were being kicked – up crossing his front, the army commander was unimpressed; that Leboeuf himself did not try to define just what was causing so great a disturbance crossing his lines shows a lack of military ability of the first magnitude. The massed columns of marching men offered a perfect target for attack, the effect of which would have gone down in history as one of the most resounding defeats ever administered to an army that prided itself on careful planning and cooperation at all levels. In warfare such opportunities are very rare.

Like a boxer who jumps to his feet upon hearing the bell, the sound of the cannonade had a similar effect on Steinmetz. Champing at the bit all morning he now ordered General von Zastrow’s VII Corps and General von Goeben’s VIII Corps to prepare to attack, even though the latter formation had been taken away from him and was “supposedly” at the Prussian monarchs personal disposal; but such military niceties mattered little to Steinmetz. With Moltke and the Royal Headquarters still some miles distant away at Flavigny Steinmetz now considered himself commander on site. Between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00p.m., he had brought up more than 130 guns in battery on both sides of Gravelotte village, but despite Moltke’s specific instructions not to engage in a full scale attack, he nevertheless sent his divisions forward to seize the high ground around Point du Jour and the Moscou farmsteads.

Nothing daunted, General Zastrow’s VII Corps pressed forward. First their artillery, pushed well in advance, deployed around the smouldering rubble that had been St Hubert Farm, where three batteries were knocked out in rapid succession. Then, attempting to follow the supposed break through made by their infantry, the First Cavalry Division came up, with only one regiment (4 th Uhlans) managing to reach St Hubert, where it was decimated by rifle and cannon fire, the rest of the division having been blocked by the chaos that reined in the Mance ravine:

To the north, Prince Frederick Charles, now well aware that the actual French right flank rested around St Privat, ordered Manstein to limit his offensive to a cannonade while at the same time halting the Guard Corps until the Saxon XII Corps came up. These troops began to arrive at around 3:00 p.m. deploying their artillery together with that of the Guard while a brigade of its infantry drove back the enemy detachments holding the outposts at Saint – Ail and Sainte – Marie – aux – Chênes. Thereafter the Guard artillery deployed south of the latter village while the Saxon batteries limbered up and moved to a position on the north side with the artillery of the X Corps coming forward to add its weight to the gun line. The Guard Corps, less 3 rd Brigade (2 nd Guard Division) detached to IX Corps, was deployed in line from Sainte – Marie – aux – Chênes southward through Saint – Ail to Habonville; X Corps stood in reserve about two kilometres behind. The Saxon XII Corps continued its flank march in a wide arc heading north – east from Jarny in the direction of Roncourt.

German losses amounted to 20,160; 5237 of these being killed, including a very large proportion of offices of all ranks, leading from the front. The French, being on the defensive, lost fewer, 12,275, with 4420 of these being listed as ‘missing,’ but actually taken prisoner. No great cavalry engagement took place during the battle and with the exception of Steinmetz’s wasteful and stupid sacrifice of the 4 th Uhlan Regiment, the mounted arm saw no action on either side.

Moltke would never state in any of his writings concerning the campaign that he had abdicated too much responsibility into the hands of overzealous commanders, nevertheless, at the other great set – piece battle of the war at Sedan in September 1870, he kept his subordinates under a firm hand, using the superior German artillery to pound the French into submission.

Acknowledgements.

This article began life as a short monograph intending to outline some of the events that occurred during the war between Prussia/Germany and the French Second Empire in 1870. The many enthusiastic and intelligent people with whom I came into contact during my visit to the battlefields herewith discussed caused me to review the article and increase it to its present length. It could have been even longer, it could certainly have been better, but nevertheless I hope it will prove helpful to those are just interested in European history, and in particular the rise of German military thought influencing future events.

My sincere thanks to Jean Francois who, although I only met him briefly when touring the battlefield of Mars – la – Tour, has been a great source of assistance, in particular his photographic coverage of the above mentioned battlefield, plus ones taken of the various farms and topographical features around the fields of Gravelotte – St Privat today, herewith used in this article. His collection of postcards depicting monuments and buildings around the sites, from the late nineteenth century through to the present day, are themselves an invaluable source of pictorial information for those considering visiting the battlefields – Merci Jean!

Once again my gratitude to Henry von Blumenthal for his invaluable assistance, in particular in regard to his families involvement in the events of 1866 and 1870 which would changed the whole course of European history. Coming from such a distinguished military family his knowledge and input on the various topics we have discussed on – line over the years has proved of the utmost value – thank you Henry!

Thanks also to Eric Necker, former manager of ‘The Museum of the war of 1870 and the Annexation,’ now in charge of the ‘Conservation departmentale des musées de Vendée.’ His help and assistance given during our visit to the former museum proved of great value in obtaining first hand source material relevant to the battles herewith described – Merci Eric!

My gratitude to Catrin Chapman who, although admitting a limited knowledge of military history, nevertheless has spent much time and effort in sorting out my composition and muddled prose – Cheers Cat!

Finally, but with profound thanks as usual, to Dr Bob, my fellow battlefield rambler, friend and photographer – Well done Bob!

Bibliography.

Ascoli.David, A Day of Battle:Mars – La – Tour 16 August 1870 , Harrap, London, 1987.

Blumenthal. Henry, Notes on the Blumenthal family’s military involvement at the battles of Mars la Tour and Gravelotte/St Privat.

Elliot – Wright. Philipp, Gravelotte – St – Privat 1870: End of the second Empire, Osprey Publishing, England, 1993.

Fuller. Major – General J.F.C., The Decisive Battles of the Western World , Vol. III, Eyre and Spottiswood, London, 1957.

Howard. Michael, The Franco – Prussian War , paperback edition, Routledge U.S.A., 2006.

McElwee. William, The Art of War Waterloo to Mons , Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1974.

Moltke.Helmuth von, The Franco – German War 1870- 71, reprint, American Military University, reading set 5. 1991.

Schlieffen. Alfred Graf von. Cannae, paperback edition, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Collage Press. 1991.

Wawro. Geoffrey, The Franco – Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870 – 1871, paperback edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Graham J.Morris. June 2017.

References [ + ]

2 thoughts on “The Battles of Mars–la–Tour and Gravelotte/St Privat.”

Dear Elias,

Thank you for your communication concerning the Empress Dragoon Regiment at the battle of Mar- la- Tour.

I have no information regarding these troops being involved in a charge during the battle. I know that they had moved into the space vacated by the Guard Cuirassier regiment when it was sent in by Bazaine in a vain attempt to try and remedy the danger to the centre of his position, which proved a disaster; thereafter, the Prussians advanced cavalry in their turn causing Bazaine to draw his sword, and he was rescued by Chasseurs. Maybe the Empress Dragoons also moved to protect their commander in chief, but no firm data is available to confirm this. Let me know if you have any firm information on the Empress Dragoons actions yourself, meanwhile I will contact a few folk I know in France and find out if more details are forthcoming.

Thank you once again for you query, and visiting the site,

Best regards, Graham J.Morris (battlefieldanomalies,com)

Hello, I have been researching the Empress Dragoons of the imperial guard under the second empire. I was wondering If you guys know any detailed info about combat they were involved in, such as their charge at Mars la tour and if they saw combat at solferino. I know they charged at Mars but I dont know when, why, or against which units.

Victory At A Dreadful Cost

On August 18, 1870, the Prussians fought a savage battle with the French at Gravelotte-Saint-Privat. Despite a series of blunders, the Prussians’ superior numbers and artillery enabled them to carry the day.

This article appears in: September 2014

By William E. Welsh

King William I of Prussia stood resplendent in the uniform of a Prussian Guard officer on a hill in eastern France on a sunny day in late summer 1870. The 73-year-old monarch watched with pride as a seemingly endless sea of troops clad in dark blue uniforms marched past him headed east toward enemy positions on a ridge near Metz. With the Prussian king that morning were Minister President Otto von Bismarck, Chief of Staff Helmut von Moltke, and Second Army Commander Prince Frederick Charles.

Those assembled on the hill could hear to their north the steady boom of the Krupp cannons that had bedeviled the French Army of the Rhine since the war began one month earlier. Soon another mass of Prussian artillery much closer began a thunderous barrage of the French positions to the east. A total of 200,000 troops from two Prussian armies were on the move that morning. By noon some units were ready to attack, but most were still marching to their designated positions.

Moltke’s plan to envelop the French, which had been frustrated at the border, seemed at that moment to be bearing fruit. Prince Frederick Charles’ Second Army had stolen multiple marches on the French Army of the Rhine since the frontier battles at Froschwiller-Worth and Spicheren on August 6. While the 112,000-strong French army resupplied itself at Metz, Prince Frederick Charles marched south of Metz and then swung north to cut the French army’s route of retreat to Verdun and communications with Paris.

Moltke’s plan for the day was for the Prussian First Army, led by General Karl von Steinmetz, to feint at the French left while the Prussian Second Army enveloped the French right flank. Moltke believed this would force the French to fall back to Metz where they would be trapped and eventually compelled to surrender. First, however, the Prussians had to drive the French from an excellent defensive position. The French held the high ground, and they had spent the previous day entrenching. Most of the French units would have a clear field of fire against the Prussians.

