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Everything We Just Learned About The Supersized AGM-158 XR Stealth Cruise Missile

Lockheed Martin has provided new details about their AGM-158 Extreme Range (XR) variant of the proven Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family of munitions . JASSM now underpins much of the USAF’s deep strike capabilities and a growing portion of the Navy and Air Force’s air-launched anti-ship capabilities via its sister, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) . We have known the XR version of this weapon has been in development for some time , but this is the first time we have seen it and have gotten official details about its configuration. This unveiling came at the Air Force Association’s biggest gathering of the year — Air, Space & Cyber 2024 — outside of Washington, D.C., an event widely used for just this kind of official disclosures and product promotions.

John Hill, Lockheed Martin’s general manager for air dominance and strike weapons said the following this morning about the AGM-158 XR:

“I would say that the ‘158 XR’ really is a story of innovation and anticipating the needs of the warfighters. It leverages an existing production line, production processes… When we think of XR, think of that as extreme range. What it really does is it stretches the existing JASSM and LRASM family, that outer mold line, to give us more fuel, essentially, and that buys us the range that we need and that the warfighters need.”

“It leverages modularity. So while we’re in doing modifications, we’re going digital. We’re leveraging the existing mission planning structure along with the existing software architecture. And as you know, JASSM or LRASM benefit from inline upgrades and fixes as they come down the production line. So for me, being part of a production line where you can incorporate changes that the warfighters ask for in stride is a pretty powerful thing. So this weapon leverages all of those really great things, and it’s a great option for the Air Force to consider for the future.”

The XR clearly sports the familiar trapezoidal cross-section and low-observable shaping of the JASSM and LRASM, but this new variant is substantially larger via a stretched fuselage. The XR is a substantial leap in proportions compared to its predecessors, allowing it carry much more gas, as well as a sizable 1,000-pound-class warhead.

As it sits now, the land attack part of the AGM-158 family, which started service over two decades ago, is made up of the following:

AGM-158A JASSM – baseline variant (no longer in production).

AGM-158B JASSM-ER – baseline extended range variant.

AGM-158B-2 JASSM-ER – “replaces obsolete components and provides a new electronic fuze, a new Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, an upgraded Missile Control Unit (MCU), and enhanced software.” (according to the U.S. Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget proposal ); “Obsolescence upgrade; increased computing capability, C++ missile control software. Foundational system upgrade for follow on 158B-3 and 158D variants.” (from a declassified Pentagon Modernized Selected Acquisition Report ).

AGM-158B-3 JASSM-ER – M-code GPS capability (still in development).

AGM-158D JASSM-ER – “Weapon Data Link (WDL) capability to re-target the missile, post-launch, against relocatable or higher priority targets during mission execution.” (again per the Air Force’s proposed Fiscal Year 2025 budget; still in development).

On top of this evolutionary roster is the anti-ship derivative of the JASSM, the aforementioned AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), which leverages nearly the identical airframe as earlier variants of the missile, but is optimized for attacking highly-defended ships in dense and very hostile combat environments. It includes an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker optimized for spotting, classifying, and precisely attacking vessels, as well as the ability to detect electromagnetic threats and either avoid them or use those signatures to help home in on and destroy them. A data link is also supposedly a key option, allowing LRASM to communicate in a networked battlespace, a feature that stands to vastly increase its lethality. This could also allow the missiles to talk to each other, providing cooperative swarming capabilities that can react to their environment and allow the missiles to autonomously work together to prosecute a target set or mission in conjunction with one another. An extended-range version of LRASM, also known as AGM-158C-3, which also incorporates other upgrades, is now in development .

Lockheed Martin is specifically calling this new cruise missile variant AGM-158 XR, not the JASSM XR, as its vastly extended range could be adapted to the LRASM side of the portfolio, as well as the JASSM one. This would provide a survivable, very long-range maritime strike capability against highly-defended ships, which could be a critical capability to degrading China’s anti-access/area-denial bubble that extends far off their shores. Further adapting and evolving existing munitions for this purpose has become a top priority and we are seeing the fruits of some of those efforts emerge as of late.

The original A variant of the JASSM is thought to have a range of well over 230 miles (with some sources stating it is over 300 miles), while the ER variant boosts that dramatically to over 500 miles (around 575 miles by some accounts). The XR is thought to be able to reach Tomahawk-like distances of around 1,000 miles. This vastly expands the weapon’s flexibility and unpredictability, while providing drastically increased survivability for its launch platforms, which are primarily aircraft, from fighters to bombers, and, in the future, even possibly cargo aircraft. It’s also possible a ground-launched capability could emerge, too. LRASM has already been tested in the Mk 41 naval vertical launch system (VLS), as well.

It’s also possible that AGM-158 XR could trade warhead size to pack even more fuel inside, extending its range even further, although weight and balance issues may restrict just how much flexibility exists in this regard.

Lockheed’s Michael Rothstein, vice president of air weapons and sensors, laid out a bit of the value proposition, including how this missile could reduce critical tanking requirements, during the Q&A with reporters today:

“You know, operationally, I would kind of put it in three things I think this brings relevance to… the first is a threat. We all know, the threats continue to evolve, and ranges continue to grow… When you can have more standoff [range] and still do the kind of exquisite targeting and get a survivable kind of weapon that JASSM/LRASM has proven itself to be at greater standoff [range], that’s good for the warfighter.”

“The second benefit it does is that, as you were dropping things at increased standoff range, instead of having to drive in farther to the release point, you’re now going back to refuel, rearm, and turn your next sortie. So it helps build operational tempo for the warfighter, because now they can generate more sorties in a day, put more mass across the target if they need to do that with other weapons, or other XRs, or whatever it may be.”

“The third… key operational standpoint, is refueling. We all know tanker bills and refueling is always a … factor for our aviation forces. You know, particularly in something like a China theater. In every theater tankers are always a hard thing. So again, if you have farther release points, that’s less gas you got to drive. That’s less [sic; fewer] tankers you need for that given mission set. And those tankers are then freed up, or that gas is freed up, to do other things.”

“Can’t get into the specifics, but we’ve done the operational analysis of all of those things, on the ranges and the threat, the tankers, and certainly… there’s benefit there to the warfighter that’s very, very significant.”

One of the AGM-158’s top features is its low-observable skin coatings and underlying structures . Its ability to weave its way through the densest of anti-air umbrellas is the key selling point for the weapon. This also includes reducing its infrared and electromagnetic signature, all of which can be fused by advanced enemy air defenses to spot and potentially track stealthy targets. Lockheed Martin says that the spiral enhancements made to the AGM-158 family will be able to be adapted directly to the XR. Just the fact that this missile was designed to use the exact same production line is stated as a big advantage. The company is targeting a 1,100 missiles-per-year production goal in the not-so-distant future. The idea is that some of the missiles produced could be ERs and others could be XRs, depending on what customers order.

It will be interesting to see what additional weight has been added to this larger AGM-158. All existing platforms that carry JASSM or LRASM can carry XR, aside from the F-16 , according to Lockheed Martin. The F-15E and F-15EX are still well-suited host platforms, and the USAF’s bomber force would certainly be able to accommodate many of them in their weapons bays and external pylons. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets can also fly with them, as well. But perhaps one of the most attractive applications could be using cargo aircraft to launch them via Rapid Dragon . These aircraft are more vulnerable than their bomber and fighter counterparts, so giving them hundreds of miles of extra standoff range could be a very enticing proposition.

Another interesting tidbit shared at the press conference today regarding the missile’s unveiling was that all AGM-158s going forward will have the semi-gloss black coating we see on the XR mockup and on some test LRASMs in the past. This is apparently for reducing the visual signature of the missile, according to Lockheed officials. Traditionally, at least for the most part, in-service JASSMs have been painted gray.

It’s worth noting that the JASSM-related ‘XR’ derivative is something of a reused moniker. Nearly 20 years ago, Lockheed Martin was working on a missile with a similar name that was an outgrowth of JASSM. That XR concept had a similar range objective and was also longer than JASSM-ER by about six feet. The design featured a canard foreplanes, not a great addition to a missile built for low observability, although Lockheed Martin said at the time its impact was not a dealbreaker for the design. The current AGM-158 XR concept does not feature canard foreplanes. Regardless, that original XR variant didn’t move forward and the JASSM-ER has remained the focus of ongoing production.

As for when we may see a AGM-158 XR actually tested? That isn’t clear. This is an internally funded initiative and moving it deep into flight test is still at least a couple years out. But considering the success of its predecessors and what the U.S. military and its allies could face in a fight across the sprawling Pacific, it would be hard to think that the Pentagon wouldn’t have extreme interest in the extreme range version of JASSM/LRASM.

Contact the author: [email protected]

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Lockheed is putting its own funds toward early development work on the missile, which could “significantly” expand the missile’s reach past the JASSM and the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile variants currently being produced for the Air Force and Navy, said Michael Rothstein, Lockheed’s vice president of air weapons and sensors.

A model of Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158 XR. (Valerie Insinna/Breaking Defense)

WASHINGTON — A new “extreme range” prototype of Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile could be ready for flight testing in one or two years, a company official said today.

The Pentagon has not committed to buying the new weapon, known as AGM-158 XR, said Michael Rothstein, Lockheed’s vice president of air weapons and sensors. However, Lockheed is putting its own funds toward early development work on the missile, which he said could “significantly” expand the missile’s reach past the JASSM and the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) variants currently being produced for the Air Force and Navy.

“I can’t give you any numbers at this point from a classification perspective” on the range of the weapon, Rothstein said. “It’s not minor. It’s not on the edge.”

Lockheed envisions the XR variant as the natural follow-up to the JASSM-D and LRASM-C3 currently in development for the Air Force and Navy. The most visible difference between AGM-158 XR and previous variants is its stretched design, but Rothstein noted that there are other “smart” modifications internal to the missile to increase modularity.

The most obvious benefit of the AGM-158 XR’s longer range is that it keeps the pilot further away from a threat. And because operators won’t have to drive in close to a target in order to strike it, it also cuts down the distance it takes for a combat aircraft to refuel and rearm — saving fuel and allowing it to conduct additional strikes over a given time period, Rothstein said.

The larger, heavier size of AGM-158 XR means that it cannot be carried by the F-16 and that other aircraft like the F-35 or F-15 that could use it will not be able to fly as far, Rothstein said. But in the latter case, that impact is negated by the longer range of the weapon itself.

The AGM-158 XR is still “several years out” from being ready for fielding, Rothstein said, adding that the timing would also depend on the services’ own budget priorities.

Looking at “the operational benefits, I think the war fighters go, ‘It makes perfect sense.’ And then leveraging, rather than a new weapon, leveraging a hot production line [and] mature supply chain, all that makes sense, too,” Rothstein said. “So the initial feedback we think is positive.”

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Lockheed unveils new ‘extreme-range’ cruise missile

Defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin is developing a new cruise missile it says will have more range and cost less than existing precision munitions.

The armaments producer revealed the new product, which is still in research and development phases, on 16 September at the Air & Space Forces Association (AFA) conference near Washington, DC.

Called the AGM-158 XR – shorthand for “extreme range” – the missile will be based on technology Lockheed developed for two of its other munitions: the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Lockheed says.

Source: Lockheed Martin

Lockheed’s AGM-158 XR builds upon a successful family of precision munitions that includes the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile

Those platforms can be launched from multi-role strike fighters and are intended to hit targets over substantial distances.

But the US Air Force (USAF) faces challenges posed by longer-range threats.

Speaking during the AFA event, secretary of the US Air Force Frank Kendall says, “The threat is now reaching out to longer and longer ranges”, driving demand for longer-range weapons.

Lockheed is positioning the AGM-158 XR as a solution.

Michael Rothstein, vice-president of air weapons and sensors at Lockheed, describes the missile as a stretched version of the JASSM-Extended Range, which offers more room for onboard propellant.

Lockheed Martin’s ship-killing LRASM stealthy, subsonic cruise missile is expected to play a critical role in any conflict in the Indo-Pacific

“The range is significantly different,” Rothstein said on 16 September, without specifying distances.

Lockheed’s current focus is producing the latest JASSM-D and LRASM-C3 models, for which the company is under contract with the USAF and US Navy.

Rothstein says the AGM-158 XR will benefit from Lockheed’s work on those programmes, adding, “It’s not a new-start weapon”.

“The investment is… rock solid,” adds Lockheed general manager of air dominance and strike weapons Jon Hill.

By leveraging its JASSM and LRASM production lines in Troy, Alabama, Lockheed insists it can bring the AGM-158 XR to production-ready status at a fraction of the cost of developing all-new weapon systems.

Though such a milestone remains several years out, Lockheed could begin flight testing a prototype within one or two years, Rothstein says – if the Pentagon shows sufficient interest.

The increased size and weight of the AGM-158 XR makes the weapon incompatible with the USAF’s Lockheed Martin F-16s. However, Rothstein says the munition could be carried by all variants of Lockheed’s fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighter, and by Boeing’s F-15E and F/A-18E carrier-based fighters.

Lockheed’s two facilities in Troy produce about 720 missiles annually, including LRASMs and JASSMs.

The company aims to expand capacity to accommodate annual production of 1,100 missiles, though it needs more orders from the Pentagon or overseas customers to hit that rate.

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Special operations outlook 2019 digital edition is here, china’s eagle strike-eight anti-ship cruise missiles: the yj-83, c803, and the family tree.

