cruise control 4runner 2023

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How do I operate the adaptive cruise control in my vehicle?

Adaptive cruise control supplements conventional cruise control with an active vehicle-to-vehicle distance control feature. designed for use on freeways and express ways, in vehicle-to-vehicle distance control mode, your car automatically acceler... sep 24, 2022 • knowledge, new section, only answer.

Adaptive cruise control supplements conventional cruise control with an active vehicle-to-vehicle distance control feature. Designed for use on freeways and express ways, in vehicle-to-vehicle distance control mode, your car automatically accelerates or decelerates in order to maintain a preset following distance from the vehicle traveling directly ahead of you.

To activate the system, press the "ON/OFF" button at the end of the stalk on the lower end of the right side of the steering wheel. The radar-ready indicator will appear in the Multi Information Display.

Accelerate or decelerate to your intended speed, then press the stalk down to set it. If you want to go faster, push the stalk upward and hold until you've reached the desired speed and then release it. Or, if you want to slow down, push the stalk down and hold as you decelerate, then release it once you've reached the desired speed.

To cancel cruise control, tap the brakes, pull the stalk towards you or turn the system off with the ON/OFF button.

Adaptive Cruise Control was designed to maintain the preset distance between your car and the car driving in the same lane directly ahead of you.

When it’s active, it automatically adjusts for changes in the speed of the vehicle traveling directly ahead of you in order to maintain the vehicle-to-vehicle distance you set.

In the event that you would like to change the preset distance between vehicles, you can do so by using the radar range button located on the lower right side of the steering wheel. Simply press the button repeatedly to cycle through the ranges available. You'll find them displayed on the Multi Information Display. And finally, you can disable the distance holding feature by pushing the cruise control stalk away and holding it until the indicator disappears and the conventional cruise control indicator lights up.

Please click here  to view a video.

Disclaimer: Adaptive Cruise Control is designed to assist the driver and is not a substitute for safe and attentive driving practices. See your  Owner's Manual for important instructions and cautions.

Not all features are available on all vehicles and model grades. Please see your Owner's Manual for further details and important safety information.

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• Toyota Manuals
• 4RUNNER 2023
• Quick reference manual

Toyota 4RUNNER 2023 Quick Reference Manual

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Summary of Contents for Toyota 4RUNNER 2023

• Page 1 QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 2023...
• Page 2 Owner’s Manual. Each box contains operating instructions to help you avoid injury or equipment malfunction. All information in this Quick Reference Guide is current at the time of printing. Toyota reserves the right to make changes at any time without notice.
• Page 3 AUDIO MULTIMEDIA AND 48-61 CONNECTED SERVICES Rear seats-Adjustments Visit your Toyota dealer for information on customizing this feature. Programmable by customer. Refer to the “Owner’s Manual” for instructions and more information. ® HomeLink is a registered trademark of Gentex Corporation.
• Page 4 OVERVIEW Instrument panel Multi-Information Voice command talk switch Audio control Display (MID) control switches switches Dynamic Radar Cruise Control (DRCC) switch Telephone Lane Departure switches Alert (LDA) switch Dynamic Radar Cruise Control (DRCC) vehicle-to-vehicle distance switch Steering wheel controls Meters Headlight/turn signal/front fog light control Automatic High Beams (AHB) switch Instrument panel light control...
• Page 5 If equipped For details, refer to the “Navigation and Multimedia System Owner’s Manual” or visit www.toyota. com/audio-multimedia for additional resources. OVERHEAD CONSOLE INSTRUMENT PANEL Type A Type B VSC off switch Rear differential lock switch Active traction control switch Multi-Terrain Select switch...
• Page 6 OVERVIEW Instrument cluster Multi-Information Display (MID) Engine coolant temperature gauge Fuel gauge Tachometer Speedometer Shift position and shift range Odometer/trip meter display Odometer/trip meter display change button Service indicators and warning lights Indicator symbols For details, refer to “Warning lights and indicators,” Section 2, 2023 “Owner’s Manual”.
• Page 7 If the indicator does not turn off within a few seconds of starting the vehicle, there may be a malfunction. Have the vehicle inspected by your Toyota dealer. If the indicator flashes, there may be a malfunction. Refer to the “Owner’s Manual”.
• Page 8 OVERVIEW Keyless entry UNLOCKING OPERATION Carry Smart Key remote Driver door unlock* Grasp Press ONCE: Driver door TWICE: All doors NOTE: If a door is not opened within 60 seconds of unlocking, all doors will relock for safety. LOCKING OPERATION Carry Smart Key remote All-door lock...
• Page 9 Smart Key system START FUNCTION Press NOTE: The Smart Key must be carried to enable the start function. With the shift lever in Park and the brake pedal depressed, press the power button. POWER (WITHOUT STARTING VEHICLE) Without depressing the brake pedal, pressing the power button will change the operation mode in succession from: Off - All systems OFF.
• Page 10 Power steering fluid reservoir Engine oil filler cap Washer fluid tank NOTE: Regularly scheduled maintenance at your Toyota dealer, including oil changes, will help extend the life of your vehicle and maintain performance. Please refer to the “Warranty & Maintenance Guide.”...
• Page 11 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Auto lock/unlock Automatic door locks can be programmed to operate in different modes, or turned OFF. DEFAULT SETTING Shift position linked door locking/unlocking function - Doors lock when shifting from Park. - Doors unlock when shifting into Park. CUSTOMIZED SETTING Speed linked door locking function - Doors lock when the vehicle speed is approximately 12 mph (20 km/h) or higher.
• Page 12 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Four-wheel drive system ( if equipped PART-TIME FOUR-WHEEL DRIVE MODELS Type A (Shift the lever) Type B (Push the “UNLOCK” button and turn) “UNLOCK” button High speed (2WD) Shift the lever from “H4” to “H2” (type A) or push the “UNLOCK” button and turn the switch from “H4”...
• Page 13 Clock H- Hour set M- Minute set Cup holders Front seat Adapter can be removed to adjust the size of the cup holders. Second row seats (without third row seats) Adapter can be removed to adjust the size of the cup holders. Second row seats (with third row seats) Third row seats (if equipped)
• Page 14 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Automatic running boards ( if equipped ON/OFF switch The automatic running boards are linked to side door operations. When a side door is opened or closed, the board on the same side extends or retracts. Tilt & telescopic steering wheel Angle Lock release lever Length...
• Page 15 Power windows Window lock switch Down All window auto up/down Press the switch completely down or pull it completely up and release to fully open or close. To stop the window partway, operate the switch in the opposite direction. Window lock switch Deactivates all passenger windows.
• Page 16 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Front seats-Adjustments MANUAL SEAT POWER SEAT Seatback angle Vertical height* Seatback angle Seat cushion Lumber support* (front) angle* Seat position Seat position (forward/backward) (forward/backward) * Driver side only Rear seats-Adjustments VEHICLES WITH 2ND ROW SEATS VEHICLES WITH 3RD ROW SEATS* * if equipped Seat position (forward/backward)
• Page 17 Rear seats-Folding 2nd row WITH 2ND ROW SEATS (3) Fold down (2) Lower (1) Push (4) Stow (6) Push down (7) Fold down (5) Pull up WITH 3RD ROW SEATS (IF EQUIPPED) (2) Lower (1) Push (3) Stow (4) Pull up (5) Fold down...
• Page 18 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Rear seats-Stowing 3rd row ( if equipped From inside (2) Pull up (1) Stow (4) Pull up (3) Pull up (5) Fold down From outside (1) Stow (2) Pull up (3) Pull up (4) Fold down Rear seats-Returning 3rd row ( if equipped (3) Raise (2) Pull...
• Page 19 Refer to the “Owner’s Manual” for more details. For programming assistance, contact HomeLink at 1-800-355-3515, or visit ® www.homelink.com/toyota. ® * HomeLink is a registered trademark of Gentex Corporation. Moonroof (...
• Page 20 Automatically switches between high and low beams as appropriate to enhance vision at night. Refer to Toyota Safety Sense™ P (TSS-P) in this guide or the “Owner’s Manual” for more details on the Automatic High Beams feature. * Operating conditions must be met. Refer to the “Owner’s Manual” for details.
• Page 21 FRONT FOG LIGHTS Type A Type B Front fog lights come on only when the headlights are on low beam. TURN SIGNALS Right turn Lane change* *Move the lever partway and hold. The signals will flash Lane change* until the lever is released. Left turn Windshield wipers &...
• Page 22 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Air conditioning/heating AUTOMATIC AIR CONDITIONING (IF EQUIPPED) Temperature control (front passenger side) Temperature control (driver side) Recirculate cabin air (outside air when OFF) Air Conditioning ON/OFF Fan speed control Climate control OFF Defogging windshield Airflow mode: Rear window and outside In “...
• Page 23 Heated steering wheel (if equipped) Press The vehicle must be on for use. Heated/ventilated seats ( if equipped FRONT SEATS Heated and Ventilated Heated only Front passenger’s seat Ventilation Heat Driver’s seat The vehicle must be on for use.
• Page 24 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Multi-Information Display (MID) Shift position and shift range Indicators Return to the previous screen Scroll/search screens Menu icon display area Content display Press to enter/set. area Press and hold to reset. Odometer and trip meter Display the registered screen Indicators Press MID control switches to change and select information in the following:...
• Page 25 Steering wheel switches ® & telephone controls (Bluetooth Voice command talk switch “ ” “ ” Use to search within the selected audio feature. “MODE/HOLD” Press to change audio mode. Press and hold to mute or pause the audio. Start call End call Microphone Bluetooth...
• Page 26 Refer to the “Navigation and Multimedia System Owner’s Manual” or visit www.toyota.com/audio-multimedia for additional resources. NOTE: Always use safe driving practices and follow all traffic rules. Power outlet-120V AC Main switch...
• Page 27 Power outlets-12V DC CENTER PANEL CONSOLE BOX Inside LUGGAGE COMPARTMENT The vehicle must be in the “ACCESSORY” or “IGNITION ON” mode for use. NOTE: Designed for car accessories.
• Page 28 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Active traction control system ( if equipped Press The active traction control system automatically helps prevent the spinning of 4 wheels when the vehicle is started or accelerated on slippery road surfaces. (1) Part-time 4WD models: Stop the vehicle, shift the shift lever to N and shift the front-wheel drive control lever into L4.
• Page 29 Crawl Control (if equipped) Med-Hi Lo-Med Indicators Speed selector dial ON/OFF switch Speed modes Crawl Control allows travel on extremely rough off-road surfaces at a fixed low speed without pressing the accelerator or brake pedal. Operating status displays on the Multi-Information Display (MID). While the vehicle is on, the driver’s door needs to be closed and the shift lever is in any position other than P or N, also the front-wheel drive control lever or switch is in “L4”, then press the “ON/OFF”...
• Page 30 FEATURES & OPERATIONS Multi-Terrain Select (if equipped) MOGUL LOOSE ROCK MUD & SAND ROCK Indicator Mode selector dial ON/OFF switch Multi-terrain Select modes Multi-Terrain Select (MTS) has 4 terrain modes. When a terrain mode is selected in accordance with terrain conditions, the engine power and the active traction control system are controlled to enhance off-road drivability.
• Page 31 Blind Spot Monitor (BSM) and Rear Cross Traffic Alert (RCTA) Outside rear view mirror indicators Multi-Information Display Buzzer* Audio system * RCTA only screen* BLIND SPOT MONITOR (BSM) The system is designed to use radar sensors to detect vehicles traveling in the 4Runner’s blind spot.
• Page 32 Refer to the “Owner’s Manual” for operation, setting adjustments, limitations and more details to understand these functions and complete safety precautions. For more information, please go to www.toyota.com/safety-sense. Pre-Collision System with Pedestrian Detection (PCS w/PD) PCS w/PD is designed to provide alert, mitigation, and/or avoidance support in certain conditions, when the system detects a potential collision with a preceding vehicle is likely to occur.
• Page 33 See www.toyota.com/safety-sense for more information. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for a list of additional situations in which the system operation may be limited. Pre-Collision Warning...
• Page 34 As part of the Pre-Collision System, this function is also designed to first provide an alert and then automatic braking if needed. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for additional limitations and information. CHANGING PCS WARNING TIMING Middle...
• Page 35 Departure Alert (LDA) is designed to issue an audio/visual alert if an inadvertent lane departure is detected. See www.toyota.com/safety-sense for more information. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for a list of additional situations in which the system operation may be limited.
• Page 36 Ignition cycle until changed by the driver or the system is reset. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for additional information on the LDA system operation, settings adjustments, limitations, and precautions before attempting to use it.
• Page 37 LANE DEPARTURE ALERT (CONTINUED) The LDA function “ ” is displayed when the Multi-Information Display (MID) is switched to the driving support system information display. (1) The system displays solid white lines on the LDA indicator when visible lane markers on the road are detected. A lane indicator flashes orange to alert the driver when the vehicle deviates from its lane.
• Page 38 Ignition cycle until changed by the driver or the system is reset. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for additional information on the LDA system operation, settings adjustments, limitations, and precautions before attempting to use it.
• Page 39 See www.toyota.com/safety-sense for more information. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for a list of additional situations in which the system operation may be limited. Indicators...
• Page 40 TOYOTA SAFETY SENSE ™ ADJUSTING DISTANCE LONG MEDIUM SHORT (default setting) To change the vehicle-to- Preceding vehicle distance: vehicle mark Press the “ ” switch to cycle through the settings, which will change progressively. This mode employs a radar sensor to detect the presence of a preceding vehicle...
• Page 41 To adjust speed or cancel, see steps (2) and (3) of ADJUSTING SET VEHICLE SPEED on page 37. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for additional information on DRCC operation, settings adjustments, limitations, and precautions before attempting to use it.
• Page 42 See www.toyota.com/safety-sense for more information. Refer to the Toyota “Owner’s Manual” for additional information on AHB operation, settings adjustments, limitations, and precautions before attempting to use it. ACTIVATING THE AHB SYSTEM (1) Push the lever away from you with the headlight switch is in the “...
• Page 43 Multi-Information Display (MID). If the tire pressure indicator flashes for 1 minute and then remains on, take the vehicle to your local Toyota dealer. Refer to the load label on the door jamb or the “Owner’s Manual” for tire inflation specifications.
• Page 44 SAFETY & EMERGENCY FEATURES Rear door child safety locks Unlock Lock Moving the lever downward will allow the door to be opened only from the outside. Seat belts Take up slack Too high Keep as low on hips as possible NOTE: If a passenger’s seat belt is fully extended, then retracted even slightly, the Automatic locking retractor (ALR) will prevent it from being re-extended beyond that point, unless fully retracted again.
• Page 45 Spare tire & tools TOOL LOCATION Tool bag Jack Spare tire REMOVING THE SPARE TIRE Assemble the jack handle and the jack handle extension bar. Insert the jack handle end through the opening in Turn the jack handle counterclockwise. the bumper, and into the lowering screw. Refer to the “Owner’s Manual”...
• Page 46 Positioning System (GPS) data and embedded cellular technology to provide safety and security features to subscribers. Safety Connect is staffed with live agents at the Toyota response center, which operates 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Services for subscribers include: •...
• Page 47 ANTI-LOCK BRAKE SYSTEM (ABS) Toyota’s Anti-lock Brake System detects which wheels are locking up and limits wheel lockup by “pulsing” each wheel’s brakes independently. Pulsing releases brake pressure repeatedly for fractions of a second. This helps the tires attain the traction that current road conditions will allow, helping you to stay in directional control.
• Page 48 Traction Control helps maintain traction on loose gravel and wet, icy, or uneven surfaces by applying brake force to the spinning wheel(s). Toyota’s TRAC sensors are activated when one of the drive wheels starts to slip. TRAC limits engine output and applies the brakes to the spinning wheel. This transfers power to the wheels that still have traction to help keep you on track.
• Page 50 TOYOTA AUDIO MULTIMEDIA AND CONNECTED SERVICES Bluetooth Pairing ® Toyota app Connected Services Apple CarPlay ® Android Auto ™ Amazon Alexa SiriusXM ® Online Support Tool Scan QR Code to Download Toyota app Apple Android Do not attempt the process while driving.
• Page 51 ® Bluetooth Pairing Note: Do not attempt the Bluetooth ® Pairing process while driving. Press [MENU] on the faceplate, then select “Setup” on display screen. STEP iPhone Bluetooth Menu Android Bluetooth Menu Ensure Bluetooth is turned on for Select “Bluetooth,” then select STEP STEP your phone.
• Page 52 GETTING STARTED WITH ® Bluetooth Pairing (continued) “Connecting” displays while Enable Notifications (text message). STEP STEP While pairing your phone this phone is forming the connection message will display: “You may to the multimedia system. need to allow message access on your phone.”...
• Page 53 Getting Started with Toyota app Toyota app allows access to valuable information about your vehicle and control of capable features equipped with your vehicle. • • • Manuals & Warranties Schedule Maintenance Roadside Assistance • • • Vehicle Health Report SiriusXM ®...
• Page 54 GETTING STARTED WITH Getting Started with Connected Services Safety Connect • • (SOS) EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ROADSIDE ASSISTANCE • BUTTON STOLEN VEHICLE LOCATOR • AUTOMATIC COLLISION NOTIFICATION Remote Connect (if equipped) • • START VEHICLE LOCK/UNLOCK VEHICLE DOORS • • VEHICLE STATUS ALERTS VEHICLE FINDER Authentication is required to enable Remote Connect.
• Page 55 VEHICLE MAINTENANCE ALERT NOTIFICATION Available on select 2018 and newer vehicles. After registering and opting into Service Connect, you will be greeted with a STEP notification of the following language “Would you like to start Toyota Service Connect Activation?” Select “Yes.” Select “OK.”...
• Page 56 GETTING STARTED WITH Connected Services Online Support Toyota’s online support tool provides intuitive “How-To” instruction and videos. To begin, please visit: https://toyotaaudioandconnectedservicessupport.com/ ® Apple CarPlay (if equipped) ® Setup of Apple CarPlay Ensure Siri is enabled on your Plug a compatible iPhone into ®...
• Page 57 ® Setup of Apple CarPlay (continued) * Screen depiction accurate at time of posting. Apple CarPlay is now ready to ® STEP operate. Requirements: Bluetooth ® functions will be inoperable while CarPlay ® is in use. Wireless CarPlay ® is not supported.
• Page 58 GETTING STARTED WITH ™ Android Auto (if equipped) Setup of Android Auto ™ With Android 9 or below, the Open Android Auto ™ app and tap STEP STEP Android Auto app download ™ get started. is required. With Android 10, Android Auto is built in and the ™...
• Page 59 ™ Setup of Android Auto (continued) * Screen depiction accurate at time of posting. Android Auto is now ready to ™ STEP operate. Requirements: Bluetooth ® functions will be inoperable while Android Auto ™ is in use. Wireless Android Auto ™...
• Page 60 Tap “Get started”. iPhone users Depending on your phone and Tap “Allow” for Toyota+Alexa to STEP STEP application settings, Toyota+Alexa access Alexa Voice Services and may automatically sign you in.
• Page 61 Bluetooth ® Toyota+Alexa is now ready. Just say “Alexa” and wait for the tone, then speak your command. Note: Ensure the Toyota + Alexa app is open on the paired phone. ® SiriusXM 8 (If equipped) ®...
• Page 62 GETTING STARTED WITH Audio Multimedia Online Support Toyota’s online support tool provides intuitive “How-To” instruction and videos. To begin, please visit: https://toyotaaudioandconnectedservicessupport.com/...
• Page 63 1 The Bluetooth word mark and logos are registered trademarks owned by Bluetooth SIG, Inc. and any use of such marks by Toyota is under license. A compatible Bluetooth enabled phone must first be paired. Phone performance depends on software, coverage and carrier.
• Page 64 Quick Reference Guide 2023 00505QRG234RUN Printed in U.S.A. 7/22 toyota.com 21-MKG-16268...