From time to time a messenger rode up and delivered a report to the king. William I was calm as the chaos of battle swirled around him, but his chief of staff was deeply agitated. Moltke rose frequently from his seat on a pile of knapsacks to stride about with his hands joined behind his back and his head bowed in thought.

“From their commanding eminence, the French held their enemies beneath them, and subjected them to a raking fire,” wrote Conway. “Their artillery was stationed far up by the Metz road, between its trees. There was not an instant’s cessation in the roar; and easily distinguishable amid all was the curious grunting roll of the mitrailleuse. The Prussian artillery was to the north and south of [Gravelotte], the mouths of the guns on the latter side being raised for an awkward upward fire. The French stood their ground and died—the Prussians moved ever forward and died, both by hundreds; I almost said thousands … so fearful was the slaughter.”

Like the road to Metz, the road to war had been a short one. Four years earlier, Prussia had defeated Austria in just seven weeks. Through the Peace of Prague, Prussia eliminated the Austrian-led German Confederation and replaced it with a Prussian-led North German Confederation. But this still left the South German States outside Prussia’s control. Bismarck saw a war with France as a way to finish the goal of uniting all German states in a Prussian-led German empire. But it meant waiting for the right opportunity.

That opportunity came in the form of the Ems Dispatch in which Bismarck framed King William’s conversation on July 13 to the French ambassador to Berlin on a highly sensitive matter in such a way as to make it seem an affront to the ambassador. Spain had offered its throne to Prince Leopold Hohenzollern, a cousin of the Prussian king, who had declined the offer, and the French wanted assurances that he would not accept it at a later date. William had already told the French that Leopold would not accept the offer; the Prussian king did not want to discuss the matter again. The French had played right into Bismarck’s hands. On July 19, 1870, French Emperor Napoleon III, or Louis-Napoleon, declared war on Prussia.

In the nearly two decades that he had been in power, Louis-Napoleon had invested in new weapons that would give his troops an edge over their adversaries. The most effective of these was the breech-loading Chassepot rifle, which by virtue of a better seal on the breech, had twice the range of Prussia’s breech-loading Dreyse rifle. Another new weapon was the mitrailleuse, a primitive precursor to the machine gun. The mitrailleuse, mounted like a cannon on a carriage, could fire up to five 25-round bursts in one minute. But the mitrailleuse lacked many of the best features of the 20th-century machine gun, such as automatic loading and easy traversing. Moreover, the French deployed it with the artillery instead of assigning it to infantry units as close-fire support.

As for the Prussians, their major technological advantage was breech-loading artillery. The Krupp-made guns were superior to the French muzzle-loading artillery in range, accuracy, and rate of fire. The Prussians also switched to a percussion fuse, which was far more reliable than the powder fuse used by the French.

By the end of July, the Prussians had deployed 310,000 men in 14 corps on the French border. Steinmetz’s First Army, numbering 50,000 men in three corps, was deployed in the Rhine Provinces. The other two armies were deployed in the Palatinate. Frederick Charles’s 135,000-strong Second Army, organized into six corps, was deployed in the western Palatinate near Saarbrucken. Crown Prince Frederick William’s 125,000-strong Third Army, divided into five corps, was stationed in the eastern Palatinate opposite northern Alsace.

In contrast, the French had about 225,000 men in eight corps. Napoleon III had deployed his eight corps at intervals on the border. The dispersed deployment would make it hard for one corps to reinforce another in the coming campaign.

Moltke’s strategy for invading France was that Steinmetz and Crown Prince Frederick William would attack and defeat the French in front of them on the flanks first. Then they would envelop the French forces between them in the center opposite Saarbrucken. But Steinmetz completely ignored the strategy. Rather than crossing the Saar River at Merzig to attack the French forces in front of him, he diverted toward Saarbrucken when he learned that General Charles Frossard’s II Corps had on August 2 occupied the lightly held German city.

Unlike Steinmetz, Crown Prince Frederick William followed his orders correctly. On August 4, the Prussian Third Army invaded northern Alsace. General Abel Douay’s division of Marshal Patrice MacMahon’s French I Corps at Wissembourg was not expecting a Prussian attack so quickly after a declaration of war and was defeated in a six-hour battle against three German corps.

Alerted that a large Prussian force was at Wissembourg, the following day MacMahon deployed his entire 48,000-strong corps in a line on a forested ridge 17 kilometers south of Wissembourg at Froschwiller-Worth and awaited the inevitable Prussian attack. In the battle that unfolded on August 6, MacMahon’s five divisions were no match for the crown prince’s nine divisions backed by 150 guns. The battle, which Prince Frederick William had not ordered, was brought on by overly aggressive Prussian corps and division commanders eager to test their troops against the French. The Battle of Froschwiller-Worth cost the Prussians 10,500 casualties. As for French, they lost 6,000 killed and wounded and 9,000 captured.

To the west, Frossard withdrew from Saarbrucken on August 5 when he learned that two Prussian armies were converging on the city. Frossard took up a new position three kilometers to the south on a ridge near Spicheren to await the Prussians. The vanguards of the Prussian First and Second Armies followed closely on Frossard’s heels. On August 6, the Prussians launched frontal attacks first against the French right and then against the French left. Neither attack pierced the French line of battle. But when the Prussians launched a successful flank attack against the French left late in the day, Frossard ordered a retreat. At the Battle of Spicheren, the Prussians paid a high price for their ineffective frontal assaults, losing 5,000 men. French losses included 2,000 killed and wounded and 2,000 captured.

On August 7, Napoleon III organized his eight corps into two armies. The five French corps in western Lorraine (II, III, IV, VI, and the Imperial Guard), which were the cream of the French army, became the Army of the Rhine under his direct command. As for the remaining three corps (I, V, and VII), the French emperor organized them into the Army of Chalons with MacMahon as its commander. Napoleon III ordered MacMahon to retreat to Chalons. The French emperor intended to retreat with the Army of the Rhine first to Metz to get much needed supplies before continuing to Chalons.

By August 9, the French Army of the Rhine had assembled behind the Nied River 15 kilometers east of Metz. On August 12, Prussian cavalry seized the Moselle River crossing at Pont-a-Mousson south of Metz. That same day, Louis-Napoleon informed Marshal François-Achille Bazaine, the most senior French corps commander, that his declining health made it imperative that he transfer command of the Army of the Rhine to Bazaine. Napoleon III told Bazaine he would soon depart for Chalons, even though the French emperor lingered at Metz for three more days saying goodbye to his troops.

As soon as Pont-a-Mousson was in Prussian hands, Moltke ordered all three Prussian armies to cross the Moselle south of Metz and then swing north to block Bazaine’s retreat. Steinmetz once again disobeyed Moltke’s orders. Instead of bypassing Metz, Steinmetz advanced directly toward the city. Although Steinmetz’s repeated disregard for orders was sufficient grounds for removal, Moltke was reluctant to take such action because Steinmetz was a longtime personal friend of the Prussian king.

On August 14, Bazaine’s army was passing through Metz to new bivouacs on the west side of the city when one of Steinmetz’s divisional commanders launched an unauthorized attack against General Claude Decaen’s III Corps encamped east of the city. The Battle of Borny was a French tactical victory but a strategic defeat in that it further delayed Bazaine’s march west. Decaen was killed during the battle, and Bazaine appointed General Edmond Leboeuf to succeed him. The Prussians lost 4,600 men in the rearguard action compared to French losses of 3,900 men.

The direct route to Chalons from Metz passed through Verdun. To make it from Metz to Verdun, Bazaine needed to march his army west on the Vionville Road through a string of villages—Graveolotte, Rezonville, Vionville, and Mars-la-Tour. An alternate route, the Doncourt Road, passed through Doncourt to Verdun. A third route, the Briey Road, farther north and more circuitous, passed through the villages of Saint-Privat and Briey.

At 10 am on August 15, Bazaine ordered the II and VI Corps to march to Verdun on the Vionville Road, and the III and IV Corps to do the same on the Doncourt Road. Prince Frederick Charles assumed that Bazaine was by that time approaching Verdun, and he ordered the half of the Second Army farthest west (II Corps, XII Corps, and Guard Corps) to march on Verdun in the hope of intercepting Bazaine’s army. The other half of the Second Army (III Corps, IX Corps, and X Corps), together with Goeben’s VIII Corps from the First Army which Moltke had transferred to the Second Army, had crossed the Moselle the night before at Corny. Those three corps were awaiting further orders from Moltke.

French marshals Francois-Achille Bazaine.

Bazaine’s army made little progress on August 15. At the end of the day, the French vanguard was at Vionville and the rearguard at Gravelotte. Prussian General Albert von Rheinbaben’s 5th Cavalry Division was shadowing the movements of the French army from south of the Vionville Road and attacking French outposts.

Of all the Prussian infantry corps, General Constantin von Alvensleben’s III Corps was the closest to Bazaine’s actual position on the morning of August 16. It had reached the village of Gorze at 2 am, which put it five kilometers south of the Vionville Road.

At dawn on August 16, Louis-Napoleon finally departed for Chalons in his royal carriage accompanied by two regiments of Imperial Guard cavalry. A short time later, Prussian cavalry blocked the Vionville Road. When Bazaine learned of that, he ordered the column on that road to halt.