By Christopher P. Carlson - February 8, 2013

A People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) missile boat launches a YJ-8 anti-ship missile. Chinese Internet photo

Series: China's Eagle Strike-Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles

• Part 1: China’s Eagle Strike-Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: Designation Confusion and the Family Members from YJ-8 to YJ-8A
• Part 2: China’s Eagle Strike-Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: YJ-81, YJ-82, and C802
• Part 3: China’s Eagle Strike-Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: The YJ-83, C803, and the Family Tree

With the growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and growing Chinese assertiveness over territorial claims as well as seeming blue-water naval aspirations, there has been a corresponding increase in media coverage on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military capabilities. As stated in earlier parts of this series, the confusing and often-inaccurate information on the technical aspects of China’s armed forces, and in this particular case the PLAN, makes meaningful debate difficult. One especially troublesome example is the inadequate reporting on China’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), and more specifically the Ying Ji-8 (YJ-8) or Eagle Strike-8 family. The purpose of this series of articles is to conduct a critical review of the available evidence to sort out the correct identity of the members of the Eagle Strike-Eight anti-ship cruise missile family, as well as providing accurate characteristics and performance data. In Part 1 of this three-part series, designation confusion, as well as the first two members of the family – the YJ-8 and YJ-8A – were covered . Part 2 addressed the YJ-81, YJ-82, and C802 missiles .

The YJ-83 showed up on the scene without any advance warning, but even during its so-called début at the National Day Military Parade in Beijing in October 1999, no actual missiles were shown. The trucks that rolled by only sported two of the launch containers on their flatbeds – containers that were also used by YJ-8A missiles. Almost immediately, wild claims as to the YJ-83’s performance began showing up on Internet blog sites. Published largely by enthusiastic Chinese nationals, the claims of supersonic speeds, GPS guidance, and a ship-to-missile data link were made repeatedly.

As photos of missiles with the YJ-83 designation stenciled on them started showing up on Internet sites, questions were raised about the performance claims. The visible configuration of the missile just didn’t support what was being said online. And yet, despite the lack of any solid evidence to support the speculative claims, many Western defense journalists accepted them as gospel, and articles proclaiming China’s unexpected rapid advancement became the norm. Even after some Chinese blog site moderators began raising flags that much of the hype concerning the YJ-83 was unfounded, the content of Western books and articles remained largely unchanged.

Figure 9: The PLAN’s YJ-83 is virtually identical in appearance to the export C802, but is an updated missile. Chinese internet photo courtesy of Christopher P. Carlson

The development of the YJ-83 is somewhat blurred as it is closely linked with the C802. A rough estimate is that the technical design was probably locked down as soon as the Chinese were confident the C802 would fly. This lone criterion suggests the design for the YJ-83 was frozen sometime between 1993 and 1994. Several Western sources reported that the new missile entered service in 1994, but hindsight now indicates that this was when the final design was likely approved.

The choice of the TRI 60-2 turbojet essentially defined the YJ-83’s size and aerodynamic form. Measurements of broad aspect photos of missiles with the YJ-83, C802A, and C802 designations all show them to be essentially the same. According to CPMIEC brochure data, the C802A is actually nine millimeters shorter than the original C802, a trivial difference. All other dimensions are the same. With the propulsion plant fixed, and the warhead design largely the same, only about 25% of the YJ-83 missile’s subcomponents were open for significant improvement. Fortunately, those subcomponents were predominantly electronic in nature.

The early YJ-8/8A missiles used hybrid computers for the navigation, autopilot, and radar seeker. A hybrid computer uses a mixture of digital and analog components – that is solid-state elements along with servos, relays, and vacuum tubes. It is interesting to note that only the radio altimeter was fully digital, comprised of solid-state components only, which reflects the likely direct influence from the revolutionary French MM38 Exocet missile.

The inertial reference unit used small mechanical gyros and accelerometers that feed their input to the autopilot computer. Servomechanisms transmitted the steering commands to the four independent rudders. While the Chinese were satisfied with the YJ-8/8A’s overall performance, the electronic and navigation components were very bulky and took up a considerable amount of space inside the missile’s fuselage. By transitioning to all digital, microprocessor based computers, and a more compact strap-down mechanical inertial reference unit; the YJ-83 had more internal volume available for fuel and a slightly larger semi-armor piercing warhead (190 kg vice 165 kg). These changes increased the maximum range of the YJ-83 and its export variant, the C802A, from 120 km to 180 km.

With a well-established airframe and mature propulsion plant already in place, the YJ-83 benefitted from an exceptionally short development timeline and began flight-testing in 1997. Apparently the missile passed through its trials quickly, as it was reported to have reached IOC in 1998. It was formally announced in October 1999 at the National Day Military Parade, and it has slowly worked up to become the dominant ASCM in the PLAN inventory (see Figure 9). The C802A export variant, shown in Figure 10, wasn’t displayed until the DSEi 2005 arms show in London, England. The seven-year delay was likely due to production limitations, and the more urgent need to replace YJ-8A missiles on the PLAN’s warships. The information presented by CPMIEC C802A brochures since 2005 go a long way toward defining the capabilities of the YJ-83 more accurately.

Figure 10: The C802A missile mock-up displayed at the Airshow China 2010 expo is the export variant of the YJ-83, not the the C803 as reported in numerous PLAN related books and journals. Chinese internet photo courtesy of Christopher P. Carlson

In regard to maximum speed, the YJ-83 is most definitely a subsonic missile. The TRI 60-2 turbojet is unaugmented, i.e. no afterburner, and is only capable of speeds up to Mach 0.9. In fact, in the 1990s there weren’t any small turbojets with the ability to support supersonic speeds. The first time an engine with this capability is mentioned is in a 2008 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics conference paper, a historical overview of Mircoturbo SA’s engines, which stated the TRI 60-5+ turbojet first demonstrated supersonic flight capability in 2007.

From a drag perspective, the rounded blunt nose of the YJ-83 is highly inefficient for supersonic flight. Since the effects of the shock wave on the nose dominate supersonic drag, the missile’s overall drag coefficient is heavily influenced by the nose cap’s fineness ratio (length of the nose cap divided by its diameter). The YJ-83 nose has a rather low fineness ratio, thus its drag coefficient would be approximately twice that of a missile with a sharper, more pointed nose such as the one on the 3M-80 Moskit (SS-N-22) family at speeds between Mach 1.5 and 2.0. Higher drag requires more thrust to maintain speed and would dramatically increase fuel consumption, thereby greatly reducing the missile’s range.

Another related problem is the turbojet’s scoop inlet. It is a fixed geometry inlet that is by design optimized for a very narrow speed range. Operating away from that design point incurs a non-trivial loss in engine performance. Furthermore, the inlet face is completely flat, which would make it even less efficient at supersonic speeds as it lacks an upper diverter to isolate the inlet from shockwave interactions with the boundary layer near the missile’s body. Finally, the scoop inlet of the YJ-83/C802A is identical to that on the C802, and similar in design to the scoop inlet on the C602 and C705, all known to be subsonic missiles. All of these observable features strongly point to the inlet design being optimized for subsonic airflow.

Combining the technical limitations of the turbojet, nose cap, and scoop inlet makes it all but impossible for the YJ-83/C802A to be supersonic. And it should be no surprise at all that the CPMIEC brochure lists the C802A’s maximum speed as Mach 0.8 to 0.9 – identical to the earlier C802.

The YJ-83 has often been described as having the ability to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) with its inertial navigation system to improve its accuracy. This claim is also unsupportable.

The first GPS-directed ordnance was the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM, a free falling bomb with an integrated inertial navigation system (INS) and GPS receiver. JDAM began flight-testing in 1996 and reached IOC in 1998. A B-2A stealth bomber first used the JDAM operationally during Operation ALLIED FORCE in the spring of 1999. An in depth Chinese technical paper, published in 1995, stated that Chinese scientists and engineers were well aware of the benefits that GPS could provide to both manned aircraft, as well as weaponry. But there were technical limitations that had to be overcome before they could be implemented in Chinese systems.

By the time the JDAM reached IOC, the YJ-83 was at the end of its flight-testing phase and was about to enter IOC itself. To even consider replacing the mechanical strap-down INS with one using ring laser gyroscopes, an integrated GPS receiver, and a dedicated computer would have delayed the introduction of this missile for at least five years, as China was still in the research and development stage of an indigenous ring laser gyro and GPS receivers had to be obtained from outside the country. And of course, since the GPS was an American system, there would always be concerns about the accuracy of the satellites’ signals. Programmatically, a decision during the 1994 – 97 timeframe to include a GPS feature in the YJ-83 would make little sense.

Indeed, senior Chinese military leaders seem to show more discipline then their Western counterparts in regard to requirements creep with defense acquisition programs, and in this case they would move any satellite navigation requirement on to the next missile in an earlier stage of development. This requirement would also be tied to the development of the indigenous Beidou system that first went operational, with a limited regional capability, in 2000. In looking at the CPMIEC brochures for the C802A, there is no reference to GPS as part of the navigation system. It is, however, explicitly stated as a feature in the C602 brochures (the PLAN version is the YJ-62) that reached IOC in 2005.

A similar argument can also be made against the data link claim. Prior to the late 1990s, only the very large Soviet ASCMs of the SS-N-3 and SS-N-12 families, and the Franco-Italian Otomat had a limited ship-to-missile data link capability. In 1997, both Israel and the U.S. were well along with their respective Harpoon improvement programs. The U.S. Harpoon II under went its first test flight in 2001, while the Israeli Harpoon Extended Performance (HAP) program was completed around the same time. Both missiles included a full two-way data link and an integrated INS/GPS to improve targeting in littoral environments cluttered with civilian shipping. Again, incorporating a command data link this late in the YJ-83’s development would have incurred significant delays. In addition, articles discussing such an advanced data link assume highly accurate navigation information; implicitly suggesting an integrated INS/GPS navigation capability is required.

The CPMIEC brochure on the C802A doesn’t mention a data link as one of the missile’s features. In fact, it is quite the opposite as the brochure explicitly states the C802A is a “fire and forget” weapon. There are three YJ-83K-based land attack missiles with a command data link, two versions of the KD-88 (one electro optic and the other probably IR-guided) and the electro optical homing CM802AKG. These missiles all showed up much later than the YJ-83. The first Internet photos of the electro optical version of the KD-88 were posted in 2006, while the CM802AKG made its initial appearance at the Zhuhai Airshow China 2010 exposition. For the earlier KD-88 missiles, the data link antennas are clearly visible on the missile’s wings. In the case of the CM802AKG, the display mock-up lacked the wing-mounted data link antennas, however, a Chinese news article covering the 2010 Zhuhai show contained a summarized interview with an unidentified CM802AKG designer who explicitly stated that a data link had to be added to the missile. When combined, all these points rule out the possibility of a data link in the YJ-83. But if this is true, how does one explain the reported attributes of adaptive mission planning and post-launch maneuvers? Again brochure data helps close this loop.

In the CPMIEC 2010 C802A brochure, route planning using waypoints is described for the first time. The missile system is capable of storing four different attacking paths with a maximum of three waypoints each. This enables a single ship to launch a multi-axis attack, a significant improvement over the limited range of launch bearings of the earlier YJ-8 and C802 missiles.

For years, the YJ-83 has been tied to the C803 designation. This linkage is based on a flawed assumption that the YJ-81 is the C801, the YJ-82 is the C802, and therefore, the YJ-83 must be the C803. As has been shown throughout this article, this naming convention is incorrect. The export version of the YJ-83 is the C802A, but there is so much reporting on the C803 that it must be dealt with separately. The air-launched version is the YJ-83K and, as one would expect, the export variant is the C802AK (see Figure 11). As for the submarine-launched version, a missile with the YJ-83Q designation hasn’t been seen; nor is it likely it ever will be.

Figure 11: The YJ-83K is the air launched version of the YJ-83, as denoted by the “K” at the end of the designator. The missile in the photo is a training version without the side cable runs. The export variant is the C802AK as shown next to a Pakistani JF-17 fighter-bomber at the Dubai Air Show in 2011. Chinese internet photos courtesy of Christopher P. Carlson

Indigenously designed and built Chinese submarines have torpedo tubes that are about the same length as Western submarines. A review of Chinese torpedoes shows that they are less than seven meters in length, over a meter shorter than Russian weapons. This puts the torpedo tubes on the Song (Type 039), Yuan (Type 041), Shang (Type 093) and others at about 7.1 meters in length. This assumes an additional 0.25 meters clearance on top of the 6.8 meters of the Yu-4 torpedo with a wire dispenser. The Yu-6 looks to be a little shorter, about 6.5 meters long with the torpedo mount dispenser for the wire.

Going back to the earlier discussion, recall that the YJ-82 capsule is about 6.1 meters long, and this is for a YJ-8-size missile without the booster. If the booster were added, the capsule would be at a minimum 7.3 meters long, probably closer to 7.5 meters as the heavier missile would likely require some additional buoyancy to ensure it reached the surface. Both the C802 and YJ-83 start out at almost 6.4 meters in length, and both missiles must have the booster to operate properly – there is no option with this, as the turbojet can only start when the missile is under powered flight. Using simple ratios, this makes the capsule length of a C802 or YJ-83 missile on the order of eight meters, far too large for the probable torpedo tube length of approximately 7.1 meters. Rumors of a YJ-83 submarine-launched variant being developed are based on speculation that doesn’t take into account the limitations of the potential launching platforms.

In addition, the 2011 U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on China’s military developments stated that a new long-range submarine-launched ASCM, with the NATO designation CH-SS-NX-13, was under development for the Song (Type 039), Yuan (Type 041), Shang (Type 093), and the future Type 095 SSN. If this ASCM were a variant of the YJ-83, it would not have an entirely new NATO designation. The YJ-83, being a variant of the C802, would share a similar NATO designation and nickname. Since the C802 is the CSS-N-8 Saccade, the CH-SS-NX-13 designation (note the change in designator format) explicitly shows the U.S. government believes it is a new weapon.

Since about 2002, the “C803” designation has worked its way into just about every Western naval systems book and article. And yet, in over ten years of reporting there has been no formal evidence to support its existence. If one examines the brochures, placards, and mockup displays that CPMIEC has put up at the various arm shows throughout the years, nowhere will the designation “C803” be found. Never. For example, Figure 12 shows a flat screen display at the CPMIEC booth at the Airshow China 2010 expo. The display lists, by range, all the ASCMs that China had on the market – the C701, C704, C802, C705, C802A, and the C602. Furthermore, there was a full mockup display of each of the above missiles on the exhibition hall floor, as well as a smaller scale model. A missile with the “C803” designation was conspicuous by its absence. The recent Zhuhai Airshow China 2012 also lacked any mention of the C803, even though numerous new missile variants were presented to the public for the first time. That is because the “C803,” if it exists at all, is likely still in the developmental stage, probably in early flight testing, and isn’t ready to be marketed.