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2024 4RUNNER

Crawl Control

When the trail gets challenging, 4Runner’s available Crawl Control (CRAWL) is here to help you conquer your off-road adventure. This advanced system automatically modulates the throttle and brakes on five low-speed settings so you can keep your focus on navigating across difficult terrain.

Electronic Locking Rear Differential

To help you negotiate uncertain terrain, 4Runner’s available electronically controlled locking rear differential distributes engine power evenly to both rear wheels, so they move at the same speed, even if one is off the ground. It is designed to help you maintain a controlled pace over obstacles.

Multi-Terrain Monitor

Like an extra set of eyes on what’s around you, 4Runner’s available Multi-Terrain Monitor (MTM) helps you navigate nature’s obstacles with confidence. By using cameras placed around the SUV, you can get a better view of your surroundings on the 8-in. touchscreen display.

Kinetic Dynamic Suspension System (KDSS)

The available Kinetic Dynamic Suspension System (KDSS) helps 4Runner make molehills out of mountains. When taking on extreme off-road terrain, this system is designed to automatically decouple 4Runner’s sway bars as needed, helping improve wheel articulation. And when the terrain goes back to smooth and flat, the sway bars are designed to automatically reconnect.

Multi-Terrain Select

When you’re in the thick of it, you can activate 4Runner’s available Multi-Terrain Select (MTS) system for optimized traction. Just choose from four terrain modes and this system helps regulate wheelspin by automatically adjusting the engine throttle and traction control.

Power Rear Glass

4Runner features a power rear window, a signature element found across all generations of 4Runner. And best of all, it’s standard. This rear glass raises and lowers with the push of a button, making it easier to grab your gear from the cargo area.

Fold-Flat Second-Row Seating

With 4Runner’s 40/20/40 fold-flat second-row seats, you can make room for everything you need by folding one or all three seats down to accommodate up to 88.8 cubic feet of cargo.

Third-Row Seating

If you’re all about the entourage, you'll be able to accommodate up to seven with the available third-row seating on SR5 and Limited grades. The seats also have a 50/50 split capability to make room for cargo.

120V AC Power Outlet

A 120V AC power outlet is conveniently located in the cargo area so you can power your gear—like your phone or an air compressor—when you’re off the grid.

Performance

270-hp 4.0-liter v6 engine.

4Runner’s legendary reliability continues with power from its 4.0-liter V6 engine. With up to 270 hp and 278 lb.-ft. of torque, you have all that you need to take you from adventure to adventure.

Full-Time 4WD

Standard on 4Runner Limited, full-time 4WD helps provide you with optimal traction for every drive. All you have to do is focus on the path ahead when the terrain gets rugged or when the road conditions become challenging, and full-time 4WD automatically sends power to the wheel that needs it most.

Part-Time 4WD

Giving you more control of your 4Runner’s capabilities is an available four-wheel drive 4-wheel-drive system that provides high- and low-range options. Select High 2 (H2) for daily driving and for the best fuel efficiency, High 4 (H4) for more traction under 55 mph, and Low 4 (L4) when you need to drive slowly or help in trekking over difficult terrain.

5000-Lb. Max Towing Capacity

With 4Runner’s ability to tow up to 5000 lbs., venturing into some of nature’s toughest ranges doesn’t mean you have to leave everything behind. 4Runner adheres to SAE J2807, the standard for tow ratings set by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).

TRD Sport X-REAS Suspension

Featuring an X-REAS suspension, TRD Sport helps you confidently corner and carve through roads without breaking a sweat. TRD Sport also equipped with 20-in. alloy wheels and premium tires for enhanced traction.

Legendary Capability

4Runner TRD Pro is ready to take your adventures to the next level. Its suspension—featuring oversize TRD-tuned FOX® high-performance shocks with rear remote reservoirs and TRD-tuned front springs—helps carry you over unforgiving terrain. And with a ¼-in.-thick aluminum skid plate designed to protect things up front, this rugged body-on-frame SUV fears no trail.

• View TRD Pro Series

Nitto® Terra Grappler® All-Terrain Tires

4Runner TRD Pro’s unique 17-in. alloy wheels come wrapped in Nitto® Terra Grappler® all-terrain tires for more on-road comfort and enhanced off-road traction.

FOX® Shocks and TRD-Tuned Suspension

Take your adventures to the next level. 4Runner TRD Pro’s suspension features oversize TRD-tuned FOX® high-performance shocks—with remote reservoirs on the rear shocks—and TRD-tuned front springs to help carry you over unforgiving terrain.

Rugged Looks

When you’re an off-road legend, there’s no need to shout it. But that doesn’t mean you can’t show off. 4Runner turns heads on the trail with its signature power rear window and TRD Pro badging. And with 17-in. TRD alloy wheels wrapped in Nitto® Terra Grappler® all-terrain tires, you can leave everyone in the dust as you crawl through rocks, dirt and mud in style.

TRD Off-Road

Delivering consistent performance when the going gets rough, TRD Off-Road’s Crawl Control (CRAWL) helps steady the course. And TRD Off-Road’s Multi-Terrain Select (MTS) and part-time selectable 4WD help you take on rock, dirt and mud—without losing your grip.

4Runner TRD Sport scores style points with its SofTex®-trimmed seats and bold 20-in. wheels. One look, and everyone knows this 4Runner is ready to get after it. But TRD Sport has more going for it than just its good looks—its strong and lightweight, 20-in. TRD Sport Gray Metallic alloy wheels give this rugged SUV a magnetic look on wild terrain. And 4Runner’s X-REAS sport-enhanced suspension offers enhanced on-road driving dynamics.

TRD Pro Rugged Style

Looking its best with a fresh coat of mud, 4Runner TRD Pro’s trail-ready toughness and cutting-edge style have made it an off-road icon. Meanwhile, its tech-focused and versatile interior helps keep you connected and comfortable as you explore the world’s wildest terrain. Now available in Solar Octane, TRD Pro looks as aggressive and capable as it performs.

Take on every adventure with style to match your purpose. TRD Off-Road features unique 17-in. alloy wheels with black-painted inserts and TRD Off-Road badging on the side of the rig. A hood scoop and black-painted roof rails finish off a rugged look that says you're itching to get out there.

Limited Grade

20-in. wheels, chrome body accents and a striking front fascia give 4Runner Limited a refined presence. Inside, it’s all decked out with creature comforts like leather-trimmed seats and a 15-speaker JBL® audio system. And staying true to its name, Limited is loaded with the proven capability features 4Runner is known for, like its standard X-REAS Sport Enhancement Suspension and available full-time 4WD.

4Runner TRD Sport scores style points with its commanding front grille, sporty hood scoop and color-keyed body details. One look at the TRD Sport badge and everyone knows this 4Runner is ready to get after it.

LED Headlights and Fog Lights

Whether you’re beating the crowd to surf before dawn or driving home from the trail after dusk, 4Runner’s standard LED headlights shine bright for greater visibility in the dark. And when you're driving with reduced visibility, 4Runner’s standard LED fog lights help give you a clearer view of what’s ahead.

TRD Interior Signature Touches

Climb inside 4Runner TRD and feel its sporty vibe. Available SofTex®-trimmed seats feature TRD embroidered headrests, while accent stitching found throughout the interior lets you know it’s ready for action. All you have to do is grab hold of the TRD shift knob and drive off to your next adventure.

Power Tilt/Slide Moonroof

Take it all in. 4Runner’s available power tilt/slide moonroof brings you closer to the great outdoors, without you even leaving your seat.

Heated and Ventilated Front Leather-Trimmed Seats

Warm up on your way up the mountain; cool down when you’re under the desert sun. No matter the climate, 4Runner’s available heated and ventilated front seats help you explore in total comfort.

Three USB Ports

With one USB port in the front and two in the second row, you and your passengers can stay powered up for whatever the journey ahead will bring.

Limited Grade Wooden Interior Accents

Featured on 4Runner Limited, wood-inspired accents are used throughout the interior. Found across the dash, and on the shift knob, its deep, rich finish adds warmth to the interior while complementing 4Runner’s sleek and distinct details.

8-In. Touchscreen With Apple CarPlay® Compatibility

4Runner offers standard Apple CarPlay® compatibility. Just plug in your compatible iPhone® and get directions, make calls, send and receive messages, listen to your own playlist and more—all via the familiar touchscreen interface.

Dual Zone Automatic Climate Control

You and your front passenger will be comfortable inside 4Runner, thanks to its available automatic dual zone climate control. Just select the temperature you want and get ready to enjoy the ride.