Alvensleben assumed the French troops at Vionville formed Bazaine’s rear guard, and without orders to engage the enemy he nevertheless ordered General Ferdinand von Stulpnagel’s 5th Division to attack what he believed was the back of the French rear guard at Rezonville, while the 6th Division marched west to Mars-la-Tour in an attempt to cut off the front of the French rear guard. Frossard’s II Corps easily repulsed Stulpnagel’s piecemeal attack. While the infantry was attacking, 90 Prussian guns deployed on high ground south of Vionville and began shelling French positions on the plateau to the north.

At 11:30 am, General Karl von Buddenbrock’s 6th Division went into action on Stulpnagel’s left. Buddenbrock’s men attacked Frossard’s left, capturing lightly held Vionville but failing to drive Frossard’s soldiers out of Flavigny. The artillery of General Francois Canrobert’s VI Corps, positioned north of Vionville, inflicted heavy casualties on Buddenbrock’s troops. By then, Alvensleben had realized the severity of his situation. He was not facing the French rear guard; he was facing Bazaine’s entire army.

Alvensleben, whose infantry was alone on the battlefield until such time as General Constantin Voights-Rhetz’s X Corps arrived, asked Rheinbaben to launch a cavalry attack to silence Canrobert’s guns. At 2 pm, General Adalbert von Breedow assembled his 800 cuirassiers and uhlans for the difficult mission. In an effort to lessen the casualties they would take on their advance, von Breedow led them through depressions in the landscape that partially concealed them until they were within several hundred yards of their objective. Just before 2 pm, Canrobert had ordered the infantry posted among the guns to withdraw to protect them from the Prussian artillery fire. This worked to von Breedow’s advantage because there were no support troops to protect the French artillerymen when his horsemen galloped into their midst, slaying as many of them as possible before the French cavalry intervened. “Von Breedow’s Death Ride,” as the famous charge was called, silenced many of the French guns but at the cost of 420 cavalrymen.

After making a forced march from its Moselle crossing, Voights-Rhetz’s X Corps arrived in mid-afternoon to reinforce Alvensleben’s III Corps. The 19th and 20th Divisions of the X Corps deployed at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, respectively. At 3:30 pm, General Emil von Schwartzkoppen ordered his 19th Division to assault what he believed was the French right flank northeast of Mars-la-Tour. In actuality, the division found itself making a frontal assault against Ladmirault’s IV Corps. Ladmirault’s riflemen easily broke up Schwartzkoppen’s attack.

With little else to try, the Prussians resorted to another cavalry attack. Rheinbaben led his two remaining cavalry brigades around the French right flank, but the French had three divisions of cavalry on the field. The Prussian cavalry, despite being outnumbered, was able to drive the French away from Mars-la-Tour, ensuring that it remained firmly in Prussian hands.

At twilight, Prince Frederick Charles arrived on the battlefield with reinforcements from Goeben’s VIII and Manstein’s IX Corps. The prince ordered an attack on Rezonville intended to collapse the French left flank, but nightfall interrupted the attack before it could achieve its objective. The Battle of Mars-la-Tour cost the French 17,000 casualties, compared to 15,800 Prussian casualties.

At dawn the following day, Bazaine ordered his corps commanders to fall back six kilometers to a long ridgeline just east of Gravelotte. He was reluctant to march his army to Verdun and risk the Prussians forcing him to fight a battle on open ground. “I will resume my march in two days if possible, and will not lose time, unless new battles thwart my arrangements,” he wrote to Louis-Napoleon. Bazaine simply did not want to abandon the vast storehouses of Metz regardless of the consequences. He hoped that the Prussians would suffer such severe casualties in the coming battle that they would be forced to abort their invasion.

The Army of the Rhine moved to its new position on the high ground west of Metz on August 17. Most of the army spent the afternoon entrenching, with the exception of Canrobert’s VI Corps, which had not carried its entrenching tools. The 12-kilometer line stretched from the Rozerieulles Plateau in the south along the Amanvillers Ridge to Saint-Privat in the north. The French left, anchored on the Moselle, was particularly strong owing to a number of walled farms on the east bank of the Manse Stream. The one major weakness was that the French right did not rest on any physical barrier and was vulnerable to being turned. The French army was deployed left to right as follows: Frossard’s II Corps, Leboeuf’s III Corps, Ladmirault’s IV Corps, and Canrobert’s VI Corps. General Charles Bourbaki’s Imperial Guard Corps was stationed next to Bazaine’s headquarters at Fort Plappeville behind the left wing, and General Francois du Barail’s Cavalry Corps was stationed behind the right wing.

The Prussian cavalry had been so badly shaken in the Battle of Mars-la-Tour that Moltke decided not to press it to conduct reconnaissance of French movements until it had rested. Instead, Moltke would have to rely on the infantry to perform that task. Thus, Moltke ordered the Second Army on the morning of August 18 to march northeast on a wide front to intercept the French if they tried to march to Verdun via a more northern route. As for the First Army, it was to concentrate at Gravelotte and await further orders.

The frontier battles had shown the Prussians that close-order, frontal assaults were futile against French infantry armed with the superior Chassepot rifle. But the Prussians used the same unimaginative tactics at the Battle of Gravelotte-Saint-Privat.

At 10 am, Manstein reported to the Second Army commander and also to Moltke that he believed the French right flank was positioned around the village of Amanvillers. However, Manstein had located the French center, not the right. Prince Frederick Charles immediately issued orders to the rest of his army to turn east toward Metz. The Prussian Guard and XII Corps marched east on the Doncourt Road, and the Prussian III and X Corps marched in that direction along the Vionville Road.

A half hour later, Moltke issued orders to Manstein to attack the French at Amanvillers. Manstein’s guns were already in action against Ladmirault’s IV Corps and his troops deploying for attack when a dispatch came from Prince Frederick Charles ordering him to suspend the attack. The Second Army commander had received reports that the French right flank was situated at Saint-Privat to the north and not at Amanvillers.

Manstein initially deployed 54 guns against the French IV Corps atop the Amanvillers Ridge, but they took up a position within range not only of Ladmirault’s cannons and mitrailleuses, but also of entrenched French infantry that fired on the gunners with their Chassepot rifles. “A hail of shell and shrapnel … answered the war-like greeting from our side,” wrote Prussian staff officer Julius Verdy du Vernois. “The grating noise of the mitrailleuses was heard above the tumult, drowning the whole roar of battle.”

At 1 pm, Manstein ordered his guns pulled back until his infantry arrived to provide protection for them. An hour later, his 18th and 25th Divisions had arrived, but Manstein was reluctant to order a frontal assault considering the devastating firepower that the Chassepot gave the French infantry. He wanted to see what result the Prussian attack on the French right would have before ordering his men to charge the ridge. There was no reason not to continue to shell the French positions. The Krupp guns were rolled back to their original places and began a punishing bombardment of Ladmirault’s IV Corps. The Prussian artillerymen “fired without interruption, smothering us in shells,” wrote General Ernest Pradier of Ladmirault’s IV Corps.

Steinmetz had arrived on the battlefield at noon and retaken control of Goeben’s VIII Corps without Moltke realizing it. The septuagenarian First Army commander ordered Goeben’s artillery and Zastrow’s VII Corps artillery to deploy north of Gravelotte and begin bombarding Frossard’s and Leboeuf’s troops on the Rozerieulles Plateau behind the Manse. Altogether, Steinmetz was able to mass 150 guns that began a steady barrage against the French positions. The Prussian shells smashed enemy guns and inflicted severe shrapnel wounds to enemy riflemen who crouched for protection in their trenches.

At 2 pm, Steinmetz ordered Goeben to lead three brigades, two forward and one in reserve, in an assault on the Saint-Hubert Farm on the opposite side of the Manse. Steinmetz reasoned that if the Prussians could capture the farm, it could be used as a forward artillery position to support a subsequent attack on the plateau.

A French artillery crew is shown posing with a heavy gun during the Franco-Prussian War. The French muzzle-loading artillery was no match for the superior breech-loading Prussian guns, which the Prussians massed at key positions to overwhelm French defenses during the fighting at Gravelotte-Saint-Privat.

Like finely detailed embroidery, the western slope of the Rozerieulles Plateau was stitched with trenches above and below and on both sides of the Saint-Hubert Farm. At 2:30 pm, a sea of blue-uniformed Prussian infantry streamed down the west ravine and plunged into the stream above and below the causeway that led toward Saint-Hubert. Inside the walled farm was a single battalion of the 80th Line Regiment of the 4th Division of Leboeuf’s III Corps. As they splashed through the stream, the Prussians heard the unmistakable thud of bullets into human flesh as French infantry fired on them. With great discipline, the Prussian riflemen advanced into the storm of bullets. The Krupp guns at Gravelotte zeroed in on the farm and blew it apart. The French still held two nearby farmhouses as well multiple rows of trenches on the west slope of the plateau. From these positions they poured a withering fire at the Prussians who sought to secure the ruins of Saint-Hubert.

At 3:45 pm, the fire from the French 12-pounders slacked off as the crews awaited the arrival of more ammunition. Steinmetz misinterpreted this as a French withdrawal and ordered Zastrow to prepare his division for an attack on the Rozerieulles Plateau. Goeben, whose corps had taken heavy casualties in the first assault, advised against it, but the headstrong Steinmetz ignored him. Like Goeben’s attack, Zastrow’s also employed two brigades forward with one in reserve to exploit a breakthrough.