Figure 12: CPMIEC display at Airshow China 2010. The C803 is not even mentioned on the screen with other Chinese anti-ship missiles offered for sale. Chinese internet photo courtesy of Christopher P. Carlson

If the high performance attributes that have long been ascribed to the YJ-83 are actually for an entirely new advanced missile, a program start date can be roughly estimated by looking at when Western and Chinese-based media sources first started reporting on these capabilities. A quick review of the primary Western references indicates these attributes were first described around 2001-2002.  Chinese blog sites, as well as the Kanwa Defense Review, started to mention these capabilities in late 1999. If this new missile began development between 1999 and 2002, then the integrated INS and satellite navigation system (GPS and Beidou) and the command data link would now be within China’s technical capabilities. However, a small supersonic capable propulsion system would undoubtedly still be the most challenging aspect.

Early on, the “C803” was initially described as a supersonic missile throughout its entire flight. The problem with this is that the new missile couldn’t possibly go 200+ km at supersonic speeds and still fit in a torpedo tube; all existing missiles with these speed and range characteristics are much larger than any torpedo tube ever built. The “smallest” missile is the Russian 3M-55 (SS-N-26) Onyx/Yakhont at 0.67 meters in diameter and 8.9 meters long, not including the launch canister. Given that the U.S. Department of Defense’s report explicitly stated the CH-SS-NX-13 is to go on all classes of modern Chinese attack submarines, it is either a torpedo tube-launched weapon, or every PLAN submarine in the Song, Yuan, Shang, and Type 095 classes would have to be fitted with external launch tubes – a significant modification for the vast majority of these submarines.

This would be tremendously expensive, not to mention occupying most of the available submarine construction way space for years. In short, fitting existing submarines with external tubes for a large supersonic missile seems totally unreasonable from a programmatic perspective. It also completely skips the PLAN’s proven acquisition concept of buy some, study thoroughly, then build our own, and is fraught with technological risk. With the recent memory of the unsuccessful YJ-1/C101 and HY-3/C301 large supersonic ASCM programs still fresh in the PLAN leaderships minds’, neither missile was formally accepted into service, it is highly unlikely they would try to go down this path again.

By the mid-2000s, there was a noticeable change in regard to the “C803’s” speed. Chinese blog sites, and some Western sources started questioning the all-supersonic flight profile, and shifted to a subsonic cruise mode followed by a supersonic terminal attack. This change eliminates the problem of requiring a large missile to meet the 250 km range figure that most of the blog sites coalesced about. If one accepts the premise that the missile had a subsonic cruise mode, with a supersonic terminal attack, then this narrows down the possible propulsion system options considerably, as there is only one ASCM in the world that can do this – Russia’s 3M54 Novator Alpha (SS-N-27).

Recall that Mircoturbo only demonstrated a supersonic flight capable small-scale turbojet in 2007; this would be rather late in the design stage for this missile and there is no reason to believe China could count on such a development six or so years earlier. However, China had signed a contract with Russia for eight Project 636M Kilo class submarines with the ability to fire the export Novator Alpha (3M54E/SS-N-27B) in May 2002, with the first submarines and SS-N-27B missiles being delivered in 2005.

It is likely Chinese engineer’s had access to detailed design documentation for both the submarine and the missile after signing the contract, and this timing corresponds roughly with the first rumors of China developing a new advanced ASCM – one that the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2010 and 2011 annual reports stated was in “development and testing.” While admittedly speculative, and based largely on coincidental inference, there is at least some basis to suggest that the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM may be a modified Chinese copy of the Russian Novator Alpha, a very different missile from the YJ-83.

Eagle Strike-8 Family Tree

It’s been a long haul, but with all the data and discussion completed, Table 1 can now be rebuilt and the confusion eliminated. Table 2 lists all the missiles in the YJ-8 family with their correct PLAN and export designations properly linked, along with their performance characteristics. Those entries with an “est,” indicate that the number is the author’s estimate and not information found in official brochure data or published articles. With regard to the YJ-82, the maximum range has been reduced to reflect the fact that the sustainer rocket motor has to do the booster’s job as well.

Table 2: Eagle Strike-8 missile family designation and characteristics data.

There has been much confusion in published works and on blog sites regarding Chinese ASCMs in general, and the YJ-8 family in particular. It is also fairly safe to say that the confusion is probably not the result of a dedicated deception program; rather it is due to an overload of information, courtesy of the Internet, coupled with a lack of basic engineering expertise by many of the participants. China has had a flurry of activity in their ASCM programs over the last 15 years, and the sheer amount of information that has been made available is unprecedented. Unfortunately, often times the presenters and/or receivers of this information don’t have a technical background, and this resulted in designations and performance specifications being misunderstood, cross-decked between different missiles, or sometimes, just plain made up to fill in the gaps. Without realizing it, the majority of reporters and bloggers “spammed” the world with a multitude of inaccurate and confusing books, articles, and chat room entries.

This article has attempted to sort the wheat from the chaff by looking at the available information through an engineering lens. A lot of the capabilities credited to the YJ-83 were just not technically feasible at the time of the missile’s development; it is an evolutionary weapon, not a quantum leap. A good analogy would be if the YJ-8 is China’s MM38 Exocet, then the YJ-83 is China’s Harpoon Block 1C. This conclusion isn’t meant to be disparaging to China or Chinese engineers. On the contrary, they have made huge strides in a relatively short period of time. Granted, they’ve had a lot of help in the process, but the bottom line is that the PLAN has fielded a very capable missile, as well as a functional targeting system, that supports accurate over the horizon missile strikes against a potential adversary’s surface ships. Not many nations can say they have this capability.

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“China CM802 Ground Missiles at a Range of 220KM”< http://www.venturedata.org/?i88474_China-CM802-ground-missiles-at-a-range-of-220KM >>

“PLA Cruise Missiles/PLA Air – Surface Missiles” < http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Cruise-Missiles.html >

“Microturbo: TRS 18, TRI 10, TRI 40, TRI 60” < http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/microturbo/ >

1999 China National Day Military Parade < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JITYxs7Oeps&feature=related >,< http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z8e0tKKHDdI&feature=relmfu >

China Air and Naval Power < http://china-pla.blogspot.com/2012/01/year-that-was-and-year-that-is-coming.html >

China Defense < http://www.china-defense.com/smf/index.php >

SinoDefence and SinoDefence Forum < http://www.sinodefence.com/ >, < http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ >

Kanwa Information Center, < http://www.kanwa.com/ >

China Defense Blog, < http://china-defense.blogspot.com/ >

Chinese Military Review, < http://chinesemilitaryreview.blogspot.com/ >

Chinese Military Power, < http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/analyses.html >

Chinese Military Forum, < http://centurychina.com/plaboard/ >

China Defense Mashup, < http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/category/chinese-armed-forces/pla-navy >

C801 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, circa 1988

C801 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, circa 1996

C802 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, circa 1987

C802 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, circa 1990

C802 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, circa 1996

C802 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, 2006

C802A Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, 2006

C802A Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, 2010

C602 Multipurpose Anti-Ship Missile, CPMIEC, 2010

ET 34 Heavy Weight Acoustic Homing Torpedo, China Shipbuilding Trading Co., Ltd, circa 2002

ET 36 Heavy Weight Acoustic Homing Torpedo, China Shipbuilding Trading Co., Ltd, circa 2002

Christopher P. Carlson is a co-designer of the Harpoon tactical naval wargame and a bestselling author.

By Christopher P. Carlson

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7:04 AM February 26, 2013

Although your article sought to dispel misunderstandings about this missile family, it likely does no better than propagating further misunderstandings with “speculations” and analysis “based largely on coincidental inference”, not just where you admitted their use in your discussion on the YJ-83 missile’s origins, but also in the overarching tone of your piece throughout. Speculations and coincidental inference can either be right, or spectacularly wrong, as anybody who has ever had analogous first-hand experience with both outcomes in mundane, daily life events can tell you.

That much should be obvious. So it was surprising to me that, despite innumerable opportunities in the course of compiling so many words and paragraphs, you have not made a single mention of an equally possible alternative interpretation of the limited data available with regard to the origins of YJ-83 and others. The alternative interpretation is that China has consistently had a strategy of simultaneous domestic development running in parallel to attempts at foreign acquisitions, but independent from borrowing foreign technical designs, because they could not risk only counting on acquiring foreign designs when many of those past attempts had in fact proved to be unsuccessful either openly or clandestinely. Such an interpretation is well supported by the observable pattern of development for not just the YJ family of missiles, but also military systems across the board. Of course, the same pattern can equally support your version of speculation, which is to allege that either overt or elicit copying of foreign counterparts occurred in every instance. But I believe the alternative interpretation which I proposed here is more plausible and sensible, not only because it is less extreme in tone than yours, but also taking into account a wider sampling of evidence from sources in addition to yours.

This does not preclude the likelihood that some weapons development did in fact have heavy foreign influences, but, unless and until disclosure of actual documentation on this topic occurs for the YJ missiles or any other technology, speculations do not advance understanding much in this regard. They are only self-serving.

The alternative that I mentioned here is just as easy to contemplate or comprehend as the version that dominates your thinking. You were certainly free to choose the interpretation for any given event or set of events, but you had more than ample room in your verbose discussion to mention both, and should have, if you wanted your lengthy effort to have any credibility beyond preaching to the choir.

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Moskva’s sinking, the rise of anti-ship cruise missiles and what that means for the US Navy

On April 14, Ukraine once again shocked the world when it launched two Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles, scoring decisive hits that sunk the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva . Named for the Russian capital Moscow, this once-symbol of Russian naval supremacy in the war on Ukraine carried a crew of roughly 500 and was fully equipped with an arsenal of anti-ship, anti-aircraft and air defense missiles. Despite its foreboding appearance, this pride of the Russian Federation was unable to defend itself against a small number ASCMs, and it paid the ultimate price.

The fallout from the Moskva sinking has been many faceted. First and foremost, it was a strategic success for Ukraine — taking Russia’s most lethal warship out of the war and forcing the remaining fleet to retreat farther away from the coast. Second, the sinking is an inescapable political problem for Russian President Vladimir Putin. His misinformation campaign within Russia, unable to suppress the news of this casualty, now must answer for this destroyed vessel and the well-being of its crew.

There is another message from this catastrophe, however, that both the U.S. Navy and Congress must consider when faced with making long-term spending decisions for our 21st century fleet: If a relatively low-cost, short-range missile such as Neptune can destroy one of the largest warships in the Russian Navy, how do we ensure that ships in our fleet are not doomed to the same fate?

This question becomes even more serious when considering the sophistication of China’s anti-ship missile technology , which significantly dwarfs the range and firepower of Ukraine’s Neptune missile. By way of comparison, the Neptune has a range of roughly 200 miles, travels at subsonic speed and has a warhead that is designed to cripple but not necessarily sink a large ship. China has anti-ship missiles like the Dong Feng 21, or DF21 — whose range is roughly 1,000 miles — and the DF26, whose range is roughly 2,500 miles.

If Ukraine’s Neptune ASCMs upended Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea with ease, clearly the U.S. Navy and Congress must consider whether our pacing threat is capable of the same.

The U.S. Navy has been furiously working on countermeasures, such as longer-range radars and integrated air and missile defense systems, both of which are being incorporated into new ship construction. The Navy also expressed confidence in the contribution of our submarine fleet with a higher budget for submarine construction and plans to extend the life of older Los Angeles-class subs.

These vessels are relatively impervious to the ASCM threat; our surface fleet is not. Today’s surface fleet must be capable to detect, track and engage our adversaries’ most capable anti-ship missiles, and have the structural integrity to survive damage sustained in combat.

President Joe Biden’s proposed Navy budget reflects the need to think through this strategic challenge. On the one hand, the request of $28 billion for Navy shipbuilding is the largest ever. By way of comparison, then-President Donald Trump’s last budget in 2020 requested $19 billion. But Biden’s request also seeks to decommission a number of legacy surface ships that predate the threat posed by modern anti-ship missiles. Predictably, this decision has been greeted by a chorus of protest, but nonetheless the fact remains: Every U.S. ship that sails into harm’s way must represent a relevant threat and be fit to fight.

Among the contested ships proposed for decommissioning are five Ticonderoga-class cruisers. The Navy, in its annual shipbuilding report to Congress , cited several serious concerns with the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, including “poor material condition of these ships due to their age” and “ongoing concerns with overall legacy sensor and [hull, mechanical and electrical] system reliability.” The chief of naval operations, Adm. Mike Gilday, said that the cruiser’s “SPY-1A, SP-1B [radars are] just not sufficient given the threat we’re facing.” By comparison, the oldest Ticonderoga-class cruiser proposed for decommissioning was commissioned in 1986, only four years after the Russian Slava-class cruiser Moskva.

While it is unclear whether the combat system aboard the Moskva failed her crew, it is without doubt its age and seaworthiness played a role in its demise as the crew was overcome by fire, smoke and seawater.

One lesson that the courageous nation of Ukraine has demonstrated to the world is one that Congress should heed: We not only need to invest in a strong Navy, but also in a survivable one. As Congress begins to shape the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, we must take an honest look at whether the platforms we are fielding to engage our adversaries are both relevant and survivable in modern naval warfare.

Rep. Joe Courtney, D-Conn., serves on the House Armed Services Committee and chairs its Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. He founded and co-chairs the Friends of Australia Caucus as well as the AUKUS Working Group (otherwise known as the AUKUS Caucus).