Smart Key System With Push Button Start

No need to reach into your pocket or purse with 4Runner’s Smart Key System. Lock and unlock the front doors and open the trunk by simply carrying the Smart Key. Once inside, just press 4Runner’s convenient Push Button Start, and you’re ready to roll.

Android Auto™ Compatibility

Android Auto™ puts many of your favorite Android™ apps from your phone right on 4Runner’s 8-in. touchscreen. You can take calls, pull up your favorite playlist, and a whole lot more—all while your Android™ phone is safely stashed away.

15-Speaker JBL® Premium Audio System

Lending the soundtrack to your many adventures is 4Runner’s available JBL® Premium audio system. To ensure you don’t miss a note of your music’s soaring highs or thundering lows, the system boasts an amazing 15 speakers, including an amplifier and subwoofer.

Sirius XM® 3-Month Trial

With the trial subscription, you get 425+ channels, including 165+ channels in your vehicle, to listen to ad-free music, plus sports, news, comedy and more. Innovative features in 4Runner make it even easier to search, discover and listen than ever before through personalized channel recommendations curated just “For You;” plus, the Live Sports category puts all your games and teams in one place for easy access.

Panoramic View Monitor

4Runner’s available Panoramic View Monitor (PVM) uses cameras on the front, sides and rear of the SUV to give you a 360-degree view of what’s going on outside.

Safety & Convenience

Blind spot monitor with rear cross-traffic alert.

4Runner’s standard Blind Spot Monitor (BSM) with Rear Cross-Traffic Alert (RCTA) helps you identify vehicles that might be in a blind spot. When you use your turn signal and BSM detects a vehicle, it warns you with a flashing indicator light on the appropriate outside mirror. Rear Cross-Traffic Alert provides audible and visual indicators to help warn you of approaching vehicles when you’re slowly backing out of a driveway or parking spot.

Backup Camera

When backing up, the area visible to the camera is displayed on the 8-in. touchscreen. 4Runner’s available front and rear parking assist sonar beeps to tell you how close the bumpers are from a detected object. The faster it beeps, the closer the object is. And 4Runner’s available Panoramic View Monitor (PVM) uses cameras on the front, sides and rear to give you a 360-degree view of what’s going on outside.

Star Safety System™

4Runner comes standard with the Star Safety System™, a suite of six safety features designed to help keep you out of harm’s way. It includes Vehicle Stability Control (VSC), Traction Control (TRAC), Anti-lock Brake System (ABS), Brake Assist (BA), Electronic Brake-force Distribution (EBD) and Smart Stop Technology® (SST).

Eight Standard Airbags

A driver and front passenger Advanced Airbag System, driver and front passenger TAP (Thorax, Abdomen, Pelvis) front seat-mounted side airbags, driver and front passenger knee airbags and all-row (third-row airbags on models so equipped) Roll-sensing Side Curtain Airbags (RSCA) are all part of a system designed to help keep you safe.

Every new Toyota comes with ToyotaCare, a maintenance plan that covers normal factory scheduled service for 2 years or 25,000 miles, whichever comes first, and 24-hour Roadside Assistance for 2 years, unlimited mileage.

Pre-Collision System With Pedestrian Detection

The Pre-Collision System with Pedestrian Detection (PCS w/PD) is designed to help detect a vehicle or a pedestrian in certain situations. Using both a camera and radar, PCS w/PD can provide an audio/visual alert to warn you of a possible collision under certain circumstances. If you don’t react, the system is designed to automatically brake.

Dynamic Radar Cruise Control

Intended for highway use, Dynamic Radar Cruise Control (DRCC) lets you drive at a preset speed. DRCC is designed to function at speeds of 25-110 mph and uses vehicle-to-vehicle distance control, helping maintain a preset distance from the vehicle ahead of you.

Lane Departure Alert

By detecting visible white/yellow lane markings at speeds above 32 mph, Lane Departure Alert (LDA) is designed to issue an audio/visual alert if an inadvertent lane departure is detected.

Automatic High Beams

The Automatic High Beams (AHB) safety system is designed to help you see more clearly at night at speeds above 25 mph. The AHB system can detect the headlights of oncoming vehicles and taillights of preceding vehicles, then automatically toggles between high and low beams accordingly.

Connected Services

Remote connect.

4Runner is up to speed with the latest tech. Using Toyota’s available Remote Connect through the Toyota app, you can start the engine, lock/unlock doors, and locate your vehicle with your compatible smartphone or smartwatch.

Wi-Fi Connect

Turn your 4Runner into a hotspot. 4G Wi-Fi Connect lets you easily connect up to five devices. And depending on your existing mobile provider, you can add the Wi-Fi Connect subscription to your current mobile plan. We’ll even include an up to 30-day/2 GB trial subscription on available trims to get you started.

Safety Connect®

Because the unexpected can happen at any time of day — or night. Every new 4Runner comes with a one-year trial of Safety Connect®, featuring Emergency SOS assistance and 24/7 Toyota Roadside Assistance to help you drive with added peace of mind.

Destination Assist

Need directions? No problem. 4Runner drivers of select grades enjoy a one-year trial of available Destination Assist. Destination Assist gives you 24/7 access to a live agent to help locate a destination and get directions.

Service Connect

You keep track of your health info; now you can do the same for your 4Runner. With an up to 10-year trial of Service Connect, you’ll get personalized maintenance updates and vehicle health reports.

2023 Toyota 4Runner

2023 Toyota 4Runner Review

• Impressive off-road capability
• Wide variety of configurations to suit many buyers
• Versatile cargo area, especially with the optional slide-out floor
• Choppy ride quality compared with more modern crossover SUVs
• V6 engine is not particularly fuel-efficient
• Tall step-in height makes for awkward entry and exit

What's new

• Retro-inspired 40th Anniversary Special Edition
• Previous Trail Special Edition has been discontinued
• Blind-spot and rear cross-traffic warning system now come standard
• Part of the fifth 4Runner generation introduced for 2010

The Toyota 4Runner is a rugged, old-school body-on-frame midsize SUV that's found success in a world filled with stylish car-based SUVs filled to the brim with tech. It's not fuel-efficient, comfortable or high-tech, but it's loved for its tough looks, off-road heritage and versatility. Like many truck-based SUVs, the 4Runner is very capable off-road, has plenty of towing capacity and offers loads of cargo space. Some rivals try to mimic the 4Runner's rugged look with body cladding and all-terrain tires, but few are truly built for off-roading.

Cost to Drive Cost to drive estimates for the 2023 Toyota 4Runner SR5 4dr SUV (4.0L 6cyl 5A) and comparison vehicles are based on 15,000 miles per year (with a mix of 55% city and 45% highway driving) and energy estimates of $3.41 per gallon for regular unleaded in North Dakota.

The 2023 model year marks the 40th birthday for the 4Runner. To celebrate, Toyota introduces the 40th Anniversary Special Edition based on the popular (and budget-friendly) SR5 model. Featuring unique bronze wheels and badging, this 4Runner wows with a heritage-inspired graphics package. The red, orange and yellow racing stripes pay homage to the old Toyota pickups that the original 4Runner was based on.

If you aren't into the 4Runner's classic looks or don't need its impressive off-road capability, there are a few alternatives to consider that perform better in city driving and offer more modernity. The newly redesigned Jeep Grand Cherokee and Ford Bronco boast solid off-road chops while offering lots of comfort and tech. There is also the Honda Passport, which has sufficient off-road capability for most and packs many modern features. If you'd like to know more about how the 4Runner performed during testing, check out our Expert Rating below to get our test team's full review of its performance, fuel efficiency and more.

Edmunds Expert Rating

Performance, fuel economy, which 4runner does edmunds recommend, toyota 4runner models.

SR5 Starts you out with:

• LED headlights
• 17-inch wheels
• Power rear window
• Keyless ignition and entry
• Underbody skid plates
• Power-adjustable driver's seat
• 40/20/40-split reclining and folding second-row seats
• Leather-wrapped steering wheel
• 120-volt power outlet in the rear cargo area
• 8-inch touchscreen
• Apple CarPlay and Android Auto smartphone integration

Every 4Runner also comes with:

• Adaptive cruise control (maintains a driver-set distance between the 4Runner and the car in front)
• Forward collision warning with automatic braking (warns you of an impending collision and applies the brakes in certain scenarios)
• Lane departure warning (alerts you if the vehicle begins to drift out of its lane)
• Blind-spot warning with rear cross-traffic warning (alerts you if a vehicle is in your blind spot during a lane change or while in reverse)

TRD Sport Based on the SR5, the Sport adds unique styling with a few extra features, such as:

• Suspension tuned for firmer on-road handling
• 20-inch wheels
• TRD-branded interior trim
• Simulated leather upholstery
• Heated front seats

SR5 Premium Upgrades the SR5 trim with:

• Power-adjustable front passenger seat
• Auto-dimming rearview mirror
• Optional sunroof

40th Anniversary Special Edition This limited-production model is based on the SR5 Premium but also gets:

• Special grille
• Bronze-colored 17-inch wheels
• Yellow-and-orange exterior graphic stripes
• Bronze interior stitching
• 40th Anniversary floor mats

TRD Off-Road and TRD Off-Road Premium These trims are similar to their respective SR5 trims but have:

• Additional drive settings for off-roading
• Locking rear differential (helps with maximizing traction off-road)
• Optional Kinetic Dynamic Suspension System (KDSS) that can improve wheel articulation when off-roading

Limited This is the 4Runner's luxury-level trim. It uses a different 4WD system and suspension setup that aims to make it more comfortable. It also comes with:

• Chrome exterior accents
• Dual-zone automatic climate control
• Leather upholstery
• Ventilated front seats
• Integrated navigation system
• Premium JBL sound system
• Front and rear parking sensors
• 360-degree camera system (gives you a top-down view of the 4Runner and its surroundings for tight parking situations)

TRD Pro The most expensive 4Runner, the TRD Pro is meant for serious off-roaders. It has the TRD Off-Road Premium's standard features plus the sunroof, navigation system and JBL sound system. It also features:

• Off-road-focused suspension with Fox dampers
• TRD wheels with all-terrain tires
• Special front skid plate
• TRD roof rack

Toyota 4Runner Reviews

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2023 Toyota 4Runner videos

2020 land rover defender vs. wrangler vs. 4runner — the new defender goes off-road with the big boys.

NOTE: This video is about the 2020 Toyota 4Runner, but since the 2023 Toyota 4Runner is part of the same generation, our earlier analysis still applies.

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• 2020 Toyota 4Runner TRD Pro — Review, Price, Interior, Off-R...

2023 Toyota 4Runner Features & Specs

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Toyota 4Runner vs. Jeep Grand Cherokee

Fresh off a 2022 full redesign, the Grand Cherokee boasts more comfort, modern styling and loads of modern tech while maintaining its impressive off-road credentials. The popular off-roader offers three engine choices and a higher towing capacity but has less cargo space. The Grand Cherokee also needs the optional air suspension raised all the way to give it more ground clearance than the 4Runner. Pricing for the Grand Cherokee starts a little higher, while the more upscale trims get costly quick.

Toyota 4Runner vs. Honda Passport

The Passport is a little shorter and more rugged-looking than the Honda Pilot. It has effective off-road capability thanks to its torque-vectoring all-wheel-drive system and different traction modes. It will never top a 4Runner off-road, but the Passport has a roomier and more comfortable cabin, superior tech and better on-road drivability. The new rugged-looking TrailSport trim includes more aggressive tires, but its 7.5 inches of ground clearance will hamper serious off-roading. Both SUVs have the same maximum towing capacity.

Toyota 4Runner vs. Ford Bronco

The Bronco is Ford's off-roader that was reintroduced in 2021. It offers more powerful engine options, more comfort and better on-road manners than the 4Runner. But like the 4Runner, the Bronco is truck-based and one of the best off-roaders in the market. Both also sport a rough-and-tumble boxy exterior. Unlike the 4Runner, though, the Bronco offers open-top driving with a removable hardtop or soft-top. The doors are removable too. When it comes to tech, the more modern Bronco has the advantage. Not surprisingly, fuel economy is not a strong suit of either.

Our experts’ favorite 4Runner safety features:

Nhtsa overall rating 4 out of 5 stars.

The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration offers independent analysis.

IIHS Rating

The Insurance Institute of Highway Safety uses extensive crash tests to determine car safety.

2023 Toyota 4Runner First Impressions

What is the 4Runner?

One of the true off-road icons, the Toyota 4Runner is a rugged SUV with a spacious interior and impressive capability. You can option a 4Runner to have three rows of seats, but the vast majority have two rows. This is a tall and boxy SUV that rides on a truck-like platform, so while it boasts impressive trail chops and strong towing capacity, the ride quality and interior comfort are not quite up to modern standards for the class. It also has quite a thirsty V6 engine.

What about the 2023 model? It's been a long time since Toyota gave the 4Runner a full redesign, but that could be exactly what's in the cards — new styling, engines and underpinning mechanical parts. A redesigned 4Runner would likely introduce a new version of Toyota's global architecture platform, a smaller version of the platform under the Tundra and Lexus LX 600, called TNGA-F. It's also probable that the yet-to-be-seen redesigned Tacoma would share it. That frame should be lighter and more rigid, which should improve both performance and comfort.

If the 4Runner is redesigned for 2023, we also expect a new range of engines under the hood. There would likely be a turbocharged four-cylinder to start. Toyota has previously stated it intends to have a hybrid version of every model in its lineup by 2025, so a hybrid V6 could potentially be an option for the 4Runner too.

Edmunds says

The 4Runner has a huge following even though the current version is inefficient and the ride is awfully stiff. Toyota could probably give the 2023 4Runner a quick once-over and still ride a healthy sales wave for years. It's also possible that the SUV receives a comprehensive update from all angles. The redesigned 4Runner wouldn't have to be overly economical or luxurious, but a bit of modernity would go a long way. Stick with Edmunds as we'll continue to update our information on the 2023 Toyota 4Runner as we learn more.

Is the Toyota 4Runner a good car?

What's new in the 2023 toyota 4runner.

According to Edmunds’ car experts, here’s what’s new for the 2023 Toyota 4Runner:

Is the Toyota 4Runner reliable?