By that time, Moltke had learned that Steinmetz was ordering the assaults, but he permitted them to proceed even though he thought it was foolhardy. Zastrow’s attack followed the course of the Rozerieulles Road, which swung past Saint Hubert and curved south toward the Point du Jour farm toward the village of Rozerieulles. Point du Jour was held by line infantry of Verge’s 1st Division of Frossard’s II Corps. Zastrow’s men never made it to the plateau. They encountered a gale of shot and shell from Chassepots, mitrailleuses, and muzzle-loaded artillery that stopped them cold.

Steinmetz, who could not see the assault because of a tract of forest that blocked his view, for some unimaginable reason believed it had succeeded. He therefore planned to reinforce it. He ordered the 1st Cavalry Division and four batteries to advance east on the Rozerieulles Road. Only one regiment, the 4th Uhlan, made it to the plateau, where it suffered 50 percent casualties in a matter of minutes. One of the batteries unlimbered on the edge of the plateau, but all of its guns were soon captured. Another unlimbered at Saint-Hubert, but counterbattery fire silenced all but one of its guns. By that point, the Manse ravine was littered with dead soldiers and horses and smashed artillery equipment.

By that time, the Prussian Second Army was preparing a major infantry assault on the opposite flank. It took Prince August of Wurttemberg’s Guard Corps nearly five hours of countermarching before it reached its attack position. The XII Corps, which also was marching northeast toward the French right flank, was about one hour behind the Guard Corps. At 3 pm, Prince Frederick Charles ordered a limited attack by the Guard against the village of Saint-Marie-Aux-Chenes, less than a kilometer from Saint-Privat, designed to drive out the 94th Line Regiment from the French VI Corps. Once the village had been captured, Wurttemberg directed the Guard to deploy its 100 guns in an arc and begin shelling the French positions in front of them.

At 4 pm, the vanguard of the XII Corps arrived at Saint-Marie-Aux-Chenes, and Prince Fredrick Charles directed Crown Prince Albert of Saxony to continue north with his three divisions of Saxons to the village of Roncourt, to put it in a position to launch a flank attack on Canrobert’s VI Corps.

French Marshal Francois-Achille Bazaine’s greatest blunder was leaving the French right flank unanchored at Saint-Privat, which proved to be the key to the battle. Struck from two sides by the Prussians, General Francois Canrobert’s VI Corps was routed at dusk.

To pin down Canrobert’s corps so it would not be able to shift troops to check the Saxon flank attack, Prince Frederick Charles decided it was necessary to send his corps forward in a frontal attack against Saint-Privat, even if that meant subjecting it to heavy losses. The Prussian Guard had 18,000 men ready for battle, more than twice the number of men in Canrobert’s corps. However, Canrobert’s men held the high ground, and a portion of them would receive the attack from inside the walled village.

Prince Frederick Charles wanted to pin down the right flank of Ladmirault’s IV Corps so it could not reinforce the French VI Corps. To achieve this objective, Wurttemberg ordered the 3rd Guard Brigade at 4:45 pm to attack General Ernest Courtot de Cissey’s 1st Division of the IV Corps at Amanvillers. The French riflemen cut down 2,000 Prussian guardsmen before they could get close enough to use their inferior Dreyse rifles.

Wurttemberg had deployed the other three Guard brigades to attack Saint-Privat. The 1st Guards Brigade formed up north of the Briey Road, and the 2nd and 4th Brigades assembled south of the Briey Road. Despite their esprit-de-corps, the veteran guardsmen must have felt a gnawing in the pit of their stomachs as they looked across the long expanse of open ground they would have to cover to reach the French line on the ridge to their front. Wurttemberg sent the 4th Guards Brigade forward at 5 pm against the 4th Division of Canrobert’s corps. The guardsmen made it to within 800 yards of the French line before they were pinned down like the 3rd Guards Brigade to their right.

At 5:45 pm, Prince August ordered the 1st Guards Brigade positioned north of the Briey Road to advance against Canrobert’s 1st Division, which its commander had split in half to defend both Roncourt and Saint-Privat. With its officers shouting, “Forward, Forward!” to keep the riflemen advancing, the guardsmen suffered heavy casualties not only from the front by those enemy riflemen at Saint-Privat, but also in the flank from those deployed at Roncourt. Nevertheless, they followed the tactics of the other Guard brigades, advancing by rushes toward their objective. Seeing that the 1st Guards Brigade would not be able to reach the village without reinforcements, Prince August ordered his 2nd Guards Brigade, which was his last, to push directly up the Briey Road toward the objective. The 2nd Guards Brigade closed to within 700 yards but stalled after losing nearly all of its field officers.

While Crown Prince Albert continued on to Roncourt with his infantry, he left behind a portion of his artillery that deployed on the left of the Guards artillery. In addition, the Prussian X Corps, which was approaching the battlefield, sent forward some of its guns. This gave Frederick Charles 208 guns with which to shell Saint-Privat. At 6:30 pm the Krupp batteries at Saint-Marie-Aux-Chenes began a steady bombardment that lasted 40 minutes. The fused shells struck the walls of the village, sending chunks of stone careening through the air. By the time the bombardment ended, the village had been heavily damaged, and flames from fires that had started in the houses leaped toward the sky.

Before it could join the assault on Saint-Privat, the Prussian XII Corps had to drive the French out of Roncourt. The Saxons launched their attack on the village at 5 pm. General Henri Pechot’s 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of the French VI Corps put up an impressive defense against the Saxons for two hours, but at 7 pm Pechot ordered his men to fall back to the relative protection of thick woods behind the Amanvillers Ridge.

The Prussians suffered heavy casualties on both flanks at Gravelotte-Saint-Privat. The casualties were so high on the Prussian right at Gravelotte where Chief of Staff Helmut von Moltke observed the battle that he initially thought the Prussians had lost the day.

By twilight, the Guard had already lost about 8,000 killed and wounded in its frontal assaults on Saint-Privat, but when the Krupp guns stopped firing at 7 pm, the Guards and the Saxons launched a simultaneous assault designed to carry Saint-Privat. Bugles and drums filled the air as guardsmen rose up to resume their assault and Saxon infantry charged up the ridge toward the walled village. At the same time the Guards and Saxons attacked Saint-Privat, Manstein ordered his 25th Division to storm the Amanvillers Ridge and engage Ladmirault’s IV Corps in an attempt to pry it from the ridge.

At Saint-Privat, the French and the Prussians fought house to house through the burning village in the gloaming. Fighting was particularly fierce in the walled cemetery in the center of the village, where the 4th Foot Guards Regiment of the 1st Brigade stormed through the gates and drove out French soldiers who attempted to make a stand in that small space. In an hour-long bloodbath, the Prussians slowly gained control of the village, forcing the survivors of Canrobert’s 1st Division to flee into the woods to the east. At great cost in lives, the Prussians finally secured Saint-Privat at 8 pm.

As the Prussians fought to capture Saint-Privat and Roncourt on their left, Steinmetz continued to send troops against the strong French position on the Rozerieulles Plateau on the Prussian right. When King William rode forward to confer with him at 5:45 pm, Steinmetz wrongly assured his monarch that his troops had gained a foothold on the plateau and requested permission to send reinforcements. Equally uninformed as to the actual state of affairs on the Prussian right, William nodded his assent and withdrew. Gathering a brigade each from the Prussian VII and VIII Corps, Steinmetz sent them forward at 6 pm. An hour later, General Eduard Fransecky’s Pomeranian II Corps, which belonged to the Second Army, arrived on the Prussian right, and Steinmetz persuaded Fransecky to send his 3rd Infantry Division against the entrenched French positions. The situation went from bad to worse when shells from the Krupp guns began landing amid the advancing Pomeranians. “Excellency, our own brothers are shooting at us!” cried the Pomeranians nearest Fransecky.

At 8 pm, soldiers from the three Prussian corps that had been sent forward on the Prussian right began streaming back along the road and through the fields toward Gravelotte. In the darkness, Prussians moving up fired into the backs of those already engaged, causing mass panic. “All is lost! All is lost!” the soldiers cried as they moved swiftly west in their blood-spattered uniforms.

Bourbaki had resisted Bazaine’s efforts throughout the afternoon to send the Imperial Guard into battle piecemeal. At 6:15 pm, one of Ladmirault’s staff officers arrived at Bourbaki’s headquarters and implored him to send reinforcements immediately to the right flank. Bourbaki, together with the staff officer, rode at the head of General Joseph Picard’s 2nd Guards Division as it set off at 6:45 pm for the right flank. When they were halfway there, they found themselves in the midst of a large body of soldiers from the French VI Corps moving south toward Metz. Bourbaki had been under the illusion that he was going to commit his troops as a reserve to win the battle rather than to serve as the rear guard for a retreat.

“You promised me a victory, but now you’ve got me involved in a rout!,” Bourbaki spat at the staff officer. “You had no right to do that! There was no need to make me leave my magnificent positions for this!” Rather than try to rally the retreating French, Bourbaki ordered his column to countermarch to its original position.