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Growing Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Threat Spurs U.S. Navy $1.5 Billion R&D Program

The U.S. Navy’s Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) program will see steady annual funding through the decade of around $150 million to help carry out the vital mission of countering current and projected anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) threats. The SSDS is the core combat system control element – integrating sensors and electronic countermeasures – for the Quick Reaction Combat Capability project, which improves the self-defense capabilities of aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships.

The world was reminded of the effectiveness of ASCMs in July 2022, after the sinking of the Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva by Neptune anti-ship missiles launched by Ukraine.

Further highlighting the urgency of SSDS work, Lockheed Martin, in the first week of the new year, was awarded a $61.7 million contract for engineering support. Work for this new order is expected to be completed by December 2024.

R&D activities run the full gamut of technology advancement and incorporation efforts. Through FY23, a significant part of this work focused on the Common Aviation Command and Control System Afloat (CAC2S Afloat), information-sharing program integration, and the Non-Lethal weapons project in support of anti-terrorism/force protection missions. A major part of $119.4 million budgeted for SSDS, in FY23 was allocated for CAC2 Afloat and related activities.

Based on an estimated projection of the program’s FY24 defense budget line, approximately $1.5 billion in RDT&E funding will likely be allocated for the SSDS program over the next ten years.

Andrew Dardine

Andrew Dardine is lead analyst for Forecast International's Defense Electronic Systems group. He is the primary author of Forecast International's Electronic Warfare Forecast and co-author of Electro-Optical Systems Forecast and C4I Forecast. Andrew is also a regular contributor to FI's Defense & Security Monitor blog, offering insights into developing technologies such as directed-energy and next-generation jamming systems. His analysis of such vital market areas as EO/IR systems and electronic countermeasures technology has been cited in Defense News, Aerospace Daily, and Bloomberg Businessweek, among other news media. He has also written about the electronic defense market for Aviation Week and the Journal of Electronic Defense.

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• Missiles of the World

3M-54 Kalibr/Club (SS-N-27)

The 3M-54 Kalibr/Klub (SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) is a Russian short-range ship-, and submarine-launched anti-ship missile. The Sizzler is part of the Kalibr family of missiles and has several export versions known as the ‘Klub’ missile series.

3M-54 Kalibr/Club (SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) at a Glance

SS-N-27 Development

Ss-n-27 specifications, ss-n-27 service history.

• James O’Halloran, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016, 2015, (United Kingdom: IHS), 174.
• “3M-54/Caliber SS-N-27 Sizzler”, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/club.htm.
• Jane’s Strategic, 174.
• Office of Naval Intelligence, “The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition”, December 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/12/18/document-office-of-naval-intelligence-report-on-russian-navy.
• Commodore Stephen Saunders RN, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2016-2017, (United Kingdom: IHS), pp. 677-707.
• Nikolai Novichkov and Peter Felstead, “Russian Project 971 Submarines to be Armed with Kalibr Missiles”, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, 24 Marc 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/59030/russian-project-971-submarines-to-be-armed-with-kalibr-missiles/

Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles and the U.S. Marine Corps: Options Available

Peter ong reports on the land-based anti-ship missile (lbasm) options on the table for the usmc and us army ground forces to use against threatening enemy ships, with the latest from virtual modern day marine expo 2020..

Peter Ong 27 Sep 2020

Peter Ong story with additional reporting by Xavier Vavasseur

“Army land-attack…capability.” Attacking ground targets at a distance is what MLRS and HIMARS are currently for, but they are outmatched by Russia rocket artillery, and their longest-range projectile is the upgraded ATACMS missile with a maximum reach of about 188 miles (300 km). The Army is exploring a Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) missile with a 313-mile (500 km) range. That’s a figure set not by tactics or technology but the limits of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which Russian violations have arguably rendered void. Like land-based anti-ship missiles, long-range land-based ground attack missiles are a major part of our adversaries’ arsenals which we lack. By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Breaking Defense on April 26, 2016

Fast-forward to September, 2020, four years since the quote from Breaking Defense and the U.S. Marine Corps (U.S.M.C.) in conjunction with the U.S. Army do have some Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) options on the table for ground forces to use against threatening enemy ships since the United States abandoned the INF Treaty. The Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) Anti-Ship missile options include: The long-range subsonic Maritime Tomahawk, the ATACMS to Precision Strike Missile, the stealthy Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), the stealthy Naval Strike Missile, and the high-speed SM-6 multi-role missile.

Technically, another option would be 155mm M109A6/A7 U.S. Army howitzers firing guided rocket-assisted Hypervelocity Projectiles (HVP) or GPS-guided extended-range rounds . HVP rounds can have multiple purposes in downing cruise missiles, attacking land targets, to targeting and hitting moving ships, but Anti-ship artillery rounds are outside the scope of this article that focuses on Anti-ship missiles.  Furthermore, the U.S.M.C. does not possess any 155mm M109 howitzers as of September 2020 and Force Design 2030 (FD2030) recommends removing the M777 towed howitzers from the Marine Corps’ inventory.

“The [U.S.] Army is pursuing longer-range, but much larger, heavier, bulkier systems than we are.  But they’re not either or; we’re going to need both [U.S. Army and USMC].” General David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S.M.C. at Virtual Modern Day Marine Expo, 2020, commenting about Long- Range Precision Fires differences between the U.S. Army and U.S.M.C.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides an excellent overview of the choices of Anti-ship missiles available to future U.S. ground forces.  Most of these missiles are already fielded with the U.S. Armed Forces and can thus be modified for ground launch via a tactical truck or a towed trailer. The goal of the LBASM CBO list is to provide a variety of ground-fired anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) options (for the U.S. Marine Corps) than the 100-nautical mile (115 mi) subsonic Harpoon ASCM that has not been fielded as a LBASM by the U.S. ground forces. The target year for fielding these LBASMs is around FY2023 even with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Readers should note that the LBASM options presented here, even if purchased and fielded, offer the U.S. Marine Corps a limited ground-based defense against enemy warships, and are not meant to act as a guaranteed deterrent against a huge armada attack. At best, the U.S.M.C. could field a few launchers at strategic locations to prevent a number of hostile enemy ships from encroaching, but the Corps’ logistics, tight budgets, and smaller force size than a conventional army would limit these LBASM launchers from being deployed in large quantities. 

Furthermore, unlike Russia and China’s larger modern supersonic and even Hypersonic ACSMs that fly at higher speeds with the intent of ramming and detonating into NATO warships, U.S. LBASMs are often smaller and lighter, subsonic, shorter in range, stealthier in design and approach by using evasive maneuvers, and carry a lighter warhead that necessitates firing a few missiles to cripple or destroy a large warship.  Some U.S. LBASMs have the smart seeker and artificial intelligence features of being programmed to hit a specific area or target on an enemy warship, such as the bridge or the ship’s ammunition magazine area.  With modern warships’ electronic jamming, decoy countermeasures, and active close-in self-protection kinetic defense, a hit by LBASMs is obviously not guaranteed.

Maritime Strike Tomahawk

The U.S. Navy’s subsonic Block Va (i.e. Block 5a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) is capable of being reprogrammed and rerouted in flight to attack moving ships out to around 900 nautical miles (or 1,035 miles/1,666 km…the exact range has not been fully disclosed) with a 1,000-pound warhead. Maritime Strike Tomahawk is by far the longest-range ASCM option although it would take about two hours to fly 900nm miles at a speed of around 550mph. The MST is slated to become operational in 2023 with the probable preferred U.S.M.C. ground launcher being a quartet of MK41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells mounted on a towed semitrailer (see photo).

ATACMS => Precision Strike Missile

The Mach 3+Lockheed Martin MGM-140 U.S. Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) could be converted into an U.S.M.C. LBASM with a new seeker head to target moving ships, and enhanced with longer range estimated to be around 313 miles (500 km) in range.  Such a modification to ATACMS is called the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and uses the latest weapons miniaturization technology to slim down the ATACMS missile’s diameter, allowing for two PrSMs to fit into a pod once occupied by a single ATACMS. Plans call for the PrSMs fielding in 2023 with upgrades of an imaging infrared seeker and home-on-radar seeker in 2025 with further plans to increase the range to 700-800 km or 430-500 miles. The preferred Marine Corps ground launcher would be a FMTV 6X6 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 tactical truck with a box launcher capable of carrying two ATACMS or four Precision Strike Missiles.

Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)

The stealthy Lockheed Martin air-launched AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is a high-subsonic ASCM with an estimated range of 300 nautical miles (560 km, 350 mi) and carries a 1,000-pound warhead. 

LRASM uses its stealthy design, a jam-resistant GPS/ Inertial Navigation System, and an imaging infrared homing seeker feeding a library of target matching software to fly around countermeasures and enemy radars using radar warning receivers.  LRASM uses a low-power datalink and the described sensor features to plot and fly the best evasive maneuvers to approach, hopefully undetected, against an enemy warship and avoid its countermeasures.  LRASM does not emit signals, and can be programmed to select a specific target area on the ship.  In addition, LRASM could also attack land targets following a software upgrade.  All these features do not come cheap as a single LRASM will cost the Marine Corps around $3 to $4 million dollars in FY2021. 

If selected, the preferred U.S.M.C. ground launcher for LRASM would probably be the M142 HIMARS, as well as the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) truck and the Logistic Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) from Oshkosh Defense.

Naval Strike Missile (NSM)

The Norwegian Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) is mounted on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships and has a range similar to the Harpoon ASCM of 100 nautical miles (115 mi). This Anti-ship/ Land Attack Cruise Missile has a small warhead of 276-pounds and flies at high-subsonic speed.

In May 2019, it was announced that the USMC will be procuring Naval Strike Missiles from Raytheon. Naval News understands that the USMC will likely integrate the NSM on unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) “ ROGUE Fires ” vehicles.

Built using a stealthy design and a composite structure, the NSM has an extremely low sea skimming mode and makes random high-agility maneuvers on terminal approach to avoid the enemy warship’s hard and softkill countermeasures. Using imaging infrared, GPS, inertial navigation, and terrain reference sensors, the NSM can automatically recognize, discriminate, and target enemy warships independently.  If selected and fielded as part of LBASM, the U.S.M.C.’s preferred ground launcher would probably be the M142 HIMARS, as well as the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) truck and the Logistic Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) from Oshkosh Defense with each truck carrying four NSMs and up to six launchers providing 24 NSMs that can be networked together with radio or optical fiber up to 10 km (6.2 mi) away.

Standard SM-6 Block 1A missile

The U.S. Navy’s RIM-174 Standard Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM), or Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block 1A family of Anti-air radar inertial-guided, active and semi-active radar homing missiles can also assume the role as Anti-ship missiles.  Currently in production for the U.S. Navy, the SM-6 has an estimated “official range of 130 nmi (150 mi; 240 km), but it could be anywhere from 200 nmi (230 mi; 370 km) to as much as 250 nmi (290 mi; 460 km),”.  According to TheWarZone , the U.S. Army wants the naval SM-6 Block 1A as a LBASM so the U.S. Marine Corps might follow if the Army decides to field it.

Unlike the other LBASMs listed here, the main benefits of having the SM-6 Block 1A as a LBASM are that it can fly at Mach 3.5 (instead of subsonic speeds) and has the added multi-role advantage of being able to provide Anti-air, Anti-missile, and Anti-ship defense on one tactical truck using the proper radar sensors unlike any other LBASMs shown here. 

The main disadvantages of using SM-6 Block 1As in the Anti-ship role is their small 140-pound blast fragmentation warhead, meaning more than one SM-6 is required to cripple or destroy a large enemy warship, and the high cost of the missile at $4.87 million each, way more than the base price of firing a Maritime Tomahawk (estimated at $1.87 million each) or any of the other LBASMs listed here.  The high unit cost makes the SM-6 not the primary choice for a LBASM.  Nonetheless, 500 SM-6s were delivered to the U.S. Navy with plans to produce 1,800 missiles, some of which may become LBASMs fired from to-be-determined U.S. Marine Corps tactical trucks and trailers if fielded.

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Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)

Long Range Anti-Ship Missile

Lrasm: long-range anti-surface cruise missile..

Our warfighters must be able to deter and defend, which is the core focus of LRASM. In order to penetrate today’s sophisticated integrated air defense environments anti-ship missiles must be able to employ considerable precision routing, guidance and stealth, day or night and in all weather conditions. Derived from the combat-proven Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), LRASM is a precision-guided intelligent anti-ship missile design to interdict a variety of surface threats at very long range, navigating semi-autonomously to the target, and delivering a precise payload from safe, standoff range.  

Multi-platform, multi-role, multi-mission.

Lockheed Martin is currently executing the Accelerated Acquisition contract for the LRASM Deployment Office, further maturing technologies delivered as an early operational capability for the U.S. Air Force B-1B and U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F.

We are also investing in a surface-launch variant to be used by the VLS, currently in the fleet.

LRASM brings additional, advanced long-range sea and land strike capabilities to the 5th Generation F-35 fleet, with initial fit checks completed and ongoing integration efforts.

LRASM technology will reduce dependence on ISR platforms, network links, and GPS navigation in aggressive electronic warfare environments. This advanced guidance operation means the weapon can use gross target cueing data to find and destroy its pre-defined target in denied environments. Precision lethality against surface and land targets ensures the system will become an important addition to the US Navy warfighter’s arsenal. LRASM provides range, survivability, and lethality that no other current system provides.

LRASM Air Launched Flight Testing

LRASM successfully completed B-1B integration and flight testing, leading the way to an early operational capability (EOC) declaration by the U.S. Air Force in December 2018. The program now marches on with F/A-18E/F flight testing leading to an EOC milestone in 2019.

LRASM Boost Test Vehicle flight from Mk 41 Vertical Launch System

The successful LRASM Boosted Test Vehicle (BTV) flight on 4 Sep '13 at WSMR Desert Ship Range, demonstrated a LRASM launch from a MK 41 VLS canister using the proven Mk-114 booster. Lockheed Martin is investing in the surface-launch LRASM effort to reduce program risk and accelerate time to fielding an OASuW capability on US Navy surface combatants. LRASM can be employed from DDGs and CGs with only software modifications to existing launch control systems. LRASM is the low-risk and low-cost solution for our naval warfighter.