Is the 2023 toyota 4runner a good car, how much should i pay for a 2023 toyota 4runner.

The least-expensive 2023 Toyota 4Runner is the 2023 Toyota 4Runner SR5 4dr SUV (4.0L 6cyl 5A). Including destination charge, it arrives with a Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) of about $40,155.

Other versions include:

• SR5 4dr SUV (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $40,155
• SR5 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $42,030
• TRD Sport 4dr SUV (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $43,015
• SR5 Premium 4dr SUV (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $43,215
• TRD OFF-ROAD 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $44,000
• TRD Sport 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $44,890
• SR5 Premium 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $45,090
• TRD OFF-ROAD Premium 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $46,580
• 40th Anniversary Special Edition 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $47,720
• Limited 4dr SUV (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $49,390
• Limited 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $51,425
• TRD PRO 4dr SUV 4WD (4.0L 6cyl 5A) which starts at $54,620

What are the different models of Toyota 4Runner?

Related 2023 toyota 4runner info, vehicle rankings by type.

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2023 Toyota 4Runner: A Comprehensive Guide On Features, Specs, And Pricing

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2023 Toyota 4Runner

In production since the last century, the 4Runner is a dinosaur in Toyota's lineup, and will be replaced with an all-new model in 2025. In the meantime, it remains one of the top 10 most reliable vehicles ever built, and the #1 choice for anyone who needs a truly unkillable, offroad-capable SUV.

• Boxy and Rugged Styling
• Genuinely Competent Off-Road
• Toyota Dependability and Reliability
• Poor Gas Mileage and Subpar Ride
• Outdated Onboard Tech

The Toyota 4Runner marks its 40th anniversary in 2023, reaching the middle-age milestone that few models ever achieve. The 4Runner made its debut in 1983 as the Toyota Hilux Surf and as the 4Runner for export markets, but the two-door “SUV” was effectively a Hilux pickup truck with a shell over the bed. The SUV mainly found its niche among those needing rough-and-tumble capabilities and to venture off-road. The model has transformed, albeit slightly, over the last 40 years without losing its foundational ruggedness.

That strategy, along with the model’s reputation for reliability, is proving successful with Toyota marking the 4Runner’s best sales year ever in the U.S. in 2021. Toyota is marking its milestone with a limited run 40th Anniversary Special Edition model, which harkens back to the 4Runner’s debut with special exterior appointments sure to rouse the interests of the model’s fans.

2023 Toyota 4Runner Performance and Capability

The 4Runner still utilizes a body-on-frame construction, a sizeable V-6 that chugs like a co-ed at a keg party and styling that hasn’t been seriously updated since the first Obama administration. But Toyota has seemingly implemented the “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” frame of thought, so the 2023 model remains relatively unchanged. The strategy is not deterring buyers. Toyota sold over 144,000 4Runners in 2021 despite a flooded mid-size SUV market.

As such, the latest 4Runner continues to source its power from a 4.0-liter V-6 rated for 270 horsepower and 278 foot-pounds of torque. The V-6 works with a relatively ancient five-speed transmission.

RELATED: 2022 Toyota 4Runner Buyer's Guide

Rear-wheel drive and two versions of four-wheel drive are available. Most 4WD models use a part-time 4X4 system with a two-speed transfer case with selectable low-range. The top-tier Limited trim incorporates a full-time 4WD system with a Torsen center differential lock feature modulated through a console-mounted switch. The differential can alter the torque split up to 30/70 (front/rear) and 53/47. Engine/front suspension, fuel tank, and transfer case (for 4x4 models) skid plates are standard across the range.

All models come with an integrated tow-hitch receiver and wiring harness with a maximum towing capacity of 5,000 pounds. Select models also feature downhill assist control, and the TRD Off-Road and TRD Pro include Toyota’s Crawl Control system which automatically regulates engine speed and braking force to allow drivers to focus on steering while traversing rough or ragged terrain. With just five gears and a bulky V-6, the 4Runner continues to return measly fuel economy figures. The EPA rates all models at 17 combined mpg and at just 19 on the highway.

2023 Toyota 4Runner Drivetrain and Performance

Continuing the theme of limited change, the 4Runner’s exterior styling remains relatively the same from its most recent facelift, which was a staggering 10 years ago. It won’t win any beauty contests — it still looks like a pickup wearing a shell — but its swollen wheel arches, boxy styling, and aggressive fascia do lend to an endearing ruggedness.

TRD models include a sizeable hood scoop and a grille that looks like it’s wearing a muzzle, but no matter the guise, the 4Runner screams utilitarianism. Those seeking to spice up the exterior a bit can opt for the 40th Anniversary Special Edition, which includes a yellow/orange/red tri-stripe across the beltline and up the C-pillar and a small section along the grille. Toyota will only produce 4,040 examples of the special edition, fitted with the unique copper wheels.

The 4Runner is available in the following colors:

• Super White

• Classic Silver Metallic

• Magnetic Grey Metallic

• Midnight Black Metallic

• Barcelona Red Metallic

• Army green

• Lunar Rock

• Nautical Blue Metallic

• Lime Rush (TRD Pro Only)

Pragmaticism is also present throughout the 4Runner’s cabin. The layout is functional, you get a dated design with yesteryear’s switchgear and completely utilitarian styling. Depending on trim, seats are either covered with cloth, synthetic leather, or genuine leather upholstery. All models include an eight-inch touchscreen flanked by traditional pushbuttons, with standard Android Auto and Apple CarPlay connectivity, and up to five total USB ports. A 12V DC auxiliary power outlet and 120V AC power outlet, both in the cargo area, are standard.

The 2023 model’s interior specs remain the same, providing notable space for front passengers, rear seats that will accommodate adults without fuss, and ample 47.2-cubic feet of cargo space with the rear seats up and nearly 90 cubic feet behind the front seats. SR5 and Limited trim models offer optional third-row seating. The 40th Anniversary Special Edition features a bronze, cross-stitch shift knob, bronze seat stitching, and 40th-anniversary logos on the seats, floor mats, and dash.

RELATED: 2022 Toyota 4Runner TRD Sport Review: A Big SUV For The Family

2023 Toyota 4Runner Price and Availability

Expect the 2023 4Runner to hit dealers this fall with seven total trims choices starting at $38,805 to $53,270 . The cost for upgrading to four-wheel drive is between $1,875 to $2,035 depending on the model, and with the 4Runner’s predilection for Overlanding, most buyers will likely opt to spend the extra dough.

The 4Runner’s list of creature comforts is relatively limited in base, SR5 trims, which include cruise control, a smart key with push-button start, a power rear lift gate, and a 4.2-inch informational display in the gauge cluster. Upgrading to SR5 Premium adds synthetic leather upholstery, heated front seats, and 40/20/40 flat-folding rear seats.

TRD Sport models include exterior amenities like the TRD hood scoop, color-keyed grille bar, bumper and lower spoiler, roof rails, and an X-REAS suspension while the TRD Pro included 2.-inch Fox internal front and rear shocks, a roof rack, Nitto Terra Grappler all-terrain tires and other features. Limited models offer a long list of standard features without some of the off-roading upgrades of the TRD trims, including:

• Dual-zone automatic climate control
• Heated and ventilated front seats
• Panoramic view monitor

RELATED: Here's How The 2022 Toyota 4Runner Compares With The Competition

The 4Runner’s safety ratings have come a long way since the second-generation model received a one-star crash rating for driver’s side impact. Despite the 4Runner's dated design, it still includes a suite of active safety features and driver’s aids. New for 2023, all models feature blind spot monitoring and rear cross-traffic alert as standard.

All 4Runner models comes standard with Toyota Safety Sense-P, which includes a pre-collision system with pedestrian detection, lane departure alert, automatic high beams and radar cruise control. The NHTSA has not yet rated the 2023 model, but the 2022 4Runner earned a four-star overall rating (out of a possible five stars). Side crash received the full five stars, while the frontal received four stars and the rollover rating was three.

Main Competition

The mid-size SUV market is a crowded place and buyers have a lot of choices. The Toyota 4Runner goes up against the likes of some well-established rivals like the Ford Explorer the Honda Passport, the Nissan Pathfinder, and the cutting-edge Korean twins of the Hyundai Palisade and Kia Telluride. If you're looking for a more rugged alternative, models like the Subaru Outback, the Jeep Wrangler, Jeep Grand Cherokee, and the Ford Bronco also come into play.

Models like the Nissan Pathfinder, and Ford Explorer, offer more seats while the Korean pair in the Kia Telluride and Hyundai Palisade offers better onboard tech with more up-to-date cabins. The Explorer along with the Jeep Grand Cherokee also offers a hybrid option.

But despite the fierce competition, demand for the old-school 4Runner remains strong, and it continues to soldier on with its tried and tested recipe. It is a rugged, reliable, and dependable family SUV that you wouldn't hesitate to take off the beaten path. Some people are willing to look past the hype of some of the more modern models and are looking for a more basic experience, which is why folks out there are paying a significant price premium over MSRP to get their hands on a 4Runner.

2023 Toyota 4Runner TRD Pro Review: Proof That Not Everyone Wants The Latest And Greatest SUV

The 4Runner continues to rest on its laurels as an off-road idol despite being a wildly outdated mid-size SUV

2023 Toyota 4Runner 40th Anniversary Edition Review: An Analog SUV For The Digital Age

Celebrating four decades of America's favorite old-school SUV

2022 Toyota 4Runner TRD Sport Review: A Big SUV For The Family

Here's why the decade old Toyota 4Runner is a hot-seller and continues to stay relevant today

2019 Toyota 4Runner Nightshade Special Edition

A splash of black for the Japanese off-roader icon

2018 Toyota 4Runner Nightshade Special Edition

If you want your 4Runner to look stealthy, you need to take a good, long look at the Nightshade Special Edition

2019 Toyota 4Runner TRD Pro

Minor upgrades keep the 4Runner competitive

2015 - 2017 Toyota 4Runner TRD Pro – Driven

The ultimate 4Runner

2017 Toyota 4Runner TRD Off-Road

Toyota renames the Trail & Trail Premium trims

2015 Toyota 4Runner Tonka

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Cruise Control

Discussion in ' 5th Gen 4Runners (2010-2024) ' started by Rocky107 , Aug 26, 2021 .

#1 Rocky107 [OP] New Member

I have a 2021 TRD Pro. Has anyone successfully turned off the radar feature on cruise control? I don't like my car automatically breaking itself.  

#2 TXKK626 New Member

Hold the cruise control activation button in for about 3 seconds when you turn it on. That activates it without the radar feature. You will see it say "radar off" for a second in the notification center on the dash when it turns on.  

#3 Rocky107 [OP] New Member

Awesome, thank you! Will I have to do this every time I turn my car on/off?  

#4 TXKK626 New Member

From what I've experienced, yes. Each time you activate cruise.  

#5 Merlin84 New Member

Speaking of cruise control has anyone noticed that it revs really high while CC is on? I can go 80mph under 2500rpm, but once CC is activated it acts like it's being dropped into a lower gear, and even on flat terrain revs at about 3500rpm  

#6 vonfatman New Member

yes, i really liked the cruise on my highlander better.....this one works too hard.  

#7 Merlin84 New Member

vonfatman said: ↑ yes, i really liked the cruise on my highlander better.....this one works too hard. Click to expand...

#8 Trail Runnah New Member

Merlin84 said: ↑ Speaking of cruise control has anyone noticed that it revs really high while CC is on? I can go 80mph under 2500rpm, but once CC is activated it acts like it's being dropped into a lower gear, and even on flat terrain revs at about 3500rpm Click to expand...

#9 Merlin84 New Member

Trail Runnah said: ↑ Does it only do that on flat ground, or when going up hills? Mine will do that going up hills, it doesn't know that it needs to work up a little extra speed before the hill, so then it will downshift and get the revs up because the engine doesn't have the power to make the grade without downshifting a few gears. However if I'm on flat ground, it's the revs are exactly the same whether I'm using cruise control or not. Yeah, if yours does it on flat ground it almost sounds like it's not allowing the transmission to shift into 5th gear. Unless perhaps you're on a slight grade, or driving into a headwind where the motor doesn't have enough power to maintain that speed in top gear. Click to expand...

#10 rickystl New Member

TXKK626 said: ↑ Hold the cruise control activation button in for about 3 seconds when you turn it on. That activates it without the radar feature. You will see it say "radar off" for a second in the notification center on the dash when it turns on. Click to expand...

#11 DRobs New Member

We have the Radar Cruise Control in our 2020 Rav4. I kind of like, at least until I get behind a really slow driver.  

#12 jetmechG550 New Member

There was another thread about this recently. Basically unless the ground is completely flat with 0 elevation changes, the cruise sucks  

#13 vonfatman New Member

thanks, now i don't feel so special! ;-)  

#14 Chucklehead Enjoy the ride! You only get one trip

Sooo. 2021 TRD ORP and couple things want to see if ya'll have experienced 1) when the cruise is on with the radar and it adjusts speed is anyone else hearing a 'clicking' sound from under the dash? None of my wife's RX350's (2) and now NX300 have I ever noticed any sound whatsoever. I assume it's all the same tech between the two - could be that Lexus sound has some sort of sound deadening and i'm just not hearing it. It's not that big of a deal all in all but still slightly annoying. 2) Also, driving yesterday in mild rain the dash light's up with two amber lights - a caution triangle, and what is supposed to be front radar - info center says "radar cruise control unavailable Clean Sensor" The sensor was not covered in anything except the rain water. No mud, excessive bugs -anything. It stayed that way for a couple miles, then went off and worked fine since. Found that odd. Oh and yeah - I do know that using cruise control in rain conditions can land my ass in a ditch....  

#15 LandCruiser I have Toyotas

Chucklehead said: ↑ Sooo. 2021 TRD ORP and couple things want to see if ya'll have experienced 1) when the cruise is on with the radar and it adjusts speed is anyone else hearing a 'clicking' sound from under the dash? None of my wife's RX350's (2) and now NX300 have I ever noticed any sound whatsoever. I assume it's all the same tech between the two - could be that Lexus sound has some sort of sound deadening and i'm just not hearing it. It's not that big of a deal all in all but still slightly annoying. 2) Also, driving yesterday in mild rain the dash light's up with two amber lights - a caution triangle, and what is supposed to be front radar - info center says "radar cruise control unavailable Clean Sensor" The sensor was not covered in anything except the rain water. No mud, excessive bugs -anything. It stayed that way for a couple miles, then went off and worked fine since. Found that odd. Oh and yeah - I do know that using cruise control in rain conditions can land my ass in a ditch.... Click to expand...