Ladmirault’s IV Corps was hard pressed after the panicked retreat of the VI Corps to its right. At that point, Ladmirault’s men were being assailed by the Prussians from three sides. When the French riflemen learned that the Imperial Guard was not coming to their assistance, the soldiers abandoned their position without orders and began moving south toward Metz.

Ladmirault descended the east slope of the Amanvillers Ridge and rounded up whatever troops he could find. He established a rear guard on the right wing of the army astride the road from Saint-Privat to Metz using Pechot’s brigade and several regiments of cavalry. Although Bourbaki led his infantry toward Metz, he ordered his artillery to remain behind to bolster Ladmirault’s rear guard.

At 10 pm, Bazaine issued orders for the French army to withdraw toward Metz. He believed his units’ ammunition had been so severely depleted by the battle on August 18 that it would not be able to fight on the same ground the following day. Moltke, who along with King William had witnessed the rout of the Prussian right wing at Gravelotte, had no idea that his troops had won the battle until he received a report in the middle of the night informing him that the Prussian Guard and XII Corps had driven the French right wing from the field. This guaranteed that Bazaine’s army would have to try to break out from Metz. Given Bazaine’s conservative mind-set, it was unlikely that he would be able to do so against the larger, better led Prussian forces confronting him.

The Prussians lost 20,000 killed and wounded compared to French losses of 12,500 killed, wounded, and captured. The French soldiers had fought valiantly and had nothing of which to be ashamed. They knew full well that they had lost the battle because of Bazaine’s poor performance as an army commander.

MacMahon tried unsuccessfully to reach Metz with his 120,000-strong Army of Chalons, but the Prussians prevented him from doing so. While the First Army and part of the Second Army laid siege to Metz, the other half of the Second Army, which Moltke had renamed the Army of the Meuse and placed under the command of Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, conducted joint operations with Crown Prince Frederick’s Third Army against MacMahon.

The two Prussian armies outmaneuvered the French Army of Chalons, driving it steadily away from Paris. MacMahon’s army soon found itself besieged in Sedan. On September 1, MacMahon attempted unsuccessfully to break out of Sedan. The following day, Napoleon III surrendered himself to the Prussians, and MacMahon’s army surrendered shortly afterward. On September 4, the French overthrew Louis-Napoleon’s Second Empire and replaced it with the Third Republic. On September 19, the Prussians besieged Paris.

Bazaine tried halfheartedly on August 31 to break out of the encirclement but subsequently surrendered on October 27. On January 18, 1871, the German princes met at Versailles to proclaim the creation of a unified German Empire. Later that month the two sides signed an armistice. Under the terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt signed May 10, 1871, Bismarck forced the defeated French to cede Alsace and part of Lorraine, as well as to pay Prussia an indemnity of five billion francs. The harsh indemnity was designed to impoverish France for the foreseeable future so that it would not be able to meddle in the affairs of the young German empire. However, France eventually recovered. Less than a half century later, an even more terrible war between the two nations broke out.

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About: Battle of Mars-la-Tour

The Battle of Mars-la-Tour (also known as the Battle of Vionville or Battle of Rezonville) was fought on 16 August 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, near the village of Mars-La-Tour in northeast France. One Prussian corps, reinforced by two more later in the day, encountered the entire French Army of the Rhine in a meeting engagement and, surprisingly, forced the Army of the Rhine to retreat toward the fortress of Metz.

Battle of Mars-la-Tour

The Battle of Mars-la-Tour (also known as the Battle of Vionville or Battle of Rezonville ) was fought on 16 August 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War , near the village of Mars-La-Tour in northeast France . One Prussian corps , reinforced by two more later in the day, encountered the entire French Army of the Rhine in a meeting engagement and, following the course of battle, the Army of the Rhine retreated toward the fortress of Metz .

Arrival of German reinforcements

Von Bredow's Death Ride

Noting that "it will cost what it will", Bredow took care to organize the brigade, consisting of the 7th Cuirassiers , 13th Dragoons and 16th Uhlans . [55] [56] The 13th Dragoons did not participate in the charge, having been detached earlier in the battle. In what would become known as "Von Bredow's Death Ride", the cavalrymen rode out from Prussian lines at 1400, Bredow using the depression north of Vionville and gun smoke to mask movements from French observers until the very last moment. [57] Erupting into view some 1,000 meters from the French lines, the Prussian cavalry charged in line into and through two French gun lines, killing French gunners and scattering Canrobert's soldiers in all directions. [57] Two brigades of Forton's French cavalry division, some 3,100 men, attempted to counter-charge into Bredow's flank and rear but were partially dispersed by Canrobert's infantry, who shot down any cavalry they could see without discrimination. [58] Bredow's brigade managed to extricate itself and withdrew to its own lines by 1500. The French cavalry did not pursue. [59] Of the 800 horsemen who had started out, only 420 returned. [56]

It was at this moment that Bazaine ordered Canrobert's 6th Army Corps to stop its attack and the pressure on the Prussian 6th Infantry Division ceased. [59] The battle west of Rezonville around the Metz-Verdun road evolved into an artillery duel. On the German left, Barby's 11th Cavalry Brigade was holding its ground north of Tronville. [60] The French and German artillery exchanged shell fire at first and when Grenier's Division from 4th Army Corps arrived, the French began to advance at 1445. [61] Fire from French skirmisher swarms and mitrailleuses overwhelmed Barby's cavalry at 500-meters range and the Germans fell back slowly on Tronville. [61] Four French divisions, two from 3rd Army Corps, Grenier's from General Landmirault's 4th Army Corps and Trixier's from 6th Army Corps, were now massed against the German left flank and poised to outflank it. [61] Faced with French artillery fire, all German forces north of Vionville began to withdraw slowly, delaying the French for an hour. [61] They were helped by the wet ground, which impeded the French movements. [61] French counter-battery fire forced the advanced Prussian batteries, which had nearly exhausted their ammunition, to abandon their positions and restock on ammunition south-west of Vionville. [62]

As the French stood poised to overwhelm the heavily-outnumbered III Corps, X Corps 20th Infantry Division under General von Kraatz reached the battlefield near Tronville at 1600, having marched 27 miles (43 km) . [63] [64] 20th Infantry Division's staff officers and Kraatz personally reconnoitered the vicinity of Tronville and Flavigny and identified the III Corps center as badly weakened. [65] Kraatz ordered his division to reinforce that position immediately. [65] The roar of cannon fire had caused X Corps commander General von Voigts-Rhetz to investigate it and upon arriving in Tronville, reports from his chief of staff Caprivi and the ongoing battle convinced Voigts-Rhetz to move his entire corps at once to support III Corps at 1130. [63] [66] At Tronville, two batteries of X Corps artillery under Baron von der Goltz were joined by two divisional batteries and they concentrated a highly successful fire on Grenier's French artillery. [67] Major Körber's four batteries nearby were joined by a battery of horse artillery, and the German gun mass then blasted the French skirmisher swarms at 750 meters and sent them running back north in disarray. [67] By 1600, III and X Corps had 210 guns supporting them on the battlefield. [68]

Two battalions from the 20th Infantry Division's 79th Regiment formed up near Tronville at 1530. [67] They held their positions on the eastern edges of a nearby wood and withstood the French infantry fire directed against them. [69] The 40th Brigade deployed at Tronville at 1630. [69] They advanced to secure the ground east and north of it and had to endure only French shell fire. [70] The French still had superior forces available but did not pursue their attack, largely thanks to Bazaine's obsession with the French left flank. [71] [45] He ordered the 3rd Army Corps under Lebouef on his right to merely hold their positions. [71] At 1500, Bazaine sent 3rd Army Corps to his left flank to protect Rezonville. [66] As a result, most of Lebouef's troops did not fight at all on 16 August. [66] Bazaine's order was a great help to Alvensleben's III Corps. [66]

Prince Friedrich Karl did not become aware of the precariousness of III Corps struggle until 1400, when a report from Kraatz informed him of the situation. [72] [66] He rode 14 miles (23 km) with his staff to the battlefield, gaining the Rezonville plateau at 1600 to the cheers of his troops. [72] [73] The III Corps and French infantry positions on the plateau, reinforced by strong artillery forces, were so firm that frontal attacks would be impossible. [72] Friedrich Karl decided to fight offensively only with X Corps to the left when it arrived, while III Corps, with the help of X Corps 20th Infantry Division, would fight primarily with the artillery. [72] The artillery batteries of the 5th, 16th and 20th Infantry Divisions were concentrated east of Flavigny under the command of General von Bülow, where they maintained a continuous fire on the French artillery north of the Metz-Verdun road. [74] Isolated attacks by French infantry were beaten off by Prussian artillery before the French could even get within range of the Prussian infantry's needle guns. [75] Two German battalions of 78th East Friesland Regiment under Colonel von Lyncker attempted to capture a height (989) south of Rezonville but failed after a few hundred meters. [75] Lyncker was wounded along with all his company commanders. [75] Two grenadier battalions of the 12th Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel von Kalinowski, supported by two 16th Infantry Division artillery batteries, pushed forward a line of skirmishers to a valley below the 989 height. [76] Three battalions from the 20th Infantry Division arrived and also attempted to capture the 989 height, likewise failing under the French fire. [77] They did gain a position on the slope of the height and defeat French attempts to throw them back. [77] Apart from these relatively modest successes and failures, III Corps situation was stable by 1700. [78]