Stay Informed: The Latest News on LRASM

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Center for International Maritime Security

Fighting DMO, Pt. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes

Read Part 1 on defining distributed maritime operations. Read Part 2 on anti-ship firepower and U.S. shortfalls. Read Part 3 on assembling massed fires and modern fleet tactics. Read Part 4 on weapons depletion and last-ditch salvo dynamics. Read Part 5 on salvo patterns and maximizing volume of fire. Read  Part 6  on platform advantages and combined arms roles. Read Part 7 on aircraft carrier roles in distributed warfighting.

By Dmitry Filipoff

Introduction

China’s arsenal of anti-ship weapons is truly a force to be reckoned with, and is superior to that of the United States in many respects. These weapons and the tactics that make use of them can be at the forefront of China’s ability to deny U.S. forces access to the Western Pacific. As both great powers build up and evolve their anti-ship firepower, it is critical to assess their respective schemes of massing fires, and how these schemes may compete and interact in a specific operational context, such as a war sparked by a Taiwan contingency. Whichever side wields the superior combination of tools and methods for massing fires may earn a major advantage in deterrence and in conflict.  

China’s Anti-Ship Missile Firepower

China has assembled a wide array of anti-ship missiles and naval force structure for generating massed fires. These weapons and the way they have been distributed across platform types come together to form an outline for how China can mass fires against warships. These weapons should be assessed through a framework of the specific traits that highlight their mass firing potential, including launch cell compatibility, platform compatibility, range, maximum flight time, numbers of weapons procured, and numbers of weapons fielded per platform.

China’s main anti-ship missiles are the YJ-12, YJ-18, YJ-83, DF-21, and DF-26. The YJ-12 serves as a primary weapon for bombers and coastal launchers; the YJ-18 is a primary weapon for submarines and large surface warships; the YJ-83 is fielded by multirole aircraft and surface warships smaller than destroyers; and the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles are China’s most long-ranged land-based anti-ship weapons. 1 While there are other anti-ship missiles in China’s inventory, those appear relatively uncommon compared to these five weapons.

Each of these weapons, save for perhaps the YJ-83, is relatively modern and introduced into China’s anti-ship arsenal within the past 10-15 years. 2 While the recency of introduction suggests the inventory may not be deep enough for a major conflict, China’s precise weapon procurement rates are not as publicly discernible compared to U.S. forces. However, the U.S. Department of Defense has stated that China conducted more than 135 ballistic missile live firings for testing and training in 2021, which “was more than the rest of the world combined,” excluding conflict zones. The DoD made the same remark about 2020, with China firing 250 ballistic missiles that year, and earlier again for 2019, but with no accompanying figure. 3 These firing rates suggest that China has invested in a robust missile production industrial base and recognizes the value of building out deep inventories of precision weapons.

The YJ-83 is a relatively common Chinese anti-ship missile that is widely fielded across its surface and air forces. It is similar to the Harpoon in being a smaller, shorter-ranged weapon that is not compatible with vertical launch cells. For warships, it is primarily fielded in box launchers aboard Chinese frigates, corvettes, and small missile boats. Multirole aircraft can field this weapon as well, making it the primary anti-ship missile for non-bomber PLA aircraft, such as land- and carrier-based aviation. 4

The lack of launch cell compatibility makes it fielded in relatively low numbers aboard the compatible platforms. The short range and low magazine depth forces the extensive concentration of platforms to mass large enough volumes of fire. The range of the weapon is short enough that aviation can be forced to concentrate in large numbers within or near the limits of modern shipboard air defenses, although attacking aircraft may still have enough space to fire and then dive to spoil semi-active illumination. Like Harpoon, the greater the proportion of YJ-83s in a mass firing sequence, the greater the risk the force will incur.

The YJ-18 strongly stands out in the PLA arsenal for being its only widely fielded anti-ship missile that is compatible with vertical launch cells. 5 It is fielded aboard China’s large surface combatants, the Type 52D destroyer and Type 55 cruiser, and a torpedo tube-compatible version of the weapon is fielded aboard PLA submarines. 6 By combining a long range of more than 300 miles with launch-cell compatibility, the YJ-18 offers a strong capability for the Chinese surface fleet to distribute across wider areas and still combine large volumes of fire. Primarily because of the YJ-18, it is starkly clear that large U.S. surface warships are heavily outgunned by their Chinese equivalents, and must compensate for the disparity in offensive firepower with superior tactics, defenses, and combined arms methods.

The YJ-12 has similar range to the YJ-18 and is compatible with a larger variety of launch platforms, including coastal launchers and bombers, but crucially it lacks launch cell compatibility. 7 The range of China’s bombers and the roughly 300-mile range of the weapon could allow bombers to reach out at long distances, concentrate aircraft well beyond the range of warship air defenses, and fire effectively first. By being compatible with bombers, this weapon can be at the forefront of China’s ability to fire on warships at extreme ranges from the mainland.

The YJ-12 and YJ-18 feature terminal sprint capability, a major force multiplier that is absent from U.S. anti-ship missiles. By accelerating to around Mach 2.5-3.0 after breaking over the horizon view of a warship, these missiles can offer less than half the reaction time for the target warship to react compared to subsonic weapons. 8 This allows the missile to cross much more distance from the horizon before the warship can make its first intercept, and reduces the time it takes the missile to get inside the minimum engagement range of major warship defenses. By substantially reducing reaction time, terminal sprint allows lethal effect to be achieved with less volume of fire compared to a slower weapon. These weapons still fly at subsonic speed for most of their flight to maximize range, especially when traveling at sea-skimming altitude. This strengthens the imperative to intercept sea-skimming missiles with aviation well before they can activate their deadly terminal sprint capability against warships.

China’s DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles offer critical asymmetric advantages by offering a combination of especially high speed and long range, allowing them to be at the forefront of China’s ability to mass fires against warships. This combination of traits also allows these weapons to combine fires with a large variety of other platforms and payloads on a theater-wide scale. If a Chinese platform is firing anti-ship missiles at a naval formation within the second island chain, the defenders cannot discount the possibility that the salvo could be bolstered by high-end ballistic fires launched from the Chinese mainland. However, if the concentrations of these land-based launch platforms are maintained at their widely separated bases across the mainland, then this will lessen the overlap between their fields of fire and dilute their delivery density. 9

With the anti-ship Tomahawk, the U.S. may soon finally have anti-ship firepower that is more widespread and long-range than what resides within China’s arsenal. But it is a major assumption to think China’s anti-ship capability will remain static in the next 10-15 years as the U.S. builds up its anti-ship Tomahawk inventory. The state of advantage could change if China fields anti-ship weapons similar in design to the Tomahawk, or fields more of its novel missile types, such as the YJ-21 anti-ship missile that was reportedly test fired from a Type 55 cruiser in 2022. 10 The YJ-21 could stand to be the first hypersonic, launch-cell compatible, anti-ship missile for Chinese surface forces. While forthcoming variants of the SM-6 could stand to offer similar capability to U.S. forces, it will likely be subject to multiple factors that dilute its anti-ship potential as described in Part 2 . 11 China has clearly demonstrated a strong interest in developing advanced anti-ship missile capability, and will be motivated to maintain its edge.

Key Elements of China’s Naval Force Structure

China’s force structure features much more variety than the U.S. military in terms of the platform types that can field long-range anti-ship firepower. Select elements and traits of this growing force structure deserve to be highlighted in light of their ability to contribute to mass fires.

Within the past decade China’s surface fleet has emerged as a major force in its own right. After producing multiple short-run variants, several modern warship designs entered serial production, dramatically increasing numbers and capability. Today China’s surface fleet is mainly composed of about eight cruisers, 30 destroyers, 30 frigates, 50 corvettes, and 60 fast-attack missile boats. 12 Most of the PLA surface fleet’s capability to fire large volumes of long-range anti-ship missile firepower is concentrated in its large surface combatants, a force of nearly 40 warships that was built within the past ten years. If current production trends hold, this force of large surface combatants could double to around 80 warships within the next decade. 13

The asymmetry of certain scenarios and force structure can allow PLA surface warships to take on more favorable missile loadouts compared to the U.S. Navy. Given its expeditionary nature, the U.S. surface fleet faces greater pressures to split its magazine depth across multiple missions, including anti-ship, anti-air, anti-submarine, and land-attack missions. If the Chinese surface fleet is operating within the second island chain, much of the demand for land-attack capability could be offloaded to forces on the Chinese mainland, such as by having bombers, multirole aircraft, and ballistic missiles filling the demand for land-attack strikes. While Chinese frigates and corvettes have virtually no long-range anti-ship or land-attack capability, their anti-submarine capability could alleviate further demand on the larger surface combatants. The U.S. Navy by comparison does not feature frigates or corvettes, which concentrates its surface fleet’s division of labor in its large surface combatants.

By being spared of the need to devote considerable magazine space to land-attack and anti-submarine weapons, China’s large surface combatants could allocate a larger proportion of their magazines to anti-air and anti-ship weapons than equivalent U.S. warships. This advantage could give China’s surface fleet more capability and staying power on a ship-for-ship basis when it comes to fleet-on-fleet salvo combat.

China’s surface forces can be significantly bolstered by non-military elements. China’s coast guard and maritime militia feature numerous vessels, and its commercial shipping fleet is massive. While these ships feature little in the way of firepower, they can considerably enhance the distribution of Chinese forces and complicate targeting by allowing the Chinese surface fleet to mask its presence among these more numerous vessels. China could also reap considerable gains in the ability to mass fires and pose a far more distributed threat if it opts to extensively field containerized launchers that could fire weapons and decoys from commercial ships. 14 Missile seekers that are programmed to avoid striking contacts that look like civilian vessels may struggle to differentiate these threats. The threat of hidden arsenal ships residing within China’s massive shipping fleet could pose an especially distributed challenge.  

China’s naval service fields bombers within its force structure, unlike the U.S. military. The H-6J variant is optimized for maritime strike and can carry up to six YJ-12 missiles, an increase from the four missiles the H-6G can carry. 15 This increased carrying capacity translates into fewer platforms needing to concentrate around a target to mass enough fires.

These bombers are relatively limited compared to their American counterparts with regard to magazine depth. An American B-1B bomber can launch 24 LRASM missiles, a volume of fire that is four times greater than what an H-6J can muster, and with similar weapons range. 16 The U.S. can launch a greater volume of fire from its bombers by fielding cruise missiles that are small enough to be compatible with internal rotary launchers, substantially increasing the magazine depth per bomber. By comparison, YJ-12s are large enough weapons that they can only be carried via external hardpoints, limiting the magazine depth of the platform.

However, as mentioned in Part 2 , the U.S. Air Force is procuring so few LRASM weapons that long-range anti-ship capability is almost non-existent for the air service. 17 The fact that China has dedicated maritime strike bombers within its naval service suggests it is less likely to grossly under-resource their inventory of anti-ship weapons.

The PLAN operates about 50 attack submarines, where all but a few are diesel-electric, which limits their range and endurance compared to nuclear-powered submarines. 18 A critical shortfall is the lack of vertical launch cells in all PLAN diesel-electric submarines. They are confined to firing anti-ship missiles from their handful of torpedo tubes, which severely restricts their volume of fire. 19 But the ability of these submarines to field anti-ship missiles with terminal sprint capability may allow them to compensate for low volume of fire by launching close-range, high-speed missile attacks against warships.

China fields hundreds of land-based multirole aircraft that could be critical in a naval conflict, including for growing or attriting volumes of fire and securing information advantage. 20 Land-based aircraft tend to have longer range than carrier-based aircraft, but most of China’s land-based aircraft are fielded by the PLA Air Force, which will naturally have less familiarity and practice operating over maritime spaces than PLA naval aviation. 21 But these aircraft will still likely operate over or near maritime spaces in a Taiwan contingency, making them a considerable factor in naval operations.

Among the many trends of China’s evolving naval force structure, its growing inventory of aircraft carriers stands to substantially tilt the naval balance in critical ways. The U.S. ability to overwhelm China’s naval forces will be enhanced by its expanding arsenal of new anti-ship weapons, but maybe not as much as hoped for because of China’s carriers. A world in which the U.S. military has finally built up enough anti-ship Tomahawks and LRASMs to mass fires against warships is also likely to be a world where China has built around six aircraft carriers, if current production trends hold. 22 China is poised to substantially change the balance of naval aviation in the Pacific during the same timeframe it will take the U.S. Navy to field enough weapons to mass anti-ship fires. China’s newfound carrier capability will then be poised to heavily attrit America’s newfound anti-ship capability, which will further drive up the volume of fire the U.S. will have to muster.

But while China may be on track to field more carriers in the Pacific than the U.S. Navy, the U.S. may maintain a critical edge by fielding increasing numbers of the F-35 aboard carriers. It is unclear if China’s carriers will field as many 5 th generation aircraft, potentially giving the U.S. major advantages in sensing, networking, and battle management functions that are powerful force multipliers for massing fires.

Nonetheless, the following dueling concepts of operation for mass fires take place in a hypothetical future 10-15 years from now, with both sides fielding considerable carrier aviation capability, and with China able to project a substantial amount of multirole naval aviation over the Philippine Sea.

China versus the U.S. and Competing Schemes of Mass Fires

The U.S. and China have developed forces that assemble massed fires in different ways. In looking at how a potential conflict may play out, it is critical to conceptualize how these different schemes would interact and oppose one another. A comparison of mass firing schemes highlights each nation’s advantages and disadvantages in the context of the other’s capabilities, and forms an outline for how kinetic exchanges could transpire.