#16 BeavertonCommuter New Member

Can't we turn off the adaptive part after activating cruise control in one of the menus? I think there's a menu with the lane lines and the three horizontal bars with which you can select the sensitivity. Or maybe you can just adjust rather than deactivate?  

#17 TXKK626 New Member

BeavertonCommuter said: ↑ Can't we turn off the adaptive part after activating cruise control in one of the menus? I think there's a menu with the lane lines and the three horizontal bars with which you can select the sensitivity. Or maybe you can just adjust rather than deactivate? Click to expand...

#18 sduck New Member

No clicking behind the dash when using CC on my 2021 ORP.  

#19 Big B Out Exploring

ha, i guess I should read the manual. I didnt know you could deactivate the adaptive part.  

#20 jmkulbeth Have you tried turning it off and on again?

That clicking is likely the brakes. If the vehicle can't bleed off enough speed by coasting, it'll apply the brakes a bit. It happens when I'm using cruise and headed down a long hill. Or, if I'm approaching a vehicle ahead that's traveling much slower than expected.  

#21 Chucklehead Enjoy the ride! You only get one trip

Hmmm, So some hear clicking and some do not Is what it sounds like. i hear it anytime it activates brakes  

#22 canadian.bacon H9 halogen is the best led bulb

LandCruiser said: ↑ You’re not supposed to use adaptive cruise in the rain or in the snow. Click to expand...

#23 4runrr New Member

Chucklehead said: ↑ i hear it anytime it activates brakes Click to expand...

#24 Chucklehead Enjoy the ride! You only get one trip

4runrr said: ↑ Mine clicks (MY22 ORP) too when activating the brakes while using adaptive cruise...sounds like a relay of some sort in the steering column. Debating asking the dealership to replace parts if its not normal. Click to expand...

#25 semprenissart Mèfi

Mine clicks as well when it applies the brakes. RPMs are not higher on mine than when I don’t use CC although I don’t think I have set the adaptive CC above 75 mph so far. My wife’s 2021 Hyundai Elantra also has adaptive CC and it seems a bit smoother than the one on the 4R. For example, if a car turns into my lane in front of me but still goes somewhat fast, the Elantra will slow down gently and match the speed whereas the 4R kinda brakes abruptly to match the speed (I’m slightly exaggerating but I can definitely feel the difference). Also wish it would work all the way to a stop and keep going when the car ahead moves like it does on the Elantra. Overall I’m happy to have it though, it’s definitely nice during morning commute when there are a lot of cars but speed of traffic is still fast.  

#26 Chucklehead Enjoy the ride! You only get one trip

yep - the 4Runner is violent with both deceleration and acceleration - definitely an area where the engineers didn't massage it's behavior before release. I love the adaptive cruse control though - My wifes vehicle is Lexus SUV - it's adaptive cruse is very finely tuned. I love it regardless of the whiplash ..... LOL  

#27 Tmiesowicz New Member

Adaptive cruise control almost had me nailed by a semi truck...was so happy the day I found out how to disable it on the 4 runner & the rav4 here!  

#28 Trail Runnah New Member

semprenissart said: ↑ Mine clicks as well when it applies the brakes. RPMs are not higher on mine than when I don’t use CC although I don’t think I have set the adaptive CC above 75 mph so far. My wife’s 2021 Hyundai Elantra also has adaptive CC and it seems a bit smoother than the one on the 4R. For example, if a car turns into my lane in front of me but still goes somewhat fast, the Elantra will slow down gently and match the speed whereas the 4R kinda brakes abruptly to match the speed (I’m slightly exaggerating but I can definitely feel the difference). Also wish it would work all the way to a stop and keep going when the car ahead moves like it does on the Elantra. Overall I’m happy to have it though, it’s definitely nice during morning commute when there are a lot of cars but speed of traffic is still fast. Click to expand...

#29 Glenn Goodlett New Member

The clicking is a relay. If my CC is reved high in 4th, tapping the accelerator forces it to upshift. Also, I found that holding your foot ever so lightly on the accelerator in hilly terrain with CC on, the vehicle will not downshift attempting to slow you down to the CC set speed.  

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Ukraine Invasion Day 918: increased air defense activity

Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 27 and the morning of August 28.

Ukrainian F-16s have achieved their first aerial victories by shooting down Russian cruise missiles during air raids. The F-16s have been deployed for air-defense, equipped with AIM-9 and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles.

Russian officials continued to blame Ukraine for threatening nuclear security in Kursk Oblast, including by misrepresenting recent statements by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's after his August 27 visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). [82] 

The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles strikes against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast on the night of August 27.[75] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak reported that Russian forces struck Kryvyi Rih with an unspecified munition on the morning of August 28, injuring nine civilians.[76] www.understandingwar.org/...

Ukrainian forces successfully conducted one of the deepest drone attacks of the war, striking a Russian oil depot in Kirov Oblast over 1100km from Ukraine.   x Drones attacked a fuel storage facility in Kotelnych, Kirov Oblast. https://t.co/a2MRsS929r — The New Voice of Ukraine (@NewVoiceUkraine) August 29, 2024

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov and Kirov oblasts and reportedly conducted a drone strike against Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 27 to 28. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Directorate (GUR) and Special Operations Forces conducted a strike with Ukrainian-made drones against the Atlas oil depot in Rostov Oblast.[16] Suspilne reported that the Atlas oil depot is part of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and supplies Russian forces. Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that a drone strike caused a fire at a fuel depot in Kamensky Raion.[17] ... Suspilne also reported that GUR conducted a strike with Ukrainian-made drones against the "Zenit" oil depot near Kotelnich, Kirov Oblast — the first time Ukrainian drones have struck Kirov Oblast, which is more than 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[19] Suspilne stated that the "Zenit" oil depot provides fuel to the Russian military. Kirov Oblast Governor Alexander Sokolov claimed that Russian forces shot down two drones but that a third drone fell on a plant in Kotelnich and started a fire.[20] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that regional dispatch services stated that there was a small fire at the "Vyatka" Federal State Institution in Kotelnich that stores oil and refined products.[21] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone in Rossoshansky Raion and that falling drone debris caused a fire near explosive objects but there was no detonation.[22]...The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed eight drones over Voronezh Oblast and four over Rostov Oblast overnight.[24] Russian sources denied claims on August 28 that there was also a fire at the Ryazan State District Power Plant in Pronsky Raion, Ryazan Oblast, alleging that dry grass caught fire on August 27.[25]

www.understandingwar.org/...

Love this. Drone buster buses #NAFO https://t.co/yf8uHNe6Cj — KT "Special CIA Operation" (@KremlinTrolls) August 29, 2024

Francisco Serra-Martins says the strategy is already creating huge dilemmas for Moscow. He believes that with extra investment, it will turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favour.

Eighteen months ago, the company he co-founded, Terminal Autonomy, didn’t even exist. It is now producing more than a hundred AQ400 Scythe long-range drones a month, with a range of 750km (465 miles). The company also makes hundreds of shorter range AQ100 Bayonet drones a month, which can fly a few hundred kilometres.

The drones are made of wood and are being assembled in former furniture factories in Ukraine.

Mr Serra-Martins, a former Australian Army Royal Engineer, set up the company with his Ukrainian co-founder, backed by US finance. It is one of at least three companies now producing drones in Ukraine at scale.

He describes his drones as “basically flying furniture – we assemble it like Ikea”.

www.bbc.com/...

www.understandingwar.org/... Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied reports on August 28 that Russian conscripts are fighting in Kursk Oblast and called such reports a "distortion of reality," despite a plethora of evidence, including Russian evidence and admissions, to the contrary.[11] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov, and other Russian sources have notably acknowledged that Russian conscripts are fighting in Kursk Oblast.[12] Russian opposition outlet Horizontal 7x7 reported on August 28 that Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) removed a local Ivanovo Oblast news outlet's post claiming that the Russian military is sending Airborne Forces (VDV) conscripts to Kursk oblast.[13] Horizontal 7x7 noted that the Ivanovo Oblast Human Rights Ombudsman previously stated that a conscript from Ivanovo Oblast returned to Russia during a prisoner-of-war exchange.[14] Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported that the Russian military plans to deploy Russian conscripts from the 290th Missile Regiment (7th Missile Corps, 27th Missile Army, Strategic Missile Forces) and 2187th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Brigade) to Kursk Oblast.[15] Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's after his August 27 visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP).[82] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces stated that Ukraine does not pose a threat to the KNPP and that Ukrainian forces are taking a responsible approach to nuclear and radiation safety. www.understandingwar.org/...

Key Takeaways: Multiple reports from Western media indicate that the US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (UK) from allowing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 28 that the tempo of Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast has slowed and that Ukrainian forces are now attempting to dig in and hold select areas they recently seized. Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov and Kirov oblasts and reportedly conducted a drone strike against Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 27 to 28. The prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram project's continued meetings with Iraqi officials appear to be supporting Iranian-backed Iraqi efforts to gain greater control of their information and media space. Kremlin newswire TASS will soon open an office in Iran, supporting Moscow's efforts to deepen its partnership with Tehran. Russia's allies appear to be increasingly restricting their transactions with Russian companies and financial institutions amid ongoing concern about the impact of secondary US sanctions. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28. Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in the Siversk direction. Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, within Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and northeast of Vuhledar. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly supporting the creation of a new type of combat unit that will specialize in using and countering drones, unmanned systems, and other electronic equipment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - AUG 28, 2024 ■ 2nd highest number of engagements while casualties are down between days ■ 4th biggest drone losses to date; record 7-day drone losses ■ 🇺🇦 strikes include a hit on a UAV control station but otherwise relative few 🇺🇦 strikes See dashboard… pic.twitter.com/t7nuJTEm4S — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 (@ragnarbjartur) August 28, 2024

Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in the Siversk direction. Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, within Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and northeast of Vuhledar. www.understandingwar.org/... Geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions southwest of Ivano-Darivka. Russian forces attacked west of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and SE of Siversk near Vyimka, Ivano-Darivka, and Spirne on August 27 and 28. Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk). www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian forces recently advanced within Toretsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Toretsk along 91 Dyvizyi Street. www.understandingwar.org/... Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances SE of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Memryk as Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces have completely seized the settlement. www.understandingwar.org/... Russian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction (SW of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive operations along the T05024 Marinka-Vuhledar highway on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 27 shows Russian forces planting a flag in western Kostyantynivka.

more air to air combat. https://t.co/o67mlD3fZF pic.twitter.com/hcNciyA8xt — Andrew Perpetua (@AndrewPerpetua) August 28, 2024

We have modified our drones to destroy the reconnaissance UAVs of the russian invaders. We have taken down more than 100 of their aircraft 🔥 The video shows only 10% of what the military has shot down using these drones. Much more will be taken down 😈 You can support our… pic.twitter.com/YKo8U9R1kv — Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) August 28, 2024

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2024

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros

August 29, 2024, 8:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks. The Russian military command likely views both of these tactical efforts as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 29 that the most intense battles in the Pokrovsk direction are ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk), southwest of Hrodivka near Krasnyi Yar, within Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and immediately east of Selydove near Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). [1] ISW has observed Russian gains in these areas in recent days, but Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have made more significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction than what observed visually confirmed evidence currently supports. [2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and have begun small arms battles with Ukrainian forces in the town, although a Ukrainian military observer described the Russian forces operating in the town as sabotage and reconnaissance groups. [3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced in much of eastern Selydove and have reached the center of the town. [4] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the northeastern outskirts of Ukrainsk (southeast of Pokrovsk), seized Memryk (immediately northeast of Ukrainsk), and entered Halitsynivka (immediately east of Ukrainsk). [5]

Russian forces appear to be attempting to maintain their rate of advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line to quickly seize Myrnohrad and reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk . The reported Russian advance from Novohrodivka to Myrnohrad's outskirts likely aims to bypass what Russian sources have characterized as major Ukrainian defensive positions northwest and west of Hrodivka. [6] Russian forces recently enveloped Ukrainian positions southeast of Pokrovsk along the Karlivske Reservoir and prompted Ukrainian forces to withdraw from limited positions in the area. [7] Russian forces likely hope to achieve a similar effect by trying to envelop Ukrainian positions between Myrnohrad and Hrodivka, although it remains unclear if Russian forces can maintain their relatively rapid rate of advance through the comparatively larger town of Myrnohrad and its surroundings. Russian forces may attempt to fight directly through Ukrainian defensive positions along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line, despite the higher costs, in order to maintain their rate of advance and try to seize Myrnohrad more quickly. Russian efforts to seize Myrnohrad do not preclude Russian forces from advancing up to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, and the Russian military will likely pursue these tactical goals in tandem.