Meanwhile, half of 19th Infantry Division under General Emil von Schwartzkoppen reached Tronville and Kraatz requested that they attack the French right wing to the north-east. [79] [64] Schwartzkoppen moved out and concentrated his 39th Brigade in an arc north-east of Mars-la-Tour. [80] At 1700, the infantry companies of the 39th Brigade advanced north-east in rushes of 100 meters, laid down and rushed again, all under constant French chassepot and mitrailleuse fire. [81] Its five battalions got within 30 meters of the positions of Grenier's infantry. [81] The French infantry fired by file and shattered the Prussians. [81] Adding to the Prussian disaster, Cissey's Division outflanked the Prussians on their left. [81] The 39th Brigade retreated and the French pursuit fire nearly annihilated its remnants. [81] Some 300 exhausted Prussians, having marched 27 miles and attacked the French immediately on arrival, were captured by the French. [81]

At 1800, the French crossed the ravine north of the Roman road and advanced on Mars-la-Tour. [81] Voigts-Rhetz's cavalry launched repeated charges to hold them off and the French retreated back over the ravine. [82] [83] The 13th Line infantry regiment of Grenier's Division was ridden down and the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique cavalry regiment forced back. [84] The Germans used the gained time and space to deploy more artillery batteries to reinforce their left flank. [84] Landmirault's 4th Army Corps deployed six regiments of cavalry on its left flank west of Bruville and north of Mars-la-Tour. [85] Barby's cavalry brigade and two more regiments moved to confront them. [86] At 1845, the opposing cavalry masses collided in a struggle involving 5,000 horsemen and 40 squadrons. [87] [88] Each side sought to outflank the other in the melee. [89] The German regiments succeeded in imposing themselves on the French flank and rear and the entire French cavalry force disintegrated in a rout, fleeing toward Bruville with dust clouds rising behind them. [89] After their complete victory in the greatest and most important cavalry battle of the entire Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian cavalry regiments reformed their ranks and withdrew toward Mars-la-Tour, having defeated the threat to the Prussian left flank. [90] With darkness approaching, Landmirault gave up on his attempts to capture Mars-la-Tour and Tronville. [90] By 1900, the Prussian positions north of Tronville were untroubled save for harassment fire from French artillery. [91]

On the Prussian right, IX Corps under General Albrecht Gustav von Manstein reached the battlefield at 1600. [92] The 72nd Regiment of the 16th Infantry Division gained the northern edges of the Bois de St. Arnould at 1700 and advanced up the ridge to its north. [93] Despite relentless French fire and considerable casualties, the Regiment captured the height (970) but was then driven back by French reserves at 1730. [94] The 40th Regiment advanced in support and took back the 970 ridge, but was compelled in turn to retreat by yet more French reserves. [95] The 11th Regiment assaulted and took back the height at 1800 and was also forced to retreat by Bazaine's reserves. [95] A French attempt to exploit their success was repulsed as the Prussian infantry fired by file. [95]

Around 1800, Bazaine ordered the 2nd brigade of the Voltigeurs of the Guard to take secure the 989 height. [95] They succeeded against the Prussian infantry but accurate Prussian artillery fire forced the French to abandon it. [96] South of the 970 height, the struggle waged back and forth after 1900, with neither side able to gain ground owing to the effectiveness of the firepower of their enemies. [97] With the full strength of IX Corps deploying at his left by 1900, Prince Friedrich Karl ordered III and X Corps to move on Rezonville. [98] Led by artillery batteries, the Prussian advance was stopped by the fire of a concentration of 54 guns of the French Imperial Guard under General Charles-Denis Bourbaki , compelling the Prussian batteries to fall back after a brief response. [99] The 6th Cavalry Division had been called upon by Friedrich Karl, and they charged the French skirmishers along the Rezonville road but while they panicked some, they could make no permanent headway against the French infantry fire. [100] [73] As the strength of the French forces was too great, Friedrich Karl's general attack on Rezonville was not undertaken. [101]

The battle ended at 2100 after twelve hours. [101] The warm summer day gave way to a cold night, as the troops rested in their bivouacs and the lines of outposts maintained a watch over the blood-soaked fields. [101]

Between 2200 and 2300, Friedrich Karl ordered the Guards and XII Corps to assemble at Mars-la-Tour on 17 August. [102] After a stream of reports on the battle from III and X Corps and present staff officers, the royal headquarters in the afternoon of 16 August ordered 1st Army under Steinmetz to prepare to cross the Moselle over to the left bank. [103] Steinmetz implemented orders to the effect and two pontoon bridges were erected on the night of 16–17 August for VII and VIII Corps . [104] The Germans were amassing all available forces to defeat any French attack on 17 August. [105]

Bazaine believed he had fought equal forces on 16 August and would have to deal with an immensely superior enemy on 17 August. [105] French ammunition expenditure had been colossal and ammunition and food stocks would have to replenished before the fight could begin again. [105] [106] The French supply trains were too far back near the Moselle for resupply to be accomplished on 16 August. [105] The French soldiers were physically exhausted and morally shaken by the long and severe battle and one later French military writer opined that the entire French army would have retreated in panic on 17 August had the Germans advanced. [105] Citing the need to acquire more ammunition and the distance from the supply trains, Bazaine issued an order on the night of 16–17 August for his army to fall back closer to Metz. [105] The strong defensive positions of the fortress would, he thought, enable him to inflict massive losses on the Germans and crush their armies. [105] After resupplying, Bazaine would begin anew the march to the Meuse on 19 and 20 August. [105] Despite some skirmishing on 17 August, the Prussians did not pursue the French in force, as attacking that day was not their intention. [107] The French withdrew to the Plappeville plateau east of Gravelotte over the course of the day. [105] There the Battle of Gravelotte would be fought on 18 August. [108]

Tactically, neither side succeeded in dislodging the other from their positions during the day. [101] The French withdrew during the night. [101] The battle was a strategic victory for the Prussians. Bazaine had failed to make it to Verdun. [110] After the Battle of Gravelotte on 18 August, the Prussians trapped Bazaine in the city on 19 August, and the Siege of Metz ensued, concluding with the surrender of the French Army of the Rhine on 27 October. [110]

Von Bredow's death ride "was perhaps the last successful cavalry charge in Western European warfare". [56] Its success won it renown among military historians, which created a myth to the effect that for some decades 'Bredow’s achievement was the norm', that cavalry could still play a decisive role in battle in a modern war between equally equipped forces, and so cavalry units continued to be part of the armed forces of major European powers for the next half century. [56]

III Corps 15 artillery batteries expended 11,520 rounds during the battle, an average of 768 rounds per battery. [111] Following the consumption of another 2,740 rounds at Gravelotte on 18 August, the corps restocked on 20 August by completely emptying its five artillery ammunition columns, as well as two more assigned to it from other corps. [111] The 25 battalions of III Corps fired 720,496 rounds of small arms ammunition during the battle, an average of 28,819 per battalion. [112] Some of the front-line infantry battalions of III Corps at Mars-la-Tour were the first German infantry formations to face significant ammunition shortages during the war. [111] III Corps, like all other German corps, had abundant supplies of ammunition; the problem was rather that the infantry battalions at the front were so closely engaged with the enemy that they had become too separated from their ammunition columns and quick replenishment was difficult or impossible. [113] Ammunition shortages were limited to only some of the front-line formations; overall, at Mars-la-Tour and during the war as a whole, German infantry ammunition expenditure was less than expected. [112]

German losses were 15,799 officers and men, including 236 officers and 4,185 men killed, 470 officers, 9,932 men and 9 surgeons wounded and 5 officers and 962 men missing. Horse casualties totalled 2,736. The III Corps suffered 44 per cent of the German casualties and lost 6,955 officers, men and surgeons, including 1,863 killed, 4,889 wounded and 203 missing. [109] The French lost 17,007 officers and men, including 879 officers and 16,128 men, along with one artillery piece. [101]