What all of China’s mainstay anti-ship weapons have in common is that they can travel to the limits of their range in roughly 30 minutes. The firing sequences of Chinese massed fires will typically be much shorter and concentrated than that of U.S. forces, such as those that rely heavily on Tomahawks (Figure 1). There will be comparatively less opportunity to counter PLA massed fires after they begin, where a shorter mass firing sequence reduces the defender’s opportunity to reposition defensive airpower to attrit inbound salvos, launch interruptive strikes against waiting archers, and organize last-ditch salvos and their contributing fires. The PLA will benefit from a faster decision cycle compared to forces using much longer firing sequences, where multiple rounds of PLA massed fires could fit into the time it takes to mount a single firing sequence using Tomahawks that are launched near the limits of their range. The emphasis will instead be more about complicating the PLA decision to fire through distribution and other means, carefully pre-positioning airpower to attrit salvos soon after they are launched, and striking PLA archers early enough that they cannot initiate massed fires.

U.S. forces may typically have longer firing sequences by virtue of the Tomahawk’s long range and subsonic speed. However, the longer flight time of the mainstay U.S. anti-ship weapon will give it more opportunity to grow the volume of fire and more ability to leverage waypointing tactics, especially to increase the complexity of threat presentation and to feint attacks in a bid to trigger last-ditch fires. This long range and flight time also translates into more opportunity to maneuver across different salvo patterns, and more ability to recover from deception in pursuit of new contacts. China will be hard pressed to match these advantages, especially when its anti-ship weapons that rival the range of Tomahawk are ballistic missiles that are much more constrained in their ability to maneuver and reorient along their fixed ballistic trajectories.

However, the long range and flight time of Tomahawk gives the defender more opportunity to bring airpower to bear against salvos, and where the range of Tomahawk could outstrip the range of friendly escorting aircraft. Mass firing sequences that heavily depend on Tomahawk will have to strongly emphasize salvo patterns and waypointing tactics to compensate for the weapon’s survivability challenges and to preserve as much volume of fire as possible. These specific challenges and tactics also make Tomahawk especially dependent on naval aviation to provide critical information and air defense support to Tomahawk salvos. If PLA warships manage to get within range of Tomahawk-equipped warships, then many of the advantages that come with Tomahawk’s longer range and flight time will be minimized.

China may hold a critical advantage with respect to interruptive strikes, which are used to disrupt an active firing sequence as it is unfolding. China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles can offer plenty of options for interruptive strikes by virtue of their high speed and long range. Warships that are suspected of being waiting archers in a lengthy firing sequence can be attractive targets for ballistic missile strikes, encouraging those warships to launch earlier and leverage waypointing to artificially increase their time to target. But this comes at the expense of frontloading the firing sequence and reducing the distribution of fires across time. China’s potentially superior ability to launch interruptive strikes could then shift the overall interaction between competing schemes of mass fires. China’s superior interruptive ability can lead to the opponent frontloading their firing sequences, which subsequently affords China more time and opportunity to bring defensive airpower to bear against the incoming salvos, while also giving China more time to organize last-ditch salvos and their contributing fires.

Anti-ship ballistic missiles can cast a shadow over the air defense doctrines of numerous forces operating within the weapons engagement zone, where warships may be forced to split their attention between sea-skimming and ballistic threats simultaneously. Warships deeper in the battlespace may be forced to radiate active sensors for the sake of defending more distant friendly forces from incoming ballistic threats, since being deeper in the battlespace can translate into more opportunity to make midcourse intercepts of those ballistic threats. By being forced to radiate and launch against ballistic threats, these warships could be highlighting their positions to the adversary. But the ability to shoot down ballistic threats will be a critical form of insurance against China’s ability to leverage its potential superiority in interruptive strikes. In this sense, effective ballistic missile defense can interrupt China’s interruptive strikes, and shift the balance of advantage in the ensuing interactions between competing schemes of massed fires.

China’s Multiple Layers of Massed Fires

China’s ability to mass anti-ship fires can be understood in terms of multiple layers. These layers are a function of the range of the weapons and the platforms that field them. Each layer of land-based anti-ship capability adds a new combination of platform types for growing the volume of fire and increasing the complexity of threat presentation. Within these more fixed layers of land-based capability, naval forces can be maneuvered to augment the density of the overlapping fields of fire. While weapons range and platform range are not enough on their own to extrapolate precise concepts of operation, they are an important point of departure for outlining options and limits.

The longest-ranged layer of how China can start to combine anti-ship fires from across land-based platform types is a mix of DF-26 ballistic missiles and bombers. These two delivery systems are China’s most far-reaching options for delivering anti-ship missile firepower, and could come together to threaten naval targets starting at around 1,800 miles from the mainland. 23

Massing fires from this limited combination of platforms poses its own set of challenges, especially by having only two main sources of firepower to draw upon. If bombers are destroyed before they can fire, PLA commanders would be forced to compensate by increasing the expenditure of their most high-end anti-ship weapons. Alternatively, if the kill chains enabling the ballistic missiles are undermined or uncertain, the transiting bombers would have virtually no options to increase their volume of fire while in flight, and may be forced to close with targets to secure targeting information for platforms other than themselves.

Bomber sorties could feature large numbers of aircraft to build a greater margin of overmatch to ensure the volume of fire can remain overwhelming in the face of unforeseen challenges and attrition. This was essentially Soviet naval aviation’s doctrine for distant anti-carrier group strikes, where upwards of 70-100 bombers would fly more than a thousand miles from their bases and then heavily concentrate within 250 miles of a carrier battle group to mass fires. 24 The need to mass fires at extremely long range confined the Soviet Navy’s options to gambling a major amount of its bomber force structure in each individual carrier attack, while being limited to homogenous force packages to produce mass fires instead of leveraging combined arms tactics. PLA naval aviation is perhaps in the more favorable position of being able to combine bomber fires with ballistic fires at extreme ranges, allowing fewer bombers to be risked per strike, and being able to compensate for bomber attrition in a timely manner with high-speed ballistic weapons.

Even so, China may not want to risk sending unescorted bombers into distant oceans and risk losing these valuable platforms to opposing carrier air wings, where air wings can better optimize themselves for early warning and air defense when reacting to especially long-range attacks. 25 Even with the possibility of combining fires with ballistic missiles, the bombers still have to concentrate their platforms inside a 300-mile radius of the target to launch fires. This could present a lucrative and concentrated target for U.S. carrier aircraft, where only a handful of fighters would be enough to credibly threaten a concentration of unescorted bombers. And the fighters can preserve the anti-air threat to bombers even if the bombers drop below the radar horizons of their target warships. Extensive aerial refueling would be required to ensure the bombers have enough aerial escorts that can accompany them on long-range strikes and contend against carrier air. The limitations imposed by refueling copious amounts of smaller escorting aircraft to extreme range could constrain the range of the larger bomber platforms, despite the extensive reach of those aircraft.

While China certainly has some ability to combine fires at the initial 1,800-mile layer, it remains a highly unfavorable scheme for massing fires, especially due to the challenge of providing extreme range aerial escort to bomber forces and a potentially heavy reliance on its most high-end anti-ship weapons.

With the twin overlapping threats of bombers and DF-26s starting at around 1,800 miles from the Chinese mainland, U.S. naval forces can travel another thousand miles closer to China before encountering the next major layer that adds another combination of land-based air and missile forces. These forces include a mix of hundreds of multirole aircraft such as the JH-7, J-10, and J-16 platforms that can field the YJ-83 anti-ship missile. 26 The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile also comes into range at around 900 miles from the Chinese mainland, assuming the launchers are near the coastline. 27

This distance is still beyond the range of unrefueled U.S. carrier air strikes, allowing air wings to focus mainly on defense. But this distance is also roughly where U.S. warships and bombers would first be able to fire on Taiwan and the Chinese mainland with land-attack cruise missiles, creating a strong incentive for the PLA to mount a strong naval and air defense at this distance.

Attacking Chinese multirole aircraft would need to heavily concentrate in large numbers within 100 miles of their targets to mass overwhelming fires with the short-ranged YJ-83. But these aircraft are much better able to defend themselves against carrier aircraft compared to bombers and can diversify their loadouts to include a mix of anti-air and anti-ship weapons. If U.S. aircraft are unable to prevent these PLA aircraft from firing their anti-ship weapons, then the number of aerial targets will drastically multiply after they launch their volume of fire. U.S. aircraft will be forced to divide their attention and anti-air weapons between firing on enemy aircraft and firing on enemy missiles that are roughly ten minutes away from impacting friendly warships. And once PLA aircraft fire their anti-ship missiles, they could be well-positioned to attack the U.S. aircraft attempting to attrit the salvos.

U.S. carrier aircraft can certainly be in a position to inflict similar dilemmas on an adversary with their own anti-ship strikes. But a critical difference is that the aforementioned PLA land-based multirole aircraft have longer range than the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 aircraft, and airfields can have a higher sortie generation rate than carriers. 28 These advantages can give them more opportunity to inflict these dilemmas and with potentially greater numbers on their side.  

However, projecting substantial airpower to nearly 800 miles beyond China’s mainland will still create major demands for aerial tanking capability. To make the most of tankers to extend range, this in-flight refueling would have to take place near potentially contested areas, such as the airspace near Taiwan, the Ryukus, and the Batanes island chain. If the airspace around these locales can be effectively contested, China may be severely limited in its ability to project land-based aircraft in large numbers over the Philippine Sea, forcing China’s carriers to be alone in providing multirole airpower beyond the first island chain.

The next major layer of PLA anti-ship firepower begins roughly 300 miles from the mainland. In this layer, coastal YJ-12 batteries and YJ-83s fired from short-range Type 22 missile boats pose an especially distributed form of massing anti-ship fires. These assets can help the PLA project sea denial over much of the East China Sea, the northern areas of the South China Sea, and over the maritime approaches to Taiwan. The fleet of 60 missile boats in particular could be valuable in contesting sections of the Batanes and Ryukyu island chains and the maritime approaches leading toward expeditionary advance bases posted on those islands. 29

These three main layers of combined anti-ship capability have more limited dispositions due to being fielded by land-based forces and small surface warships. On top of these more static land-based layers, China’s surface and submarine forces are able to dynamically extend the scope and concentration of China’s ability to mass fires against warships, and provide a maneuvering base of offensive fire. But these forces have their own limits to survivability and their ability to generate large volumes of fire.

Chinese submarines could arguably pose some of the earliest missile threats U.S. forces face by deploying far and away from the Chinese mainland, but their volume of fire is especially constrained due to the lack of vertical launch cells. Chinese submarines could still stalk certain areas such as Yokosuka, where they could fire on depleted warships returning from the fight, divert frontline assets to local submarine hunting patrols, and generate uncertainty around the maritime approaches to critical naval bases. Chinese submarines could also make major contributions to preserving the broader PLA anti-ship missile inventory by making a priority of torpedoing U.S. large surface combatants, which boast large missile magazines and considerable air defense capability.

China’s fleet of large surface combatants, primarily the Type 52D destroyers and Type 55 cruisers, could add significant volume to a mass firing scheme. However, it is debatable how far forward China is willing to employ these ships from the mainland in a high-end conflict. The need for airpower to be on hand to improve survivability for these ships and their salvos, and to provide critical airborne information functions, limits how far these ships can be confidently deployed. If China extends a surface force from beyond the umbrella of airpower’s critical enablers, those surface forces may be alone in contending with hostile salvos and airpower, especially from U.S. carrier air wings. Sending surface warships beyond the range of supporting aviation and into the weapons range of opposing aviation is a recipe for defeat in detail.

The struggle to maintain a substantial amount of multirole aviation out to a thousand miles from the mainland imposes significant liabilities on any mass firing scheme China can assemble at this distance. But until China can confidently field a significant number of its own carrier air wings, the bulk of naval-enabling airpower will have to come from land-based aviation that may be hard-pressed to fight in distant waters. For now, the U.S. may be heavily advantaged in being able to maintain robust combined arms relationships between its surface and carrier air forces regardless of the distance between those forces and land-based airfields. In the near-term, China’s ability to make the most of its surface fleet’s contributions to massed fires will be heavily constrained by the range and sustainability of land-based airpower, and its limited ability to overlay airpower’s critical enablers over distant maritime spaces.

In designing the overall scheme of massed fires with these limitations in mind, China’s surface fleet fits well within the second main layer of China’s anti-ship firepower. By leveraging a combination of YJ-18s launched by ships and YJ-83s launched by multirole aircraft, China can substantially lessen the burden on its bombers and land-based ballistic missiles to mass fires. Instead, it can focus on using much more common platforms and missiles to generate massed fires while posing a more distributed threat.

The similar range of the YJ-12 and the YJ-18 means China’s surface and bomber forces need to concentrate within a similar ring around a target to combine fires. Through combined arms methods, warships could provide critical air defense and sensing support to friendly aircraft and provide a protective screen from which their airpower can leverage. Carrier air wings that pursue bombers and multirole aircraft could be led into Chinese warship air defenses.

The range differential between the the YJ-12, YJ-18, and YJ-83 is small enough to create a disposition where PLA aircraft and warships can readily provide critical enablers to one another, rather than the more divided nature of having U.S. airpower travel far forward to support Tomahawk salvos fired from upwards of a thousand miles away. While the similar ranges of China’s primary anti-ship cruise missiles can certainly increase force concentration, their similar ranges also create a foundation for force-multiplying combined arms relationships and closely integrated force packages.

The second main layer of anti-ship firepower at around 800-1,000 miles from the mainland appears the most preferable to China. But maintaining a robust scheme for massing fires at this distance will not just be a function of the available combinations of capability. For China, it is a critical operational imperative.

Buffering the Pacific: Competing Mass Fires in Operational Context

China’s potential schemes of massed fires have to be assessed in a specific operational context. While there are many dimensions to future contingencies, a core operational challenge for China in a Taiwan contingency is to maintain a maritime buffer zone out to around a thousand miles from the mainland. If U.S. and allied forces can get within this range, they can launch large volumes of land-attack cruise missile fires against China and Taiwan that can considerably complicate PLA operations. If China cannot effectively contest a maritime buffer out to this distance, it would have to devote considerable airpower toward cruise missile defense over oceanic spaces, when that airpower may be sorely needed for operations elsewhere. Preempting the looming threat of hundreds of land-attack cruise missiles launching from U.S. warships and bombers is therefore a critical operational imperative for China. As opposing forces contest sea control, the success of the anti-ship effort will unlock or deny options for follow-on power projection that could have decisive effects on a campaign.