Reported Russian advances into Selydove and in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk likely aim to eliminate a relatively large Ukrainian salient on the southern edge of the wider Russian salient in the Pokrovsk direction that could threaten Russia's offensive effort in the area . Ukrainian positions east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to threaten the Russian rear in the Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command is likely concerned about Ukrainian counterattacks and fires disrupting Russian offensive efforts as Russian forces deploy logistics, artillery elements, and force concentrations westward into the forward part of the salient to support the intensified effort on Pokrovsk itself. The Russian military command also likely aims to expand and stabilize the southern flank of the Russian salient in the area in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from threatening the gains Russia has made in its 2024 offensive effort once Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction culminate. [8] The Russian salient is roughly 21 kilometers wide at its base from the Ukrainian salient east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line to Ukrainian positions north of Avdiivka along the H-20 (Avdiivka-Kostyantynivka) highway. Russian positions along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway southwest of Avdiivka are roughly 13 kilometers from Avdiivka, whereas the current line of Russian advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line is 30 kilometers from Avdiivka. Significant Ukrainian counterattacks from the base of the salient towards Avdiivka could threaten to encircle the Russian force grouping deployed forward in the salient, and the Russian military command likely aims to preempt this possibility by eliminating the Ukrainian salient on the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces likely hope that advances in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk will mutually support ongoing offensive operations west of Donetsk City and that offensive pressure from both directions will overwhelm Ukrainian forces or prompt Ukraine to withdraw from the limited positions in the rural open areas east of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk. The area north of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) is mainly comprised of open fields with limited cover or concealment from relatively few windbreaks, and Russian advances through this terrain would likely require significant successful mechanized assaults, which Russian forces have routinely struggled to conduct. [9] Russian forces have proven more adept at advancing from settlement to settlement with small infantry groups in the Pokrovsk direction, although it remains to be seen if Russian infantry groups can maintain their rate of advance as they approach Ukrainsk and Hirnyk. [10]

The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless, if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts. It remains unclear if the Russian military command intends for Russian forces to fight their way entirely through Pokrovsk in frontal urban combat, as they have through the smaller towns east and southeast of Pokrovsk, or aims to envelop or encircle the city as Russian forces previously attempted and failed to do against Bakhmut and Avdiivka. [11] The Russian military command's calculus about what preparatory actions are required for launching offensive operations on the city of Pokrovsk and how Russian forces will attempt to seize the city will likely depend on where Ukrainian forces decide to engage in significant defensive efforts. ISW will not speculate or forecast about future Ukrainian defensive efforts, however.

Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov publicly announced on August 29 the creation of the "BARS-Kursk" volunteer detachment and stated that the detachment's main function will be to "ensure security" in Kursk Oblast during the incursion and the re-settlement of border settlements in Kursk Oblast at an unspecified later date. [12] Smirnov stated that the detachment will cooperate with the Russian military and the counterterrorism operational headquarters — which are overseeing the ongoing Russian response in Kursk Oblast — and will also provide humanitarian support for residents of border settlements. Smirnov stated that volunteers will sign six-month contracts, undergo training, and receive any "necessary" weapons to perform their duties. Kursk Oblast officials published a recruitment ad for the detachment on August 24. [13] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported that Russian authorities are also forming "BARS-Bryansk" and "BARS-Belgorod" detachments and that the three detachments will support the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces. [14] Sarantsev estimated that the three detachments will be comprised of 4,921 volunteers in total.

The formation of these new BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) volunteer detachments is consistent with the Kremlin's apparent strategy to avoid re-deploying experienced or combat effective units engaged in fighting in the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions to Kursk Oblast due to concerns about slowing the tempo of Russian offensive operations in these higher priority directions. ISW previously noted that the Kremlin appears to be largely relying on conscripts and irregular forces redeployed from lower-priority directions in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. [15] Putin indicated a possible desire to continue relying on Russian volunteer servicemembers ( dobrovoltsy ) to address the Ukrainian incursion during his August 12 meeting with Russian military, security, and civilian officials by alluding to increased willingness to sign military service contracts among prospective dobrovoltsy . [16] Putin has consistently relied on volunteer and irregular formations to alleviate Russia's manpower constraints during the war and has avoided declaring general mobilization or another round of partial mobilization, both of which would be incredibly unpopular among Russian society. [17] Putin almost certainly remains extremely averse to declaring general mobilization and will likely continue to rely on irregular formations to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast until Russian offensive operations culminate in eastern Ukraine — at which point Putin may consider re-deploying more combat effective Russian forces from these directions to push Ukrainian units back across the border.

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Ukrainian forces have reached Nizhnyaya Parovaya (north of Sudzha) and advanced into the northwestern part of the settlement. [18] Additional geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Russian forces have likely recaptured Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) and eastern Korenevo. [19] Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Korenevo, Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo), Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo), Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo), Leonidovka (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya and Russkoye Porechnoye (both north of Sudzha), Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), and within Borki (southeast of Sudzha). [20] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to storm Korenevo to try to create a route to Rylsk (northwest of Korenevo). [21] Elements of the Russian "Kaskad" Operational Combat Tactical Formation (formerly of the Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], reportedly since subordinated to Rosgvardia) are reportedly fighting near Korenevo, though the Russian military command reportedly previously dissolved the formation. [22]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike. [23] An unnamed US official told Western media on August 29 that the jet crashed on August 26, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed a special commission to determine the cause of the crash. [24] The loss of equipment and aircraft during combat operations is not particularly novel, and it is expected that Ukraine will lose some Western-provided military equipment during combat. However, any loss among Ukraine's already limited allotment of Western-provided F-16s and trained pilots will have an outsized impact on Ukraine's ability to operate F-16s in the near term as part of its combined air defense umbrella or in an air-to-ground support role.

Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29. The Russian Investigative Committee charged Popov with embezzling money meant for the maintenance of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Patriot Park, a Russian military exhibition in Moscow. [25] Russian authorities did not disclose how much money Popov is suspected of embezzling personally but noted his case is connected to the large-scale fraud cases of the Patriot Park Head Vyacheslav Akhmedov and MoD Directorate for Innovative Development Deputy Head Major General Vladimir Shesterov, whom Russian authorities arrested on August 5 for embezzling over 40 million rubles (roughly $471,000). [26] Russian state news outlet TASS reported, citing Russian law enforcement sources, that Akhmedov testified against Popov. [27] A Russian source that has previously correctly preemptively reported several command changes within the Russian MoD assessed on August 5 that Popov could be the next high-ranking MoD official to be arrested. [28] Russian sources have previously theorized that the arrests of high-ranking MoD officials who served under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu may be part of an effort to "clean house" of Shoigu's affiliates within the MoD, which the sources claimed indicates that Shoigu's influence within the Kremlin may be declining. [29]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Kremlin press service announced on August 29 that Putin will travel to Mongolia on September 3, marking his first visit to a state party to the Rome Statute since the ICC issued the arrest warrant in March 2023 for Putin's role in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. [30] Putin notably avoided traveling to South Africa for a BRICS summit in August 2023 on similar grounds. [31] Putin's upcoming visit to Mongolia for negotiations on a "strategic partnership" suggests that Mongolian authorities likely will not enforce the ICC arrest warrant. [32] This visit also follows the annual “Selenga” bilateral Russian–Mongolian military exercises which began on August 15, further highlighting the strong bilateral relations between the two countries. [33] Russia has previously stated that it does not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction, and Russian officials have not yet commented on the possibility of Putin’s arrest in Mongolia. [34]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28. [35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that members of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces, Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery, causing a fire at the refinery's vertical reservoirs. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Zenit Oil Depot and a field artillery warehouse of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces in Voronezh Oblast and are clarifying the effect of these strikes. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck targets in Rostov, Kirov, and Voronezh oblasts. [36]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks.
• The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless, if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts.
• Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike.
• Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
• The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk on August 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. [37] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces operating in this direction are conducting assaults without armored vehicle support. [38] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated that the tempo of Russian offensive operations near Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City) is decreasing and that Russian forces are beginning to transition to defensive operations in the area but are still pressuring Ukrainian forces elsewhere on this front. [39] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City), and that elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) continued conducting a relief in place for elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City and east of Vovchansk). [40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and reportedly seized Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) amid continued fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Synkivka. [41] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Synkivka, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk). [42] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Tabaivka. [43] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Fighting continued near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stelmakhivka, Stepova Novoselivka, Kolisnykivka, and Kruhlyakivka and towards Lozova; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove and towards Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Torske; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on August 28 and 29. [44] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are attacking daily in small squad-sized assault groups of two to four people and have recently been using equipment after not using equipment for an unspecified amount of time. [45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne on August 28 and 29, but there were no changes to the frontline. [46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Bila Hora on August 28 and 29. [47] Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka. [48]

Russian forces recently advanced east of Toretsk and reportedly advanced further within eastern Toretsk on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Chapaieva Street in northwestern Druzhba (east of Toretsk). [49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters in eastern Toretsk on August 29, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [50] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba, south of Toretsk near Niu York and Nelipivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on August 28 and 29. [51]

Russian forces recently advanced east and southeast of Pokrovsk and continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak northwest of Svyrydonivka (east of Pokrovsk), northwards in fields east of Hordivka (east of Pokrovsk), up to the Novohrodivska Mine No. 1/3 in northwestern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and westward up to the Rosiia Mine slag heap north of Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). [52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further within northwestern Novohrodivka, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [53] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, Myrolubivka, and Hrodivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka, Marynivka, Mykhailivka, Selydove, Karlivka, Halitsynivka, and Ukrainsk on August 28 and 29. [54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka on August 29, but did not make any confirmed gains. [55] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka. [56]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations in the area on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields south of Pobieda. [57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northward past the T-05-09 highway west of Pavlivka and advanced along a front up to 2.5 kilometers wide and a kilometer deep northeast of Vuhledar. [58] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kostyantynivka, Vodyane, and Vuhledar on August 29. [59]

Russian and Ukrainian forces did not report fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 29.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29. [60] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that elements of the Russian 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both of the (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced north and east of Robotyne, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked in Robotyne, north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka, and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on August 28 and 29. [62]

Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on August 29 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian aerial and naval drone strike on Sevastopol and destroyed four aerial drones over the Black Sea and three naval drones in the area. [63] ISW has not observed additional evidence confirming this claim.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 28 to 29. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on August 29 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and two missiles of an unspecified type from airspace over Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and 74 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsk-Akhtarsk and Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast. [64] Oleshchuk reported that Ukranian forces downed two Kh-59/69 missiles and 60 Shahed drones over Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Sumy, and Donetsk oblasts and that the other 14 drones did not strike their intended targets.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on August 29 that a group of State Duma deputies submitted a bill proposing to allow accused criminals to sign military service contracts during mobilization, martial law, and wartime. [65] Russian State Duma State Building and Legislation Committee Head Pavel Krasheninnikov and Defense Committee Head Andrei Kartapolov and Russian Federation Council Constitutional Legislation and State Building Committee Head Andrei Klishas authored the bill and noted that the bill does not apply to criminals accused of violence against minors. The author's explanatory note states that the bill also allows for people with a criminal record, who have previously been imprisoned, or who have expunged criminal records to sign military service contracts. It is unclear how the proposed process is legally different from the current mechanisms through which Russia has had convict recruits sign military contracts, although the new law may no longer require the immediate pardons that the Kremlin appeared to be offering convicts in exchange for signing contracts. [66] Russian authorities have previously relied on penal and convict recruits to supplant Russia's manpower needs in Ukraine. [67]

Kremlin officials continue to project confidence about the state of Russia's domestic drone production capabilities. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov claimed on August 29 that Russia is developing its high-tech industry and that Russian drone production industry is moving towards using a higher percentage of import-substituted component parts and machine building equipment. [68] Russia has previously relied on the People's Republic of China (PRC) to evade sanctions and offset limitations in its domestic technology and production capacities, particularly regarding drones, and the PRC is set to limit the export of an unspecified number of radio and drone production components to Russia beginning on September 1. [69]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian officials recently intensified existing narratives attempting to deter the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine and prevent the West from lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons against military targets in Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Dmitri Polyansky recently doubled down on narratives accusing Ukraine and the West of escalating the war in Ukraine, spoiling peace negotiations, and permitting alleged Ukrainian war crimes in Kursk Oblast. [70] The Kremlin has routinely intensified these information operations during critical moments in Western policy discussions regarding support for Ukraine and is likely doing so now as part of its ongoing reflexive control campaign to coerce Western decision-makers into making policy decisions favorable to Russia. [71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces have not recorded any significant movement or increase of Belarusian forces near the Ukrainian border. Demchenko stated that Ukrainian forces are actively monitoring the state border with Belarus and are prepared to respond to any change in the situation. [72] Demchenko also stated that Ukrainian forces have erected engineering fortifications along the border to protect against possible Belarusian shelling and support defensive operations against a possible Belarusian attack into Ukraine. [73] ISW has previously assessed that a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine is unlikely due to Belarusian forces’ limited capabilities, low readiness, and the implications that such an incursion would have for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime domestically. [74]

Independent Belarusian monitoring group the Hajun Project reported on August 28 that Belarusian forces used a fixed wing aircraft to shoot down a Russian Shahed-136/131 drone that violated Belarusian airspace amid a large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine on the night of August 28 to 29. [75] Belarusian forces reportedly shot down the drone over Yelsk Raion, Gomel Oblast (which shares a border with northern Ukraine).