1 2 Clodfelter 2017 , p. 187.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 339.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 340.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 343.
1 2 3 4 5 6 GGS 1881 , p. 344.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 355.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 345–349.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 351.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 354.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 354–355.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 361–362.
1 2 Zuber 2008 , p. 307.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 357.
1 2 Howard 1991 , p. 119.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 358.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 358–359.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 359.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 359–360.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 360.
1 2 3 4 5 6 GGS 1881 , p. 361.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 362.
1 2 3 4 5 6 GGS 1881 , p. 363.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 363–364.
1 2 3 4 5 6 GGS 1881 , p. 364.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 364–365.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 GGS 1881 , p. 365.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 366.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 377.
1 2 3 Zuber 2008 , p. 244.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 367.
1 2 GGS 1881 , pp. 367–368.
↑ Howard 1991 , p. 120.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 368.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 368–371.
1 2 3 Zuber 2008 , p. 246.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 371.
↑ Howard 1991 , p. 121.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 370.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 373–374.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 374.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 374–375.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 375.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , pp. 378–379.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 379.
1 2 Howard 1991 , p. 122.
1 2 GGS 1881 , pp. 379–380.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 380.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 381.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 382.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 384.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 383.
1 2 3 4 5 GGS 1881 , p. 385.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 384–385.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 386.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 386–387.
1 2 3 4 Howard 1991 , p. 123.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 387.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 388.
1 2 GGS 1881 , pp. 388–389.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 389.
1 2 3 4 5 GGS 1881 , p. 390.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 391.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 392.
1 2 Howard 1991 , p. 124.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 393.
1 2 3 4 5 Zuber 2008 , p. 247.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 394.
↑ Zuber 2008 , p. 174.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 395.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 395–396.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 396.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 402.
1 2 Howard 1991 , p. 126.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 402–404.
1 2 3 GGS 1881 , p. 404.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 404–405.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 405.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 405–406.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 397–399.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 400–401.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GGS 1881 , p. 407.
↑ Howard 1991 , pp. 124–125.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 407–409.
1 2 GGS 1881 , pp. 408–409.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 409–410.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 410.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 410–411.
↑ Howard 1991 , p. 125.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 411.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 412.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 413.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 414–415.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 415.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 415–416.
1 2 3 4 GGS 1881 , p. 416.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 417.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 416–417.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 418–419.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 419–420.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 420.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GGS 1881 , p. 421.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 430.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 429.
↑ GGS 1881 , pp. 429–430.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 GGS 1881 , p. 434.
↑ Howard 1991 , p. 127.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 436.
↑ GGS 1881 , p. 439.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 142*.
1 2 GGS 1881 , p. 338.
1 2 3 GGS 1884 , p. 197.
1 2 GGS 1884 , p. 195.
↑ GGS 1884 , pp. 194–196.

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Mars La Tour Kaserne Fürstenwalde

This article is also available in: Deutsch

Seemingly every larger village in Brandenburg has some connection to Germany’s military past – but few places can boast 360 years of continuous military use like the city of Fürstenwalde. When strolling through town, you’ll stumble across plenty reminders of the city’s garrison past – and even on the outskirts between the farmers fields, you’ll find the remnants of the Nazi era “Mars La Tour Kaserne”, evoking images of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.

Table of Contents

A short history of Fürstenwalde

While there is some historical debate surrounding the topic that the area surrounding modern day Fürstenwalde was inhabited by the 1st century AD (known as Susudata ) – Fürstenwalde was first officially mentioned in 1272. Its strategic location next to the river Spree – which was also conveniently unpassable for ships beyond this point – made it one of the richest cities in the Margraviate of Brandenburg

Fürstenwaldes rise through the centuries were somewhat dampened when the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Kanal was built in 1668, which connected the Oder river with the Spree, essentially robbing the city of some of its lucrative income. Fürstenwalde was quick to adopt industrialisation and by 1842 was one of the first cities to be connected to the Niederschlesisch-Märkische Eisenbahn . The line was one of the first rail lines in Germany and connected Berlin with Breslau (now Wroclaw in Poland).

Again, its strategic location helped it become an attractive industrial hub for a wide variety of industries – with one of the most notable companies settling here belonging to Julius Pintsch – manufacturer and inventor of the Pintsch Gas. Upon its discovery, the gas was “widely used in railway transport and marine navigation applications up until the 1930s.

Fürstenwalde as a Garrison City (1618 – 1900)

Like much of europe, Brandenburg was ravaged during the 30 years war (1618-1648) – and Fürstenwalde was not spared. The city was first mentioned to have garrisoned troops in 1634, when the stationed troops donated a silver chalice to the Cathedral. By 1687, a company of “Grand Musketeers” were garrisoned in the city, and in 1778, the arrival of two troops of Zieten Hussars (300 men) was noted.

The city was occupied by Napoleonic troops from 1806 until 1813, when the city was freed by russian troops led by General Alexander von Benckendorff (founder of the Imperial Russian Secret Police). With Napoleon gone, the newly formed (in 1809) Brandenburgisches Ulanen-Regiment (Kaiser von Russland) Nr. 3 was garrisoned in Fürstenwalde from 1817 onwards.

For those not familiar with the term Uhlan , they were a light cavalry, having originated in Lithuania in the late 14th century and quickly gained popularity throughout europe.

Since 1687, soldiers had been billeted in private accommodation in Fürstenwalde – that is until 1897, when the German military finally built the Ulanenkaserne (along the Gartenstraße) and gave the stationed troops centralised accommodation.

Mars La Tour Kaserne in Fürstenwalde

After the Nazis came to power, they almost immediately began expanding existing military facilities (such as ins Wünsdorf ) and building new barracks as well as vastly increasing military research, development and training. The Ulanenkaserne in Fürstenwalde was expanded in 1937 and was now home to the 1. Pionier-Bataillon für Eisenbahn und schweren Brückenbau (a pioneer /engineering battalion responsible for building railroad tracks and bridges).

mars la tour kaserne radfahrerkaserne fürstenwalde brandenburg lost places

The Kavallerie-Regiment 9 which had been stationed in Fürstenwalde since 1920 was forced to move out of the Ulanenkaserne, though a brand new military complex – known as the “Reiter Kaserne” – was built for them along the Braunsdorfer Chaussee. Its worth noting that the Reiter Kaserne in Fürstenwalde (and possibly the Marrs La Tour Kaserne) was designed by Robert Kisch, the same architect who designed the Kaserne Krampnitz outside of Potsdam.

Another military complex that was being constructed was the so-called “Mars La Tour” Kaserne, just a little further south of the Reiter Kaserne, Exact details are hard to come by and seem to have been lost to time, but the Mars La Tour Kaserne in Fürstenwalde (not to be confused with the Mars-la-Tour-Kaserne in Braunschweig ) was built between 1937 and 1943, and consisted of 8 barracks, two large entrance gates as well as two messhall buildings. The long construction period seems to indicated that the complex was expanded several times over the years.

eingang tor mars la tour kaserne radfahrerkaserne fürstenwalde brandenburg lost places

The Mars La Tour Kaserne, named after the the battle of Mars-la-Tour on the 16th of August 1870 (which resulted in an important strategic win over the French for the Prussian Army) – apparently housed the II./Kavallerie-Regiment 9 before the outbreak of the war (the regimental staff, as well as the I, II and III eskadron were all stationed in Fürstenwalde).

With the outbreak of the second world war and the Kavallerie-Regiment 9 being sent to the frontlines, new units moved into the Mars La Tour Kaserne, most notably the Radfahr-Ausbildungs-Abteilung 9 – a bicycle infantry unit around 1943. Its from this unit that the Mars La Tour Kaserne received its other name, the “Radfahrerkaserne” (literally “Cyclist Barracks”).

krankenhaus vorderansicht mars la tour kaserne radfahrerkaserne fürstenwalde brandenburg lost places

In 1939, the Kavallerie-Ersatz-Abteilung 9 (ersatz = reserve) was formed out of the Kavallerie-Regiment 9, which also included 2 bicycle squadrons. Over the course of the war, the units name changed multiple times, eventually splitting into a Radfahr-Ersatz-Abteilung 9 and a Radfahr-Ausbildungs-Abteilung 9 in 1943.

With the tide of the war having turned, the Volkssturm was established in late september of 1944. All men aged between 16 and 60 were drafted as a last ditch effort to stop the Soviets (and allies from advancing). In Fürstenwalde, the Mars La Tour Kaserne was used to train the new conscripts.

graffiti zimmer mars la tour kaserne radfahrerkaserne fürstenwalde brandenburg lost places

With the Soviet Army rapidly advancing towards Berlin, Fürstenwalde was deemed essential for the 3rd main defensive ring around Berlin and declared a fortress . The Soviet Army conducted several heavy air raids on the 17th and 18th of April 1945, essentially flattening large parts the city.

The remaining troops aided by the Volkssturm left the Reiter Kaserne, Mars La Tour Kaserne and Ulanenkaserne to engage the Red Army – setting fire to what was left of the city center to slow down the soviet advance. Most of the Volkssturm had been wiped out at this point and the last of the residents of Fürstenwalde were evacuated (leaving only 2000 people behind in the city with a former population of 28,000) before the Spreebrücke (the main bridge crossing in Fürstenberg over the Spree river) was blown up.

The Mars La Tour Kaserne under the Soviets

The Soviets took over the Reiter Kaserne and Ulanenkaserne after the end of the war, as well as the Flugplatz Fürstenwalde (and the Twin Villas in Fürstenwalde ), while the Mars La Tour Kaserne was used to house refugees and those who had become homeless at the end of the war.

After the refugees and homeless had been rehoused, the Soviets seemingly had no use for the Mars La Tour Kaserne, and allowed for large segments of the base to be demolished in 1947 – with several workers being severly injured and killed in the process.

Having seemingly a change of heart, the Soviets decided to reactivate what was left of the the Mars La Tour Kaserne in Fürstenwalde in 1954, and transformed it into a military Hospital (similar to the Heilstätte Beelitz and Heilstätte Grabowsee ). The Soviets operated the military hospital until their withdrawal from Fürstenwalde in 1993.

With the Soviet withdrawal from Fürstenwalde, along with that of the Bundeswehr which had inherited the GDR military installations in the area in 1990 – Fürstenwalde was completely free of any military presence since 1634.