A key question then is what sorts of combined arms relationships can China maintain out to this critical distance from the mainland, what schemes of massed fires those relationships would yield, and how those schemes of massed fires would interact with those of opposing expeditionary forces. The previous section highlighted how at about 800-1,000 miles from the mainland, China’s combined arms relationships for massed fires can consist of bombers, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and land-based aviation. China’s surface and submarine forces can be maneuvered to add to this mix, which considerably increases the potential volume of fire and complexity of threat presentation.

China would be in the challenging position of having to maintain a maritime defense that is forward enough to hold U.S. surface forces at risk before they can launch land-attack fires, but not so far forward that it outstrips the PLA’s ability to add more platform types to its combined arms scheme of massing fires. It also cannot be so far forward that surface forces outstrip their ability to be well-supported by aviation in the critical air defense mission, or else those surface forces could be alone in facing withering anti-ship fires. The need to maintain substantial PLA surface warships near the outer edge of a buffer zone would also limit their maneuver space compared to the opposing expeditionary forces that can leverage the broader expanse of the Philippine Sea and adjacent waters. This asymmetry in maneuver space would simplify the scouting and targeting challenges for expeditionary forces facing warships that are tasked with reinforcing a buffer zone. But these surface warships are critical for providing a major base of fire that can persist at the outer edge of the buffer zone, or otherwise a disproportionately large volume of the available firepower would have to come from more transient platforms such as aircraft.

U.S. forces can impose some of these buffering dilemmas today because the land-attack Tomahawk missile is widely fielded across its surface warships. Those warships would still have to lean very heavily on U.S. submarines and carrier aviation to destroy opposing surface and air forces in advance, where those forces could prevent U.S. warships from reaching firing areas that are within Tomahawk range of Taiwan or China.

The dynamic significantly changes if China’s anti-ship capability remains constant enough that the U.S. can secure a major range advantage with the anti-ship Tomahawk. This range advantage would threaten to split apart the combined arms relationships the PLA is able to maintain in a distant maritime buffer. The anti-ship Tomahawk would force the PLA to depend more on the platforms that are better able to reach out and threaten U.S. warships while circumventing Tomahawk firepower by attacking from different domains. These platforms include aviation, submarines, and ballistic missiles, but each of these has significant disadvantages, such with respect to sustainability, volume of fire, and survivability. This scheme may be the only combined arms mix that could have a chance of attacking distant surface forces before they could fire first against an outranged surface fleet.

A key challenge then is how to maintain a robust mass firing scheme within a forward maritime defense when the defender’s anti-ship capability is heavily outranged. If the defender’s surface force can be more easily fired upon first, then it can threaten to remove a major base of fire that is undergirding the combined arms scheme for much of the maritime buffer.

A surface force that is outranged or at risk of aerial attack must rely on more creative and combined arms tactics to compensate for the inferior ability to fire effectively first. This disadvantage especially requires a force to place heavier emphasis on scouting, counter-scouting, deception, and stealth. By securing distinct advantage in these specific areas, a force can earn vital proximity to an adversary with longer-ranged weapons, or induce them to launch wasteful fires, or complicate their decision to fire at all. Airpower is valuable for executing these specific tactics that help warships compensate for a disadvantage in the ability to fire first, but a distant buffer zone increases these challenges by diluting aviation’s availability while limiting the surface maneuver space.

A force that is more likely to be fired on first may be forced to focus much of its initial strategy on optimizing for defense, so it can absorb enough volume of fire in the hopes of then transitioning to a more offensive posture that has better options against a depleted adversary. But if the adversary is firing with weapons of much longer range, then they can more effectively withdraw from the battlespace without coming under fire themselves. The buffering defenders may have to content themselves with inflicting weapons depletion more so than platform attrition, and maintaining sea denial rather than seizing sea control.

China has unique options for reinforcing a maritime buffer even if its surface forces could one day face major disadvantages in their ability to fire first. By filling the forward edge of the buffer zone with copious amounts of state-owned commercial shipping, China could vastly complicate the sensory picture of the battlespace. China’s surface warships could then lurk among these large commercial vessels, and work with aviation to challenge scouts that attempt to probe and make sense of the morass of maritime contacts. Submarines may struggle to use sonar to isolate warship contacts amidst the heavy churning of many commercial ships. Anti-ship missiles may need to rise above sea-skimming altitudes to dodge commercial ships and discover warship contacts, potentially exposing themselves to more defensive fires and offering more early warning to an adversary. China’s uniquely asymmetric ability to leverage large fleets of state-owned commercial shipping in naval warfare deserves careful consideration, especially within the context of maritime active defense.

While China’s commercial fleets can vastly increase the complexity of its naval threat presentation, the U.S. has its own unique advantages that can provide similar effects. The long reach of the Tomahawk broadens the geography of firing areas enough to where the U.S. can capitalize on alliance advantages. The Tomahawk has long enough range to where it can be fired from within the complex littoral geography of the Japanese and Philippine home islands and into a variety of Indo-Pacific maritime spaces. This could allow U.S. forces to circumvent maritime buffers or fire upon them from their littoral margins, which are mostly allied territories. This concept is somewhat similar to the Cold War-era concept of hiding carriers within Norwegian Fjords to launch strikes against the Soviets. 30 Warships traditionally rely on broad oceanic maneuver to be a major enabler, but operating from labyrinthine littoral terrain can also complicate detectability and enhance the complexity of threat presentation even if it comes at the expense of maneuver space.

While operating within fixed geography can certainly help adversaries localize naval forces, it may be more difficult to mass fires against warships residing within these littorals. Operating from these areas substantially increases the opportunity for warships to leverage friendly land-based air defense and aviation for support, increasing the volume of fire required to overwhelm warships. The challenges of navigating over littoral terrain can also force missile salvos to engage in tactically unfavorable behavior. Anti-ship missiles may have to depart from sea-skimming altitudes when flying over land, or burn more range to maintain themselves over water at low altitudes while taking more circuitous routes toward littoral contacts. Although it may increase warship findability in some respects, littoral firing areas could improve defensibility enough to compensate. The U.S. can carefully consider how the Maritime Strike Tomahawk opens up vast opportunity for launching massed fires against opposing fleets from friendly littorals.

Figure 2 highlights how these competing fields of fire overlap, and how firing areas located within these island littorals offer key advantages. These littorals can help U.S. forces circumvent a PLA buffer zone and bring those forces within Tomahawk range of Taiwan and the mainland coast. These separate areas also offer a substantial degree of overlap for combining fires over key geography. Tomahawk-equipped forces lurking within the complex littorals of Kyushu and the central Philippines will be able to combine and mass fires with one another over Taiwan and a substantial area of the Philippine Sea. 

These dueling schemes of massed fires therefore look to increase their complexity of threat presentation with unconventional means. China’s navy could aim to preserve its maritime buffer by lurking within a vast array of commercial vessels, and the U.S. Navy may seek to circumvent or damage the buffer from within a web of allied island geography. While this hardly makes for a traditional view of maneuvering battle fleets exchanging heavy fire, modern navies may be driven toward such methods by the unforgiving ferocity of naval salvo combat and its overriding insistence on firing effectively first.

Conclusion  

China’s ability to mass fires against warships is a product of a truly historic evolution. China was a third-rate maritime power only two decades ago, but it has transformed into a force that heavily outguns the U.S. Navy in major respects. China has clearly stolen a march on the U.S. when it comes to developing advanced anti-ship firepower, and now the U.S. is racing to close the gap. But it will still be many years before the U.S. has the tools in place to have decent options for massing fires. By then, the Chinese naval arsenal may have become something even more fearsome.

Part 9 will focus on the force structure implications of DMO and massed fires.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of its naval professional society,  the Flotilla . He is the author of the “ How the Fleet Forgot to Fight” series   and coauthor of “ Learning to Win: Using Operational Innovation to Regain the Advantage at Sea against China . ”  Contact him at  [email protected].

1. For PLA anti-ship cruise missile capabilities and platform compatibility, see:

Dr. Sam Goldsmith, “VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, pg. 10, April 2022,  https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2022-04/Vampire%20Vampire%20Vampire_0.pdf?VersionId=tHAbNzJSXJHskd9VppGNRcTFC4hW7UqD .

For ballistic missile capabilities, see:

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 64-67, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF/ .

2. For Y-18 and DF-26 introduction timeframes, see:

Michael Pilger, “China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 28, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-18%20Antiship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf .

For YJ-83, YJ-12, and YJ-18 introduction timeframes, see:

Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments,” Joint Force Quarterly 75, September 30, 2014, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577568/a-potent-vector-assessing-chinese-cruise-missile-developments/ .

For DF-21D introduction timeframe, see:

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development and Counter-intervention Efforts,” Testimony before Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons Panel I: China’s Hypersonic and Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicle Programs U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 23, 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Erickson_Testimony.pdf . 

3. For assessments of PLA ballistic missile firing rates across China Military Power Report editions, see:

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 64, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF .

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 60, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF .

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 55, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF .

4. For YJ-83 capabilities, see:

Dr. Sam Goldsmith, “VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, pg. 10, 13, 16, 20, April 2022,  https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2022-04/Vampire%20Vampire%20Vampire_0.pdf?VersionId=tHAbNzJSXJHskd9VppGNRcTFC4hW7UqD .

5. Michael Pilger, “China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 28, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-18%20Antiship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf .

8. For terminal sprint capability, see:

Michael Pilger, “China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, pg. 2, October 28, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-18%20Antiship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf .

9. Gerry Doyle and Blake Herzinger, Carrier Killer: China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles and Theater of Operations in the early 21st Century , Helion & Company, pg. 49, 2022.

10. Amber Wang, “Chinese military announces YJ-21 missile abilities in social media post read as warning to US amid tension in Taiwan Strait,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3208763/chinese-military-announces-yj-21-missile-performance-social-media-post-read-warning-us-amid-tension .

11. “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,” Congressional Budget Office, pg. 45, January 2023, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-01/58255-hypersonic.pdf .

12. For Chinese surface fleet ship types and numbers, see:

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 53-54, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF .

Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, pg. 8, 27-33, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/265 .

Tayfun Ozberk, “China Launches Two More Type 052DL Destroyers In Dalian,” Naval News, March 12, 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/03/china-launches-two-more-type-052dl-destroyers-in-dalian/ .

13. Based on the aforementioned sources listed in reference #12, China built roughly 30 destroyers and eight cruisers in a ten-year period from 2012-2022.

14. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, pg. 13-14, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/265 .

15. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 60, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF .

16. Oriana Pawlyk, “B-1 Crews Prep for Anti-Surface Warfare in Latest LRASM Tests,” Military Times, January 3, 2018, https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/01/03/b-1-crews-prep-anti-surface-warfare-latest-lrasm-tests.html .

17. “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates,” Navy Justification Book Volume 1 of 1 Weapons Procurement, Navy, Page 1 of 10 P-1 Line #16, (PDF pg. 261), April 2022, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/WPN_Book.pdf .

18. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, pg. 8, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/265 .

19. Captain Christopher P. Carlson, “Essay: Inside the Design of China’s Yuan-class Submarine,” USNI News, August 31, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/08/31/essay-inside-the-design-of-chinas-yuan-class-submarine .

20. The Military Balance 2022: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, Routledge, pg. 259-261, February 2022, https://www.iwp.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-Military-Balance-2022.pdf .

21. Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “Selling a Maritime Air Force The PLAAF’s Campaign for a Bigger Maritime Role,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, pg. 15-16, April 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2019-04-01%20Selling%20a%20Maritime%20Air%20Force.pdf .

22. For PLA carrier production rates, see: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 55, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF .

23. For DF-26 range, see:

For H-6J bomber range, see:

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 60, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF .

24. Maksim Y. Tokarov, “Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy,” U.S. Naval War College Review, Volume 1, 67, 2014, pg. 13, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=nwc-review .  

25. Lieutenant Commander James A. Winnefeld, Jr., “Winning the Outer Air Battle,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , August 1989,  https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1989/august/winning-outer-air-battle . 

26. For JH-7 YJ-83 compatibility, see:

Dr. Sam Goldsmith, “VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, pg. 13, April 2022,  https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2022-04/Vampire%20Vampire%20Vampire_0.pdf?VersionId=tHAbNzJSXJHskd9VppGNRcTFC4hW7UqD .

For J-16 compatibility, see:

Andreas Rupprecht, “Images show PLAAF J-16 armed with YJ-83K anti-ship missile,” Janes, February 18, 2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/images-show-plaaf-j-16-armed-with-yj-83k-anti-ship-missile .

For J-10 compatibly, see: “New Cruise Missile Confirmed For China’s J-10C Fighter: An Anti-Ship Weapon to Boost Export Prospects?” Military Watch Magazine, March 4, 2022, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-cruise-missile-confirmed-for-china-s-j-10c-fighter-an-anti-ship-weapon-to-boost-export-prospects .

27. For DF-21 range, see:

28. Air bases can employ “elephant walks” where large numbers of aircraft are surged from an airfield in a back-to-back manner that is not feasible for carriers. Damaged airbase runways are also generally easier to repair than damaged carrier flight decks, such as by using fast-drying concrete that can be ready in several days.

For considerations for air base sortie generation, see:

Christopher J. Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2002.09.24-Anti-Access-Threat-Theater-Air-Bases.pdf .

For carrier sortie generation rates, see:

“CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford Class Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN 78),” December 2021 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), pg. 4, April 28, 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2021_SARS/22-F-0762_CVN_78_SAR_2021.pdf .

“Appendix D: Aircraft Sortie Count,” (for Operational Desert Storm), https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-navy-in-desert-shield-desert-storm/appendix-d-aircraft-sortie-count.html .

29. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, pg. 40, August 1, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/222 .

30. “Vice Admiral Hank Mustin on New Warfighting Tactics and Taking the Maritime Strategy to Sea,” Center for International Maritime Security, April 29, 2021, https://cimsec.org/vice-admiral-hank-mustin-on-new-warfighting-tactics-and-taking-the-maritime-strategy-to-sea/ .

Featured Image: The Type 55 guided-missile destroyer Nanchang (Hull 101) attached to a naval vessel training center under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams in tactical formation to occupy attack positions in an undisclosed sea area during a recent 10-day maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zou Xiangmin)

6 thoughts on “Fighting DMO, Pt. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes”

I hope the added range of the new 21″ variant of SM-6 can also provide our forces a similar option to the Chinese by providing a simultaneous long range cruise and ballistic threat to their fleet.

Our bomber force will be essential, but we need more shooters and we need more rounds coming by other means. P-8s UAVs and other manned fighters can help, but at some point there becomes a need for more ships.

What if the Russians work with the Chinese ? China is expert at producing technology that is sourced from others. Kinzhal is variously reported to have a range of 1500KM – 3000 KM and can be launched from aircraft of ships. Something like this would vastly complicate US fleet operations, would it not ?

If the US ends up in a shooting war with China, it will be because the US miscalculated.

We can talk about mass firing schemes etc all we want. But when the first large US surface combatant is lost with all hands those firing schemes will decline in priority. If even a single US aircraft carrier is lost the shock to the American public, who will probably not be very engaged in the scheming, will suddenly wake up. And when they find after a month or 2 that they can no longer buy cell phones, computers, refrigerators or washing machines, or get their cars repaired due to the “chip drought” that is going to have a more profound impact on the outcome of the war than actual war fighting.

Refer to recent Pentagon leaks about Mach 10 DF-27 hypersonic carrier killer maneuverable glider with 8,000 km range and invulnerable to US missile defence. This implies US major surface combatants are at risk potentially all to way to Hawaii, the Mediterranean, the Indian ocean and northern Australia depending on the launch location from well within China’s borders. With a $US 18 trillion economy where every dollar gets 5-10 more bang for the buck than the US, China has the industrial wherewithal and motivation to mass produce the DF-27, DF-17 and YJ-21 for which the U.S doesn’t have an answer. If China’s suborbital hypersonic glider (dubbed by Milley as a Sputnik Moment), China in theory can sink US carriers and amphibious ships docked on the East coast or sailing in the Atlantic.

“invulnerable to US missile defence” Initially, yes. There are a number of countermeasures being explored (if not already nearing deployment).

Also, Chinese HGV tests that miss the target by ~24 miles (even without defender’s countermeasures) definitely present questions.

As for economy: where did you get “5-10 more bang for the buck” from? 2021 China/US GDP(PPP) was ~$27 trillion/$23 trillion, so quite even.

As the DF-27 is invulnerable to US missile defense, just like the threat of DF-21, the U.S. CVBG must stay away from coast to perform the active AAW, so air force shall perform anti-missile mission. God bless America.

Very good article that puts the spot light on why the Philippines just might be the deciding factor in any shooting conflict in the ( Philippine Sea ) SCS . The US is limited to only Defensive action for the Philippines and so far cannot direct any offensive actions from any Base in the Philippines. That must/has to change if China is to be challenged from a Complete take over of the SCS . Without the Philippine Bases the US will need to tharwart a China take over its just a matter of time ……

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Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.

R-360 Neptune: A Ukrainian coastal anti-ship cruise missile

R-360 Neptune is a coastal anti-ship cruise missile developed by Ukrainian Luch Design Bureau. Its design is tied to the old Soviet Kh-35 anti-ship missile, designed to defeat surface warships and other vessels with a displacement of up to 5,000 tons. Unlike the Kh-35 missile, the R-360 Neptune missile has improved range and electronics. The missile can engage convoys or individual targets. It is a relatively new weapon in Ukrainian Navy, introduced in early March 2021.

Development

Antiship missiles are large weapons. They require training, which has simulators. An anti-ship missile also requires a launch platform, and the whole system can weigh tons. On top of that, they often require integration with radar to provide launch targeting.

Guided by that, Ukraine started to build its own coastal anti-ship cruise missile system. Production of advanced missile systems took place in cooperation with other Ukrainian enterprises, including Artem Luch GAhK, Kharkiv State Aircraft Manufacturing Company [uk], Motor Sich (MS-400 turbofan engine), Pivdenne YuMZ PivdenMash, Lviv LORTA [uk] and other radar electronics, Vyshneve ZhMZ Vizar Kyiv, Radionics (seeker), Arsenal SDP SE (navigation system) and others.

The first tests of the system were conducted on 22 March 2016, attended by Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Oleksandr Turchynov. In mid-2017, the manufacturer tested Neptune missiles concurrently with the Vilkha missile complex trials. However, unlike the Vilkha, Luch Design Bureau did not publicize the test results and capabilities of the Neptune.

According to the press service of the NSDC, the first successful flight tests of the system took place on 30 January 2018. On 17 August 2018, the missile successfully hit a target at 100 kilometers (62 mi) during test firings in southern Odessa. On 6 April 2019, the missile was again successfully tested, hitting targets during tests near Odesa. Luch Design Bureau delivered the R-360 Neptune system to the Ukrainian military in December 2019.

The missile was first revealed in the “Weapons and Security 2015” exhibition in Kyiv.

When deployed, a Neptune coastal defense system comprises a USPU-360 truck-based mobile launcher, four missiles, a TZM-360 transport/reload vehicle, an RCP-360 command, and control, and a special cargo vehicle. The system is designed to operate up to 25 kilometers (16 miles) inland of the coastline. A Neptune missile, including a rocket motor, is 5.05 meters (199 in) in length, with a cross-shaped hard wing.

Neptune missiles are designed to be housed in transport and launch containers (TLC) with dimensions 5.30 by 0.60 by 0.60 meters (209 in × 24 in × 24 in). The system has a maximum range of about 300 kilometers (190 mi).[17][18] A single missile weighs 870 kilograms (1,920 lb), of which 150 kilograms (330 lb) is the warhead.

Operational use

Ukraine war.

On April 13, 2022, Ukrainian Navy sources claimed the Russian cruiser Moskva was hit by two Neptune missiles during the Ukraine War, resulting in an ammunition explosion. A day later, on April 14, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated, without discussing the cause, that a fire had caused munitions to explode, and the crew had been fully evacuated. Russian news outlets announced that Russian warship Moskva had sunk in inclement weather while being towed a few hours later.

Technical specifications

Classified.

Down with Putin, send more support to Ukraine.

Looks like a viable and good missile defense systems. Too bad the only AN 225 was destroyed….this would bring an immediate end to the current tragedy if it was used as super bomber!

Conventional wisdom is this type of missile should have been easily shot down by the cruiser. It had two sets of SAMs and point defense systems.

It all points to it not being about the weapon, but who’s behind the weapon that brings success.

This is great news that the missile is designed and made in heroic Ukraine. Do serve more up to the invaders.

Regardless of the actual effectiveness of the “Neptune” there can be no doubt that it was NOT designed and manufactured in the Ukraine. First, the Ukraine as the 2nd poorest country in Europe simply did not have the money to develop, let alone manufacture and field such a sophisticated weapons system. 2nd, the Ukraine has never had the needed intellectual, let alone manufacturing infrastructure necessary to create such a weapons system.

Consider that if such a weapons system did not need relatively large sums of money and infrastructure to develop, build and field every 2-bit dictator on the planet would have some now wouldn’t they…

Whatever the actual source of this surface-to-surface anti-ship system may be, it was NOT the Ukraine. If I were to make an educated guess, I suspect it was supplied by a secret skunkworks inside israel, given their vast expertise false flags using foreign weapons (remember israel using remarked US and captured Egyptian jets to attack the USS Liberty). Naturally, israel wouldn’t actually pay for these themselves, so no doubt the original source of funding was the US taxpayer…

Please bear in mind that literally within the first hour of Putin’s Police Action that USA Today published the first piece of fake news when it categorically stated THERE ARE NO US BIO-WEAPONS LABS IN THE Ukraine when in point of fact there were literally dozens…

If Russia were in “Europe”, it would be the second or third poorest. It’s per capita GNP is about the same as Ukraine.

I think that the world is finally coming to realize that wars are largely being fought, so the military industries can make money, along with their puppet politicians, regardless of the country!

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Missiles, drones, and more: How Yemen’s Houthi rebels get their weapons

On Sunday, Yemen’s Houthi rebels launched a missile strike inside Israel, causing panic and further escalation in the war. The attack has also put the spotlight on the militia’s weapons arsenal. While the exact number of weapons is not confirmed, the group is believed to have drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as anti-ship weapon read more

“The Houthis launched a surface-to-surface missile from Yemen into our territory. They should have known by now that we charge a heavy price for any attempt to harm us. Anyone who attacks us will not escape from our arms,” said an indignant Benjamin Netanyahu as he vowed revenge against the Yemen-based group of rebels, after they fired a ballistic missile on Israel on Sunday.

Around 6.30 am (local time) on Sunday, air sirens rang out in Israel with local media showing footage of people racing towards shelters at Ben Gurion international airport south-east of Tel Aviv. The panic spread after a missile, claimed by the Houthis to be an advanced surface-to-surface hypersonic missile, hit an open area in the Ben Shemen forest, causing a fire near Kfar Daniel. Fortunately, there were no reports of damage or casualties.

This marks the latest escalation in the ongoing Israel war against Hamas, which has drawn in other groups such as the Houthis, the Hezbollah and others, which are collectively known as the Iran’s Axis of Resistance .

The strike also puts the spotlight on the weapons stockpile of the Houthis. What is in their arsenal? Where do they get their weapons? We take a closer look and get you the answers.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthis are a Yemeni militia group named after their founder Hussein Badreddin al Houthi. They are allied and backed by Iran and are part of the “axis of resistance”. As per a US report, the Houthi-Iran relationship has evolved, with Iran viewing them as an extension of its regional power.

Their slogan has long been: “God is the greatest; death to America; death to Israel; curse the Jews; victory to Islam.” As per Brookings , the group’s official name is Ansar Allah – meaning ‘supporters of God’.

What weapons do the Houthis have?

Initially, the Houthis were believed to be a primitive military force with ageing Kalashnikovs. However, that’s far from the truth. The Yemeni rebels have an arsenal, which includes advanced drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as anti-ship weapons.

While there isn’t any precise information about the Houthis’ arsenal, their attacks reveal a glimpse of their weapons stockpiles. For instance, during the Yemeni civil war in 1994, the Houthis featured a Scud missile, which was sourced from the USSR. In the years between 2015 and 2021, the Houthis have also launched multiple unarmed vehicles (drones) and ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia targets.

Houthi spokespersons have also boasted of having multiple missiles in their arsenal, including the Toufan — a long-rang surface-to-surface ballistic missile, having a range of approximately 2,000 km. The Houthis also have the Tankeel, Aqeel and Quds-4 missiles in their stockpiles.

In addition, they also have the Sayad drone, which is used in one-way suicide missions, as well as the Shahed drones, which boast of a 900 km range and capable of carrying a payload of 20 kg.

As per a senior US defence official, the Houthis have weapons that can reach as far as the Mediterranean Sea.

Reports also state that the Houthis have missiles like the Burkan series, as well as the Fateh-110, which adds to the Yemeni group’s firepower.

However, some experts note that one should be a bit wary of the military might of the Houthis and their arsenal. As per a Counterextremism report, during the 2023 parade, the Houthis displayed the Zelzal-3 rocket. But, it seemed to be billowing in the wind, indicating that the Houthis were displaying a mock-up rather than a real rocket. The report does add, however, that one should be wary of the group and their weapons stockpile.

How do Houthis get their weapons?

According to the United States and Saudi Arabia, most of the weapons, including drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles come from Iran. Officials note that there’s evidence of debris with Iranian manufacturing labels, naval interdictions of missile smuggling dhows originating from Iran, and missile-related training and equipment materials in Farsi seized from Houthi-controlled territory. Additionally, missiles such as the Burkan, the Quds-1 all bear Iranian fingerprints in design and manufacturing.

A US Defence Department’s report states that Iran supports the Houthis as a cheap and effective way to challenge Saudi Arabia and other rivals.

As Dr Elisabeth Kendall, a Middle East specialist at Cambridge University, told the BBC , “The Houthis could not operate at this level without Iranian arms, training and intelligence.”

For Iran to send weapons to the Houthis, they usually smuggle them over land. . A senior Yemeni military source has been quoted as saying that one smuggling route runs through Shehen, an unpoliced zone along the Yemeni-Omani border.

Another method by which the Houthis are in possession of such weapons is through war. The Houthis have acquired military arms and armaments from other forces. A 2016 report showed that Houthi troops had captured at least 16 C-90C rocket launchers from either Saudi forces or local pro-Hadi fighters that Saudi Arabia had equipped.

In 2015, a Saudi coalition air-drop mishap led to the Houthis capturing a shipment of RPG-26 variants. The Yemeni grouped even posted a thank you note addressed to Saudi King Salman after the incident.

Interestingly, the Houthis have also taken advantage of the government’s weak control of its own armaments. Houthi forces have looted the government weapon caches in the past, gaining access to missiles and other heavy weaponry.

How have Houthis participated in the war?

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis have reportedly fired drones and missiles towards Israel. However, most of these attacks have been intercepted.

They have also launched attack on commercial shipping vessels, which they believe to have links to Israel. These attacks forced several shipping companies to reroute their vessels to avoid the Red Sea . And as per a report, maritime trade through Egypt’s Suez Canal, the waterway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, dropped 42 per cent in the first two months of this year.

Commenting on Sunday’s attack, Nasruddin Amer, the deputy head of the Houthi media office, described it as the “beginning”, which has many concerned that an all-out war is on the horizon.

With inputs from agencies

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