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02dAFUbguyJ6ti1Xx4GKu9JNNtteqK33sf7Gj4h8fBH2aqzLGy9YPnhyALJgZQsJial ; https://t.me/osirskiy/830 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/29/golovnokomanduvach-zsu-pobuvav-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-i-rozpoviv-pro-zhorstki-boyi/

[2] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/155760; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6583 ; https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/20294; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6582 ; https://t.me/officer_alex33/3599; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6580 ; https://www.facebook.com/151OMBr/videos/856130316682507/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6587 ; https://t.me/okspn/32537; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6589 ;

[3] https://t.me/dva_majors/50947 ; https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/13580 ; https://t.me/Donbas_Operativnyi/87930

[4] https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/13578; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27847 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135301 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58614 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58629 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19177 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135368 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135278;

[5] https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/13581 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27856 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135353 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58636

[6] https://t.me/rybar/63125 ; https://t.me/rybar/62816 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135195 ; https://t.me/zimovskyAL/31879 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58508 ; https://t.me/rybar/62969

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[12] https://t.me/gubernator_46/8169

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2024

[14] https://t.me/otukharkiv/975 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/29/okupanty-formuyut-novu-brygadu-dlya-pidtrymky-svoyih-syl-na-harkivshhyni/

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74856 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6891385

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012223

[18] https://t.me/napravleniespravedlivosti/283; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6584

[19] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1829143931310977133; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1829125774374310218 ; https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/184; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6588; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1828803134417957344

[20] https://t.me/rybar/63146; https://t.me/dva_majors/50947; https://t.me/wargonzo/21806 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50999 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/181972; https://t.me/rusich_army/16845; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14717 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14718

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/21805 ; https://t.me/mig41/36547

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021zRYaFyVCw5dQ8WhKpDc7vMnpQP2k18FWkMqqt2ZGeYZ44B4zu4gBCkem8KTeyDTl

[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukrainian-f-16-is-destroyed-in-crash-4f6d66f6?mod=breakingnews ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-f-16-jet-destroyed-crash-monday-wsj-reports-2024-08-29/ ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021zRYaFyVCw5dQ8WhKpDc7vMnpQP2k18FWkMqqt2ZGeYZ44B4zu4gBCkem8KTeyDTl

[25] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21719009; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/08/29/protiv-byvshego-zamministra-oborony-rf-pavla-popova-vozbudili-ugolovnoe-delo-o-moshennichestve; https://t.me/tass_agency/269157; https://t.me/tass_agency/269158; https://t.me/tass_agency/269160; https://t.me/tass_agency/269161

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024

[27] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21719431; https://t.me/tass_agency/269236

[28] https://t.me/arbat/1846 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072624 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[30] https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-mongolia-visit-icc-arrest-warrant-0b97ffa2e76f0809264d3d4872484d0c ; https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/08/29/putin-3-sentyabrya-posetit-mongoliyu-eta-strana-chlen-mus-i-formalno-dolzhna-ego-arestovat ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/69673 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/269221 ; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74957

[31] https://apnews.com/article/brics-xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-963108da4d389f8e1e7775c9e002b5f9

[32] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/08/29/putin-3-sentyabrya-posetit-mongoliyu-eta-strana-chlen-mus-i-formalno-dolzhna-ego-arestovat ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/69673

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024

[34] https://tass dot com/politics/1588237

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08qQM6whKRYFt6Sj7n1u7DKtVegsAYcXqkj5B9GU99bz2WdGmP4tXX3NjhBBhtvT2l ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/29/u-dvoh-oblastyah-na-rosiyi-goryat-naftobazy/

[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082824

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21807; https://t.me/mod_russia/42725 ;

[38] https://t.me/otukharkiv/971

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/28/otu-harkiv-rosiyany-zavodyat-dodatkovi-pidrozdily-z-leningradskoyi-oblasti/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[40] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2024 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/970

[41] https://x.com/AMKosint/status/1829054009682079984 ; https://t.me/divgen/53612; https://t.me/kupiansknash/11145; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6576

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14694; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27853; https://t.me/vrogov/17271 ;  https://t.me/mod_russia/42725

[43] https://t.me/rybar/63136

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl

[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/29/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vorozhu-taktyku-vypalenoyi-zemli-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl

[48] https://t.me/Sever_Z/5960 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10519

[49] https://t.me/ZSU_32_OMBR/110; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6573

[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75904 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27851

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl

[52] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/155760; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6583 ; https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/20294; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6582 ; https://t.me/officer_alex33/3599; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6580 ; https://www.facebook.com/151OMBr/videos/856130316682507/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6587 ; https://t.me/okspn/32537; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6589

[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27847

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl ; https://t.me/rybar/63125 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21807 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58629

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21807

[56] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12656

[57] https://t.me/odshbr79/314; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6572

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75904 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50949 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27849

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/21807

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot/26916

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl

[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/50947 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/7880 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/7881

[64] https://t.me/ComAFUA/404

[65] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21719509 ; https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/708911-8

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2024 ; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/clev58319pvo ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/59722

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024

[68] https://tass dot ru/politika/21715269

[69] https://meest dot cn/news/zmini-v-eksportnih-perevirkah-z-kitayu/ ; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/38142 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070324

[70] https://t.me/MID_Russia/44595 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/269044; https://t.me/tass_agency/269051; https://t.me/tass_agency/269064; https://t.me/MID_Russia/44565; https://t.me/MID_Russia/44566; https://t.me/tass_agency/269167 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/269176

[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024

[72] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/29/chy-ye-biloruski-vijska-na-kordoni-rozpovily-v-dpsu/

[73] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/29/bpla-ta-systemy-videosposterezhennya-yak-monitoryat-derzhrubizh-z-bilorussyu-rozpovily-prykordonnyky/

[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024

[75] https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1829051992112504990 ; https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1829051995648385519 ; https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1829051998592704870

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Wednesday, August 28, 2024

Russian offensive campaign assessment, august 28, 2024.

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

August 28, 2024, 7pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on August 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Multiple reports from Western media indicate that the US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (UK) from allowing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia.  The  Financial Times  (FT)   reported on August 27 that a source familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine's use of British and French Storm Shadows may require access to American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in areas where Russian forces are jamming the GPS signals that the missiles use for targeting.[1]  FT  reported that "well-placed" sources stated that the UK government sent a request to both the US and France earlier in summer 2024 to grant Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia, and French President Emmanuel Macron stated in May 2024 that Ukraine should be allowed to strike military sites in Russia from which Russian forces attack Ukraine. The  Telegraph  reported on August 27 that the UK government supports Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia with Storm Shadow missiles but that the missiles also use unspecified, classified American systems, whose use requires US permission.[2] The  Telegraph  stated in a since-deleted section of its original web article that the UK has not formally asked the US to allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadows to strike military targets within Russia, and that a White House source stated that the US is concerned about how the use of the missiles — even without US approval — could escalate the situation and draw the US into the war in Ukraine. The  Telegraph  reported that British Prime Minister Keir Starmer is taking a "consultative approach" to negotiations with the US and does not want to spark a disagreement over the issue. A source in the UK government reportedly stated that Russia is aware that Ukraine is asking for permission to strike military targets in Russia, so Russia has moved its "most critical assets" out of range of long-range missile systems. ISW continues to assess that although Russian forces have moved aircraft out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles, a significant number of Russian military objects remain within striking distance of Western weapons, which is allowing Russian forces to leverage sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia to support military operations against Ukraine.[3]

Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 28 that the tempo of Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast has slowed and that Ukrainian forces are now attempting to dig in and hold select areas they recently seized.  These milbloggers claimed the intensity of Ukrainian attacks within Kursk Oblast has decreased and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to hold and fortify select areas, amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations within the salient in Kursk Oblast.[4] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually stabilizing the situation in Kursk Oblast.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 28 showing Russian forces operating in eastern Korenevo indicates that Ukrainian forces likely recently withdrew from the area and that Russian forces regained some lost positions.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced past Vetreno, Kremyanskoye, and Sheptukhovka (all east and northeast of Korenevo); within eastern Nechayev and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (both northeast of Sudzha); and in the fields south of Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) cleared Spalnoye and that Russian forces have regained control of the settlement.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked east of Korenevo near Olgovka, north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka, and southeast of Sudzha near Borki.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to cross the international border near Zhuravlevka, Belgorod Oblast (southwest of Belgorod City and north of Kharkiv City).[10]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied reports on August 28 that Russian conscripts are fighting in Kursk Oblast and called such reports a "distortion of reality," despite a plethora of evidence, including Russian evidence and admissions, to the contrary.[11] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov, and other Russian sources have notably acknowledged that Russian conscripts are fighting in Kursk Oblast.[12] Russian opposition outlet  Horizontal 7x7  reported on August 28 that Kremlin-controlled social media site  VKontakte  (VK) removed a local Ivanovo Oblast news outlet's post claiming that the Russian military is sending Airborne Forces (VDV) conscripts to Kursk oblast.[13]  Horizontal 7x7  noted that the Ivanovo Oblast Human Rights Ombudsman previously stated that a conscript from Ivanovo Oblast returned to Russia during a prisoner-of-war exchange.[14] Russian opposition outlet  Mobilization News  reported that the Russian military plans to deploy Russian conscripts from the 290th Missile Regiment (7th Missile Corps, 27th Missile Army, Strategic Missile Forces) and 2187th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Brigade) to Kursk Oblast.[15]

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov and Kirov oblasts and reportedly conducted a drone strike against Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 27 to 28.  Ukrainian outlet  Suspilne  reported that sources within the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Directorate (GUR) and Special Operations Forces conducted a strike with Ukrainian-made drones against the Atlas oil depot in Rostov Oblast.[16]  Suspilne  reported that the Atlas oil depot is part of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and supplies Russian forces. Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that a drone strike caused a fire at a fuel depot in Kamensky Raion.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that wreckage of one of the downed drones fell near the oil depot, starting a fire in one of the technical buildings that spread to tanks containing flammable materials.[18]  Suspilne  also reported that GUR conducted a strike with Ukrainian-made drones against the "Zenit" oil depot near Kotelnich, Kirov Oblast — the first time Ukrainian drones have struck Kirov Oblast, which is more than 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[19]  Suspilne  stated that the "Zenit" oil depot provides fuel to the Russian military. Kirov Oblast Governor Alexander Sokolov claimed that Russian forces shot down two drones but that a third drone fell on a plant in Kotelnich and started a fire.[20] Russian state news outlet  RIA Novosti  reported that regional dispatch services stated that there was a small fire at the "Vyatka" Federal State Institution in Kotelnich that stores oil and refined products.[21] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone in Rossoshansky Raion and that falling drone debris caused a fire near explosive objects but there was no detonation.[22] A prominent milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were likely targeting the Minudobreniya agricultural chemical manufacturing plant south of Rossosh.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed eight drones over Voronezh Oblast and four over Rostov Oblast overnight.[24] Russian sources denied claims on August 28 that there was also a fire at the Ryazan State District Power Plant in Pronsky Raion, Ryazan Oblast, alleging that dry grass caught fire on August 27.[25]

The prominent Kremlin-linked  Rybar  Telegram project's continued meetings with Iraqi officials appear to be supporting Iranian-backed Iraqi efforts to gain greater control of their information and media space.  The  Rybar  team announced on August 28 that they met with the head of the media service of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Muhhanad al Aqaabi to discuss the role of foreign media organizations in Iraq's information environment.[26] Iran has notably co-opted the PMF and uses the organization to covertly enable its objectives in Iraq.[27]  Rybar  claimed that al Aqaabi spoke about Western media "propaganda" and information space manipulations during the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), particularly in 2015 to 2017, and praised Russian and Chinese media for reporting "impartially" on the war with ISIS. The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (controlled by Iranian-aligned factions within Iraq), has taken efforts over the past year to institute media and information space controls to stifle opposition voices.[28] Russia has undertaken its own multifaceted and multidomain efforts to similarly restrict and control domestic media and information space, including by co-opting well-known media voices such as the  Rybar  project.[29] Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors may seek to learn similar tactics from  Rybar  and other Russian sources as they continue efforts to crack down on opposition in the information space.

Kremlin newswire  TASS  will soon open an office in Iran, supporting Moscow's efforts to deepen its partnership with Tehran. [30]   TASS  Director General Andrei Kondrashov announced on August 28 that  TASS  plans to open a correspondent office in an unspecified location in Iran, adding to the 62 international offices that  TASS  has in 57 countries.[31] Russia and Iran have deepened their military, economic, financial, technical, industrial, and political control over the backdrop of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and  TASS 's expansion into Iran is likely intended in part to extend that cooperation into the media sphere.[32]  TASS 's expansion into Iran indicates growing media cooperation between Moscow and Tehran as well.

Russia's allies appear to be increasingly restricting their transactions with Russian companies and financial institutions amid ongoing concern about the impact of secondary US sanctions.  Kremlin-affiliated business outlet  Kommersant  reported on August 28 that "market participants" stated that banks in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), specifically in Dubai, began blocking payments for electronic components and equipment from Russian companies in August 2024.[33]  Kommersant  noted that the UAE has previously served as a payment point between Russian importers and electronics companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC), but that UAE banks are growing increasingly concerned about the risk of secondary sanctions. General Director of Russian Beshtau Electronics company Oleg Osipov confirmed to  Kommersant  that the issues with the banks in Dubai began roughly at the end of July to the beginning of August 2024 and claimed that the "PRC side" is initiating the blocking, but did not provide additional details. Another source told  Kommersant  that Russian companies previously paid for PRC electronics via banks in the UAE, although the goods themselves were immediately sent to Russia, and that the UAE banks were accepting a commission of only 1–3 percent on the transactions. UAE electronic company Jacky's Electronics founder Guseyn Imanov told  Kommersant  that he is also aware of issues with paying for consumer electronics and components through banks in Dubai and claimed that Russian companies have found an unspecified alternative way to conduct financial transactions at an increased commission. Russian and Kyrgyz media recently reported that at least 12 Kyrgyz commercial banks have suspended personal monetary transfers through Russian banks, including Sberbank, T-Bank, and MTS Bank, for an indefinite period.[34] Kyrgyzstan's National Bank told Kyrgyz outlet  24.kg  that commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan are taking measures to prevent negative consequences of international sanctions.[35] The US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a series of additional sanctions on August 23 against Russian and Chinese companies and actors accused of being involved in Russia's war effort and supporting Russia's defense industry.[36] Russia's allies appear to be responding more strongly to these more recent sanctions, and additional foreign banks may take steps to avoid the wider risk of secondary US sanctions in the coming weeks and months.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28.  The FSB detained six residents of the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28 for preparing sabotage and terrorist attacks on law enforcement officers and a Russian Orthodox church in Sunzha.[37] The FSB claimed that "supporters of international terrorist organizations" contacted one of the suspects, who received orders from a militant in Syria to attack the church.[38] The Investigative Committee for the Republic of Ingushetia opened a criminal case against three residents for participating in a terrorist organization and organizing a terrorist act and against three other locals for illegal possession of explosives.[39] ISW is unable to verify the FSB’s claims.