Mars La Tour Kaserne Video

As you can see from the photos, the interior of the remaining building is in an atrocious state, and considering that a large part of the interior is quite dark – there is no footage of the interior, rather just drone footage from above/the surroundings.

The Mars La Tour Kaserne Today

After the Soviet Military pulled out of Fürstenwalde, the former military installations were handed over to the German State. The Reiter Kaserne and the Ulanenkaserne were converted into civilian housing estates in the late 1990s and early 2010s (after years of being left empty), while similar plans were hatched for the Mars La Tour Kaserne.

krankenhaus treppe mars la tour kaserne radfahrerkaserne fürstenberg brandenburg lost places

Despite being up for sale, and in theory being located in an attractive area – nobody has snapped up the property over the past years, leading a few people to speculate that ground contamination might be the cause. Only the main entrance gate, the Soviet border walls and the main “hospital” complex have survived – while all other buildings have been torn down.

mars la tour kaserne fürstenwalde abriss

With the buildings having been left empty for so long, rampant vandalism, few illegal parties and arson have decimated the interior of the building, while some locals have decided to use the property to dump their trash illegally. While efforts have been made to secure the building, and regular cleans ups have been organized to remove the trash, it seems like little is going to happen in the next few years (aside form it most likely being torn down due to its condition).

Mars La Tour Kaserne / Radfahrerkaserne Address

Alter Postweg 15518 Rauen 52.347645, 14.039040

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NASA is moving forward with 10 studies to examine more affordable and faster methods of bringing samples from Mars’ surface back to Earth as part of the agency’s Mars Sample Return Program. As part of this effort, NASA will award a firm-fixed-price contract for up to $1.5 million to conduct 90-day studies to seven industry proposers.

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“Mars Sample Return will be one of the most complex missions NASA has undertaken, and it is critical that we carry it out more quickly, with less risk, and at a lower cost,” said NASA Administrator Bill Nelson. “I’m excited to see the vision that these companies, centers and partners present as we look for fresh, exciting, and innovative ideas to uncover great cosmic secrets from the Red Planet.”

Over the last quarter century, NASA has engaged in a systematic effort to determine the early history of Mars and how it can help us understand the formation and evolution of habitable worlds, including Earth. As part of that effort, Mars Sample Return has been a long-term goal of international planetary exploration for the past two decades. NASA’s Perseverance rover has been collecting samples for later collection and return to Earth since it landed on Mars in 2021.

The following companies and proposals were selected from among those that responded to an April 15 request for proposals:

Lockheed Martinin Littleton, Colorado: “Lockheed Martin Rapid Mission Design Studies for Mars Sample Return”
SpaceX in Hawthorne, California: “Enabling Mars Sample Return With Starship”
Aerojet Rocketdyne in Huntsville, Alabama: “A High-Performance Liquid Mars Ascent Vehicle, Using Highly Reliable and Mature Propulsion Technologies, to Improve Program Affordability and Schedule”
Blue Origin in Kent, Washington: “Leveraging Artemis for Mars Sample Return”
Quantum Space, in Rockville, Maryland: “Quantum Anchor Leg Mars Sample Return Study”
Northrop Grumman in Elkton, Maryland: “High TRL MAV Propulsion Trades and Concept Design for MSR Rapid Mission Design”
Whittinghill Aerospace in Camarillo, California: “A Rapid Design Study for the MSR Single Stage Mars Ascent Vehicle”

NASA’s Mars Sample Return is a strategic partnership with ESA (the European Space Agency). Returning scientifically selected samples to Earth for study using the most sophisticated instruments around the world can revolutionize our understanding of Mars and would fulfill one of the highest priority solar system exploration goals as identified by the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine.

For more information on Mars Sample Return, visit:

https://science.nasa.gov/mission/mars-sample-return/

Dewayne Washington Headquarters, Washington 202-358-1600 [email protected]

IMAGES

Mars-la-Tour. L’AS Mars-la-Tour : 100 ans d’existence
Mars-la-Tour. Un bon présage pour l’AS Mars-la-Tour
Battle of Mars-la-Tour Painting by Franz Adam
Battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte
Mars-la-Tour. Feu d’artifice, match de gala : les 100 ans de l’AS Mars
The Battles of Mars–la–Tour and Gravelotte/St Privat.

COMMENTS

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As Mars-La-Tour Foot, Mars-la-Tour. 45 likes · 1 talking about this. Vous trouverez ici les actualités et informations de l'AS Mars-La-Tour foot
The last charge: The Battle of Mars-la-Tour and Von Bredow's 'Death
Bazaine's excessive caution at Mars-la-Tour allowed the Prussians to retain the initiative for most of the day, despite being heavily outnumbered. Alvensleben's bold attack, combined with spoiling attacks by the Prussian cavalry, succeeded not only in cutting the Verdun Road, but also holding it in the face of piecemeal French counter ...
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Groupe de discussion du club de football de la commune de Mars la Tour.
Battle of Mars-la-Tour
The Battle of Mars-la-Tour (also known as the Battle of Vionville or Battle of Rezonville) was fought on 16 August 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, near the village of Mars-La-Tour in northeast France.One Prussian corps, reinforced by two more later in the day, encountered the entire French Army of the Rhine in a meeting engagement and, following the course of battle, the Army of the ...
A Beckoning Victory: the Battle of Mars-la-tour 1870
At Any Cost P500 Page. "The tragedy is that, obsessed with avoiding defeat, he was blind to a beckoning victory.". - David Ascoli, author of A Day of Battle, referring to French Marshal Francois Bazaine. The Battle of Mars-la-Tour was fought on August 16 th, 1870 and is considered to be one of the more remarkable battles of military history.
Battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte
Helmuth von Moltke. Battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, (Aug. 16-18, 1870), two major engagements of the Franco-German War in which the 140,000-man French Army of the Rhine, under Marshal Achille-François Bazaine, failed to break through the two German armies under General Helmuth von Moltke and were bottled up in the fortress of Metz.
Battle of Mars-La-Tour
This is the first part of a series of cinematics depicting the battle of Mars-La-Tour. The Battle took place during the Franco-Prussian War from 1870 till 18...
Battle of Mars-la-Tour
The Battle of Mars-La-Tour was fought on 16 August 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, near the village of Mars-La-Tour in northeast France. One Prussian corps, reinforced by two more later in the day, encountered the entire French Army of the Rhine in a meeting engagement and, surprisingly, forced the Army of the Rhine to retreat toward the ...
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If you find our videos helpful you can support us by buying something from amazon.https://www.amazon.com/?tag=wiki-audio-20Battle of Mars-la-Tour=======Image...
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Mars-la-Tour. Mars-la-Tour August 16, 1870. For internal reasons, the leaders of both France and Prussia needed war - for Napoleon III it was to rally the nation around him and fight off internal dissent. For Prussia it was to spur the unification of Germany, and when war came, Prussia was joined by a number of other German states.
The Battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte/St Privat
The orders were: Left flank, 2 nd and 6 th Corps to take the Verdun road to Mars - la - Tour and Rezonville. Right Flank, 4 th and 3 rd Corps to march on Doncourt and Verneville. Imperial Guard, in the rear of the above formations at Gravelotte. One cavalry division to cover each flank of the retirement.
Mars-la-Tour (Chapter 6)
As Bismarck had anticipated, France's potential allies in Europe were the first to blench at the news of Spicheren and Froeschwiller. Stunned by the speed of the Prussian attacks, first the Austrians, then the Italians, and finally the Danes stood down, quietly refusing to intervene in a war that the Prussians now looked certain to win.
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The 19th and 20th Divisions of the X Corps deployed at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, respectively. At 3:30 pm, General Emil von Schwartzkoppen ordered his 19th Division to assault what he believed was the French right flank northeast of Mars-la-Tour. In actuality, the division found itself making a frontal assault against Ladmirault's IV Corps.
About: Battle of Mars-la-Tour
The Battle of Mars-la-Tour (also known as the Battle of Vionville or Battle of Rezonville) was fought on 16 August 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, near the village of Mars-La-Tour in northeast France. One Prussian corps, reinforced by two more later in the day, encountered the entire French Army of the Rhine in a meeting engagement and, surprisingly, forced the Army of the Rhine to ...
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Battle of Mars-La-Tour FrancoPrussianWar.com History of the Frando Prussian War. Battle of Mars-La-Tour or Rezonville. August 16, 1870. Map of the battle, from Battles of the 19th century 1897 by. G.A. Henty. Click map for larger image . Two Prussian corps encountered the entire French Army of the Rhine under Bazaine, and successfully forced ...
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Battle of Mars-la-Tour

Battlefield Anomalies

Introduction

The French Army.

The Prussian Army.

French War Plans.

Prussian Plans.

Opening Moves.

Fröschwiller – Wörth.

The Fortress of Metz.

The Advance of the German Armies.

The Battle of Colombey – Nouilly.

15 th August.

The Battle of Vionville – Mars – la – Tour.

August 17 th .

18 th August. Gravelotte – St.Privat.

Acknowledgements.

Bibliography.

2 thoughts on “The Battles of Mars–la–Tour and Gravelotte/St Privat.”

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Victory At A Dreadful Cost

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