Key Takeaways:

• Multiple reports from Western media indicate that the US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (UK) from allowing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia.
• Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 28 that the tempo of Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast has slowed and that Ukrainian forces are now attempting to dig in and hold select areas they recently seized.
• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov and Kirov oblasts and reportedly conducted a drone strike against Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 27 to 28.
• The prominent Kremlin-linked  Rybar  Telegram project's continued meetings with Iraqi officials appear to be supporting Iranian-backed Iraqi efforts to gain greater control of their information and media space.
• Kremlin newswire  TASS  will soon open an office in Iran, supporting Moscow's efforts to deepen its partnership with Tehran.
• Russia's allies appear to be increasingly restricting their transactions with Russian companies and financial institutions amid ongoing concern about the impact of secondary US sanctions.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in the Siversk direction.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, within Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and northeast of Vuhledar.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly supporting the creation of a new type of combat unit that will specialize in using and countering drones, unmanned systems, and other electronic equipment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast   ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 28, but there were no confirmed changes the frontline. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 27 and 28.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Lyptsi and Vovchansk.[41] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces stated that Russian forces are preparing to move elements of the 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to forward positions near Hlyboke and are moving small groups of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC) near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City) to conduct logistical support and improve Russian communications systems.[42] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces also stated that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are preparing for assault operations in Vovchansk and that elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are conducting a relief in place for elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade near Tykhe (east of Vovchansk). ISW observed reports in early August 2024 that elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade were operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces have very few armored vehicles and are conducting assaults mostly on foot, motorcycles, or buggies.[44] The spokesperson stated that the intensity of Russian assaults in the Kharkiv direction has decreased since the start of the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast from up to 10 attacks per day to one or two attacks per day.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[46] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stelmakhivka, Stepova Novoselivka, Kolisnykivka, and Kruhlyakivka; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove, Nevske, and Makiivka; and west of Kreminna near Terny on August 27 and 28.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions southwest of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[48] Russian forces attacked west of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, Ivano-Darivka, and Spirne on August 27 and 28.[49] A Russian battalion commander from the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) operating in the Siversk direction told Kremlin newswire  TASS  in an August 28 article that Russian forces in the area first conduct artillery and first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and then conduct ground attacks in small infantry groups.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian state news outlet  RIA Novosti  claimed as of August 28 that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka and Kurdyumivka (both southeast of Chasiv Yar).[51] Russian forces attacked within eastern Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on August 27 and 28.[52]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter jet with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) near Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on August 28.[53] A representative of the Ukrainian brigade that downed the Russian Su-35 stated that the brigade is unable to confirm the status of the Russian crew or sufficiently conduct a battle damage assessment since the aircraft fell into Russian-occupied Ukraine.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced within Toretsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Toretsk along 91 Dyvizyi Street.[55] Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; southeast of Toretsk near Pivnichne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York and Nelipivka.[56]

Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances southeast of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Memryk (southeast of Pokrovsk) as Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces have completely seized the settlement.[57] Additional geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces have advanced southeast of Krasnyi Yar (also southeast of Pokrovsk) along Artema (Vyshneva) Street, which runs from Krasnyi Yar into Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have also advanced up to the Zhuravka River in central Hrodivka and reached the southern outskirts of Myrnohrad (due east of Pokrovsk) via Krasnyi Yar and Mykolaivka.[59] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are advancing in and near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) with support from the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are pushing along the railway in eastern Novohrodivka.[60] Russian and some Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have reached the eastern outskirts of Selydove (further southeast of Pokrovsk) and are advancing into the town following Ukrainian withdrawals from some positions in eastern Selydove.[61] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating in Selydove, but Mashovets reported on August 28 that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD), with support of elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division managed to break through towards Selydove from the north along the E50 Selydove-Karlivka route, which is consistent with recent Russian claims of Russian advances into Selydove via Mykhailivka (just east of Selydove).[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported a high rate of Russian attacks northeast, east, and southeast of Pokrovsk on August 27 and 28, and noted that over half of the Russian ground attacks in the Pokrovsk direction on August 28 were concentrated near Selydove and Novohrodivka.[63] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the Russian 589th and 433rd motorized rifle regiments (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) for their recent gains southeast of Pokrovsk.[64] Elements of the Russian "White Wolves" Battalion reportedly recently seized Komyshivka (about 20km southeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City on August 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka (both west of Donetsk City) on August 27 and 28.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive operations along the T05024 Marinka-Vuhledar highway on August 28. Geolocated footage published on August 27 shows Russian forces, reportedly of the Republic of Tatarstan volunteer-based 1st "Timer" Battalion of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC), planting a flag in western Kostyantynivka (northeast of Vuhledar) at a position along Shakhtarska Street, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the whole settlement.[67] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have completely seized Kostyantynivka, although one Russian milblogger noted that reports of Kostyantynivka's capture may be premature because some of the settlement remains a contested grey zone.[68] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have also crossed the T05024 road southwest of Vodyane (just northeast of Vuhledar), although ISW has not yet seen visual evidence of this claim.[69] Unspecified Russian security forces told Kremlin newswire  TASS  on August 28 that Russian forces have interdicted two main ground lines of communication (GLOCS) into Vuhledar, likely in reference to the T05024 and T0509 Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka road, both of which geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have crossed in limited areas.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian ground attacks northeast of Vuhledar near Kostyantynivka and Vodyane; near Vuhledar itself; and west of Vuhledar near Prechystivka.[71]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Velyka Novosilka on August 28.

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis  (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne, Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on August 27 and 28.[72] Elements of the Russian "Gnom" drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[73]

Positional engagements continued in the Kherson direction on August 27 and 28.[74]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign  (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 27 and the morning of August 28. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles strikes against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast on the night of August 27.[75] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak reported that Russian forces struck Kryvyi Rih with an unspecified munition on the morning of August 28, injuring nine civilians.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly supporting the creation of a new type of combat unit that will specialize in using and countering drones, unmanned systems, and other electronic equipment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin announced on August 28 that the Russian MoD is sponsoring the creation of the "BARS-SARMAT" Detachment, which Rogozin characterized as a volunteer detachment specializing in robotic electronic complexes and systems.[77] Rogozin encouraged his subscribers to amplify this news and stated that the detachment will test and use new drones, robotic systems, electronic reconnaissance and combat systems, counter-battery systems, and control and communications equipment in combat conditions. Rogozin stated that the detachment wants to recruit software developers, cybersecurity specialists, technicians, drone manufacturers and designers, and other specialists to support the detachment's work. Rogozin noted that the BARS-SARMAT Detachment also wants to recruit women as well as students from technical universities who are willing to take academic leave. Rogozin supervises several BARS units, including the Russian BARS-10 Battalion of the "Tsarskiye Volki" Brigade, and has recently advocated for the Russian MoD to encourage greater competition and variety among Russian technological innovation and drone production initiatives.[78] Several Russian sources amplified Rogozin's announcement on August 28 and noted that the "BARS-SARMAT" Detachment is forming in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and will provide feedback on the battlefield utility of new technology to the Russian MoD and Russian weapons developers.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger insinuated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems by flying their drones at higher altitudes. The milblogger amplified footage on August 28 purportedly showing a Russian drone operator flying a drone at an altitude of roughly 107-108 meters before diving the drone to strike a nearby Ukrainian artillery system.[80] The milblogger claimed that the drone operator was able to overcome Ukrainian EW interference by operating the drone at a high altitude and then quickly causing the drone to plummet and strike the Ukrainian system.

Russian milbloggers expressed concern on August 28 that recent Ukrainian efforts to target Russian reconnaissance drones with first-person view (FPV) drones will impact Russia's reconnaissance and strike capabilities in Ukraine.[81]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts  (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian officials continued to blame Ukraine for threatening nuclear security in Kursk Oblast, including by misrepresenting recent statements by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's after his August 27 visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP).[82] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces stated that Ukraine does not pose a threat to the KNPP and that Ukrainian forces are taking a responsible approach to nuclear and radiation safety.[83]

Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces responded to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's August 27 claim that Russia is reviewing its nuclear doctrine, noting that multiple high-ranking Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have voiced similar claims in recent months.[84] The Kharkiv Group of Forces stated that these Russian claims are meant to intimidate the West so that the West continues to restrict Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia with Western-provided weapons.

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on August 28 that Ukrainian calls for Belarus to withdraw forces from the international border area are "unacceptable" and that Belarus is simply fulfilling its obligations to help Russia defend itself from foreign attacks.[85] Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on August 27 that Belarusian forces are likely building up near the Ukrainian border in order to stretch and divert Ukrainian forces, consistent with ISW's August 26 assessment about the intentions of the reported Belarusian build-up.[86] ISW continues to assess that it is very unlikely that Belarus will invade Ukraine or enter the war on Russia's behalf.[87]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.ft.com/content/274d8994-c0fb-4f9b-8572-0ffb00b5de23

[2] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/08/27/uk-backs-ukraine-use-storm-shadow-missiles-russia/; https://archive dot ph/VQaIf

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082424; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms

[4] https://t.me/smotri_z/34020; https://t.me/sashakots/48661 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16823 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50878

[5] https://t.me/sashakots/48660; https://t.me/epoddubny/20879 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14650

[6] https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/183; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1828803134417957344; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1828803389154803745

[7] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27835

[8] https://t.me/rusich_army/16823 ; https://t.me/rybar/63113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50878

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/42686 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50878 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16823 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21790

[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/50856

[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/268942

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081924

[13] https://t.me/IvanovoNovosti/25483 ; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/39454 ; https://t.me/astrapress/62952

[14] https://t.me/horizontal_russia/39454 ; https://t.me/IvanovoNovosti/25483 ; https://t.me/astrapress/62952

[15] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19990

[16] https://suspilne dot media/822993-ekstrenne-zasidanna-radi-ukraina-nato-ukraina-stvorila-vlasnu-balisticnu-raketu-917-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1724834944&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[17] https://t.me/golubev_vu/1507

[18] https://t.me/rybar/63112

[19] https://suspilne dot media/823573-gur-mo-vperse-vrazilo-dronami-naftobazu-u-kirovskij-oblasti-rf-dzerela/

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/268952

[21] https://ria dot ru/20240828/kotelnich-1968954199.html

[22] https://t.me/gusev_36/2692

[23] https://t.me/rybar/63112

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/42668

[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/50885; https://t.me/tass_agency/268966

[26] https://t.me/rybar/63111

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[28] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-resistance-factions-shift-major-crackdown-media-spaces; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-cmc-draft-regulation-digital-content-iraq

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061124

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/268855

[31] https://rg dot ru/2024/08/28/novosti-so-znakom-kachestva.html; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21703425

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071324

[33] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6919850?from=top_main_3

[34] https://www.forbes dot ru/finansy/519570-perevody-cerez-rossijskie-banki-prekratili-osusestvlat-12-bankov-kirgizii ; https://24 dot kg/ekonomika/302630_sanktsii_udarili_poperevodam_kakie_bankikr_vse_esche_otpravlyayut_dengi_vrossiyu_/ ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/finance/news/2024/08/19/1056584-kirgizskii-mbank ; https://t.me/tass_agency/267816 ; https://m.business-gazeta dot ru/news/645383 ;

[35] https://24 dot kg/ekonomika/302630_sanktsii_udarili_poperevodam_kakie_bankikr_vse_esche_otpravlyayut_dengi_vrossiyu_/

[36] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240823

[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/268913; https://t.me/tass_agency/268906; https://t.me/tass_agency/268903

[38] https://t.me/tass_agency/268909

[39] https://ingushetia.sledcom dot ru/news/item/1909904/

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l; https://t.me/wargonzo/21791

[41] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11273

[42] https://t.me/otukharkiv/941

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/28/u-dshv-zsu-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-harkivshhyni/

[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/28/u-dshv-zsu-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-harkivshhyni/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6565; https://www.facebook.com/RDTerritorialDefenseForcesNorth/videos/544194034604539/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l

[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1828734164188713195; https://t.me/BattalionSIGIRIYA/87

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l

[50] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21704051

[51] https://ria dot ru/20240828/spetsoperatsiya-1968946235.html

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14635 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21791

[53] https://t.me/Pavliuk_KSV/5569 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/980 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/28/lyczari-rozkryly-podrobyczi-zbyttya-rosijskogo-su-25/

[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/28/lyczari-rozkryly-podrobyczi-zbyttya-rosijskogo-su-25/

[55] https://t.me/skalabatalion/246; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1828863805620695520

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21791

[57] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1828729455960809718; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/181731; https://t.me/dva_majors/50856; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14656; https://t.me/wargonzo/21791; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75827; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75837 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135227 ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/276743 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/129399; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19153

[58] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1828735672586219550; https://x.com/vosintt/status/1828741998884409714; https://www.facebook.com/71brigade/videos/499752789440715/?mibextid=jmPrMh&rdid=m3nShiGF0hDjtjGQ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6562

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58605; https://t.me/motopatriot/26829; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58609; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135242; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27829; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27824

[60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2144

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/268925; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75794; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75827; https://t.me/dva_majors/50848; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75839 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135227; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27824; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27839; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58597; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135242

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2144

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l

[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/42664

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75834 ; https://t.me/btr80/19894 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135245

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l

[67] https://t.me/krylataya_pehota_z/1877; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6559; ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10499

[68] https://t.me/krylataya_pehota_z/1877; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6559; https://t.me/rybar/63104; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18858; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14632; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27821; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75805; https://x.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1828753966454472744; https://t.me/motopatriot/26838; https://t.me/motopatriot/26839

[69] https://t.me/rybar/63104

[70] https://t.me/tass_agency/268889

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql

[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hvYvDy7aPcowjP6Tsya7omtQuMduZK4BxRneMhrCoeGS3QAt7hqV1imtW95tbpMhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/10501

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qUUyqRxjK1MKSTh5hjknbf7xGDXZtrB7U2H3AL28KceNo6rYyFVjy4RaN3ia8QU9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZQNnW7qYx5knBHTJJEMhKw5Pv7uasPG8q3kCjpbFVJCyBTcvZbRe1rmXEpKtL8Sql ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Qq9EbNXg5qVq7Fx1RzSwwBBHN4LKfCmCivGE9yu6kRAN7CaGxVvsXdwhjPWFnsqTl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11146

[75] https://t.me/police_kh_region/30583 ; https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/41155

[76] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/15592 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/15593 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/15594 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/15597

[77] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6348

[78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024 ; https://ria dot ru/20221111/rogozin-1830870951.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080223 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24 ; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2024

[79] https://t.me/tass_agency/268936 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50871 ; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3803 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50881

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/10501

[81] https://t.me/bayraktar1070/2636 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17101 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/129407

[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/268819; https://t.me/tass_agency/268890; https://t.me/tass_agency/268911 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/268921; https://t.me/tass_agency/268943

[83] https://t.me/otukharkiv/942

[84] https://t.me/otukharkiv/960; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/66cdbaea9a7947f9c51ad6ca

[85] https://tass dot ru/politika/21708225 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/269011

[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/27/navishho-bilorus-postijno-musuye-temu-kordonu-poyasnyly-v-dpsu/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082624

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024